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Background to the Study
This study is the product of the concern of the
Malaysian Government and a number of institutions associated with
management training, in particular the Malaysian Institute of
Management, to improve the standard of management in the country
through more effective management development, and so to further the
economic development of the country. It grew out of a request made
by the Malaysian Government for a survey of management development
needs, a request put to the Ministry of Overseas Development, and
financed by the British Government as part of its special aid
programme to Malaysia."^ This original survey was conducted under the
supervision of Professor N.C. Hunt of Edinburgh University during
1972. It was similar in approach to a previous study supervised by
2
him of management development needs in Kenya. In both cases the
studies were essentially action-oriented and intended to result in
concrete recommendations to the respective governments regarding
management development needs in the private sector and the provision
3
of management training facilities. (Appendix A gives the terms of
reference of the original Malaysian study). In 1976 a follow-up
study was conducted to try and assess the degree and direction of
change in management development practices. This part of the study
was financed by the School of Oriental and African Studies, and a
1 Reference: Malaysian File (18) dim. JPM. 25282
2 L.M. Whitlock, "Management Development in Kenya."
3 The original survey resulted in the following report to
the Malaysian Government: N.C. Hunt and B.M. Conway,
"Management Development Needs in West Malaysia."
1
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a summary of the findings was also submitted to the Malaysian
Government.^
While this thesis reflects the essentially practical
orientation of the research it also goes considerably further than
either of the two reports in its endeavour to interpret that data
taking into consideration the conceptual issues involved in
management development, and the complex of historical, social,
economic and political factors that make up the context in which it
takes place and determine the managerial needs and constraints of the
companies on the one hand, and the human resources to be developed on
the other.
Aim and Structure of the Thesis
The aim of this thesis is to examine the practice of
management development in a developing country - here, Peninsular
Malaysia - in order to gain an understanding of the specific problems
it poses. It will start by looking at what is meant by management
development, what the process involves and the assumptions upon which
it is based. One of the basic points this thesis seeks to illustrate
is that one cannot fully understand the problems companies face in
developing their managerial staff without an appreciation of the
whole range of factors that impinge upon the situation. For this
reason special attention has been paid to the historical, political,
social and economic context of management development in Malaysia.
The study will examine the way in which companies are actually
developing their managerial staff, and coping with the special needs
and constraints in the Malaysian situation. Finally, it will
endeavour to draw conclusions regarding the practice of management
development in Malaysia and the principal areas where it may be
improved.




The terms 'manager' and 'management development' will be
discussed in the next chapter; however, at this point some
clarification is necessary. 'Manager' is being used to refer to the
individual who is responsible for the day to day running of a
business enterprise as well as planning for the future and initiating
new ventures. That is 'manager' is not being used as synonymous with
'entrepreneur', rather the entrepreneurial role is one of the
possible components of the managerial role. This implies a measure
of specialization of function. Management development is, therefore,
considered largely in the context of the company with a number of
managers on its staff. As will be seen it was not possible to use a
precise cut off point in terms of size of managerial cadre in
defining the sample of companies under study and there are some very
small companies in the study. However, in the case of these
companies, management development needs to be interpreted in its
broader sense and the approach modified to suit their particular
needs and constraints.
Some clarification of Malaysian terminology is necessary. A
number of terms are used to refer to the territory of West Malaysia,
or Peninsular Malaysia, as it has recently come to be called.
Historically, it was referred to as the Malay peninsula and came to
be known as British Malaya. The states with which Britain had the
closest relationship (and were the focus of economic development in
the peninsula) were the Federated Malay States (FMS); the others were
termed the Unfederated Malay States (UFMS). The coastal ports of
Singapore, Penang and Malacca were administered separately and they
are referred to as the Straits Settlements (SS). After World War II
the Federated and Unfederated States were brought together with
Penang and Malacca (but leaving out Singapore) into the
Federation of Malaya, and then in 1963 this territory combined with
Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah to form the federation of Malaysia. In
1965, Singapore was ejected and became a separate republic. The
country now consists of East Malaysia - Sarawak and Sabah - and
Peninsular, or West, Malaysia. All these various terms for the
peninsula will be used according to the historical period.
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Communal groupings are very important on the Malaysian
scene. Frequent reference will be made to the three main 'races' of
Malaysia - the Malays, Chinese and Indians. The term 'race' is used
here in the way it is in the country, that is, to mean ethnic origin.
It does not necessarily imply that the person is not a Malaysian
citizen. Before the War immigrants from China and India were not
considered citizens but in the post-war period most Chinese and
Indians have been able to acquire citizenship. The Malays are
considered to be the indigenous race and are frequently referred to
as 'bumiputras' meaning 'sons of the soil'. The term 'bumiputra'
also applies to the other indig enous communities of Malaysia - the
small tribes of the interior of the peninsula and the tribes of
Sarawak and Sabah. However, since the Malays are the most numerous
of these groups, the term 'bumiputra' tends to be used as synonymous
with 'Malay' .
The currency of Malaysia is the 'Ringgit' or Malaysian
dollar. It is this currency that will be used throughout and the
symbol, $, should be taken to mean Malaysian dollar unless otherwise
indicated.
A final word about abbreviations. Abbreviations for such
things as the Third Malaysia Plan, TMP, and Government bodies such as
the Federal Industrial Development Agency, FIDA, are very commonly
used in Malaysia and accordingly these shortened forms have been
adopted in this thesis. The full title will always be given the





The aim of this chapter is to explore what is meant by
management development and the assumptions upon which it is based.
This analysis is intended to put subsequent chapters on the
background to, and practice of, management development in Malaysia
into the context of general theory and thought on the subject.
THE MEANING, APPLICABILITY AND IMPORTANCE OF MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT
First, it is appropriate to define some of the terms that
are going to be used throughout this study. The term 'management'
refers to the activities of both entrepreneurship and business
administration. This covers, on the one hand, the risk-taking
inherent in innovation, and on the other, the forecasting, planning,
organizing, co-ordinating and controlling of administration. It is a
decision-making process aimed at the optimum utilisation of available
resources. The 'manager' carries out both these sets of tasks. In
fact, in a very large organization it may be primarily those of
business administration, whereas in a smaller organization the
innovative role would be a very important part of his activities.
The larger the organization the more likely the manager is to
specialize in a very few functions, whereas in a very small
organization there may be only one manager who performs all these
functions.
'Management development' refers to the totality of various
processes that go into developing a man's capacity as a manager and
providing for the managerial needs of the firm both in the present
and in the future. It is the process whereby an individual with a
good background education and ability is developed into a successful
manager. Its aim is to maximise his potential as a manager and to
enable him to realise that potential to the fullest. Therefore, it
is concerned with all levels of management from the most junior to
the most senior. It subsumes 'management education' which involves
6
the study of the theoretical concepts behind the various subjects
that make up the field of management - economics, industrial
relations, organizational behaviour, and so on; and 'management
training' which is the practical, job-related part of developing
managers. Management education is characteristically provided by
institutions of higher education - universities, business schools and
polytechnics; management training may occur on the job, at
in-company training courses or external training centres.
Management development implies an approach to the
development of managerial staff based on the belief that good
managers can be developed and must be developed to meet the growing
needs of the organization. It is an approach that has been evolved
in response particularly to the needs of large dynamic American
organizations but has appeared to have logical application to
companies no matter what their size, industry or geographic location.
It reflects a scientific approach to management that characterizes
much of recent American thinking. As Drucker puts it
...the manager can improve his performance in all
areas of management including the managing of a
business, through the systematic study of
principles, the acquisition of organized knowledge
and the systematic analysis of his own performance
in all areas o| his work and job and on all levels
of management.
The use of sophisticated technology and of mass production
have both emphasized the need for an analytical approach:
Mass production...requires management trained in
analytical thinking, in scheduling and in planning.
New-style mass production as well as process
production requires management trained in seeing a
business as a whple in conceptual synthesis and in
decision making.
Since this analytical approach is related to a technology that it has
been suggested is universal, it is argued that the need for such an
approach is universal:
Technology - like the language of mathematics - is
universal. By obeying laws of reason and science
1 P.F. Drucker, The Practice of Management, p. 21.
2 ibid. , p. 134.
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science, men of varying cultural and ideological
positions presumably can agree on the best machine
design or most desirable production system. For the
most part, this technology is Western. The hardware
of Europe and the United States is spreading over
the globe so that the machine tended by the U.S.
worker may be more modern, but is not fundamentally
different from that of the Indian or Brazilian
worker's where industrialization is just taking
place. Demands for attention, response and care
exerted by the machines ^on their human operators are
essentially identical.
Given that most modern technological developments originated in the
West, and it is this that has engendered the current emphasis on an
analytical approach to management, this concept has tended to be
influenced by Western cultural assumptions. Nonetheless, there is
considerable support for the universal applicability of this
approach.
This argument is based on two main planks. The first is
that American management thought and practice is the most advanced in
the field and therefore can provide a model for other countries which
will assist them to manage their businesses more effectively and so
4
attain faster growth. The second has already been mentioned: the
spread of technology around the world which, it is suggested, demands
a specific approach by those who use it. Technology in this case may
be said to refer not just to the industrial hardware but to the
systems of modern commerce and industry as well. Because of the
educational and attitudinal requirements of modern industry, people
around the world are gradually casting aside traditional ways and are
acquiring an increasingly similar set of values and attitudes. This
is termed the convergence theory.
One of the major instruments of convergence is the
multinational company which carries a philosophy and practice of
3 R.A. Webber, "Convergence or Divergence?" Culture and
Management. T.D. Weinshall, ed. p. 41.
4 See for example A.R. Negandhi, "A Cross-Cultural Comparative
Study of Management," OMEGA, 2, 6 (1974), pp. 785-791.
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management developed in the West throughout the developing world.
The ubiquity and size of these companies, not to mention the status
and financial rewards attached to employment by them, gives them a
potentially powerful influence both on their own managers and within
the business community in which they operate. Brooke and Remmers
write:
National differences as such are becoming less
significant. It is the fact of international
operations that isimportant rather than particular
local differences.
Many developing countries are following the Western model
of development, particularly through industrialization, importing
Western technology, expertise and management. If one takes Malaysia,
not only are there a number of European companies dating from
colonial times but the Government has made a very clear choice of
industrial development along Western lines and of attracting foreign
investment to do this.
However, whether convergence is taking place or not, at
present there is a great deal of divergence between the business
environment in a developing country and that in a Western country, a
divergence that is immediately evident to the observer. On the basis
of his research Winston Oberg states:
My own experience in international management leads
me to believe that cultural differences from one
country to another are more significant than many
writers now appear to recognize. For example, the
skills that lead to managerial success in the U.S.
may not be^the skills that lead to managerial success
in Brazil.
Gonzalez and McMillan have come to a similar conclusion; they write,
"this unique American (management) philosophy is a special case,
limited in applicability to economies and cultures comparable to that
5 Michael Z. Brooke and H.L. Remmers, The Strategy of the
Multinational Enterprise, p. 292.
6 Winston Oberg, "Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Management
Principles," Journal of the Academy of Management, IV, 2,
(June 1963), pp. 129-30.
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of the United States."'' Not only are present cultural differences
real and significant but Oberg's research sheds doubt on the validity
of the convergence theory itself. If the skills required for
successful management in a developing country are different from
those in the West, this suggests that cultural and contextual
differences play a more important role in determining the type of
management required than technology. Management consists both in the
management of work and the management of people; while the former
may revolve around a technology which may be said to be neutral, the
latter is complex and culture-bound.
The key importance of this human element in economic
development has been given increasing recognition. Frederick
Harbison states:
...human resources - not capital, nor income, nor
material resources - constitute the ultimate basis
for the wealth of nations. Capital and natural
resources are passive factors of production, human
beings are the active agents who accumulate capital,
exploit natural resources, build social, economic
and political organizations, and carry forward
national development. Clearly, a country which is
unable to develop the skills and knowledge of its
people and to utilize them effectively in the
national economy will be unable to develop anything
else.
Walter Elkan expresses a similar view when he refers to human capital
as "the most important part of a country's capital stock".
However, human capital alone is not enough; it is the quality of
human capital that is the most relevant factor, that is, in this
case, its suitability to the requirements of a modern economy.
Education is the principal way of improving the quality of
human capital and the relationship between economic growth and
7 Richard F. Gonzalez and Claude McMillan, Jr., "The Universality
of American Management Philosophy," Journal of the Academy of
Management, (April 1961), p. 33.
8 F.H. Harbison, Human Resources as the Wealth of Nations, p. 3.
9 W. Elkan, An Introduction to Development Economics, p. 21. Also
see F.H. Harbison and C.A. Myers, Education, Manpower and
Economic Growth, pp. 13-14.
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education in general, has frequently been explored. Harbison and
Myers came to the conclusion that, "there is a high correlation and
presumably some casual relation between enrolments in education (and
hence investment in education) and a country's level of economic
development as expressed by GNP per capita." *
They found that the relationship between
education and economic growth appeared to be one of the chicken and
the egg:
Investments in education certainly contribute to
economic growth, but it is also obvious that
economic growth makes it possible for nations to
invest in educational development. Education,
therefore, is both t^e seed and the flower of
economic development.
The same relationship appears to apply with management development:
it costs time and money, and therefore a firm must be doing well to
implement it, yet it is also a factor contributing to a firm's
continuing growth and success.
Nonetheless, in the context of a developing country
striving to modernize and industrialize, the development of dynamic
management is a necessity. Throughout most of the developing world
there is a shortage of managers equipped to handle the new forms of
commerce and industry that are springing up. Some means of
developing new managers is thus essential.
What then are the elements involved in management
development? There is the end product - the competent manager,
although since it is a continual process, it would perhaps be better
to identify the end product as the maximization of the managerial
potential of the individual. Then there is the organization within
which he works and which defines the particular combination of skills
he will require. Third, there is the environment in which that
organization functions - its constraints, demands, and opportunities.
10 F.H. Harbison and C.A. Myers, Education, Manpower and Economic
Growth, p. 185.
11 F.H. Harbison, and C.A. Myers, Manpower and Education, pp.x-xi.
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Fourth, there is the individual, the man or woman who is going to be
developed as a manager, the person with all his potentialities, his
attitudes and values. And finally, there is the actual process of
management development itself, the process whereby the new recruit is
developed into the competent manager.
THE MANAGER
The skills required of a manager can be categorized into
three main groups - entrepreneurial skills, administrative skills,
and technical skills. Entrepreneurial skills involve innovation and
risk-taking. "It is the carrying out of new combinations that
12
constitutes the entrepreneur," states Schumpeter. Elaborating a
little, he brings in such characteristics as initiative, authority
13
and foresight. On the other hand, Schumpeter entirely rejects
14
risk-taking as part of the entrepreneurial function. This is
because he defines risk-taking narrowly as the taking of financial
risk, and it is the role of the capitalist to take those risks.
However, it is now common to give a wider definition to risk-taking
and to attribute to the entrepreneur the taking of risks on behalf of
his shareholders. Entrepreneurial skills form the dynamic,
thrusting, innovative end of a manager's activities. They are not
demanded equally of all managers, indeed in very large corporations
it is often administrative and technical skills that are the most
crucial. Likewise, they are required more in certain functions than
in others: more in sales and marketing for instance, than in, say,
accounting or the technical side of a company's activities.
The administrative skills required of a manager are related
to the day to day running of the company's activities. They may
12 Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development, p.75.
13 loc. cit.
14 ibid., p. 137.
15 It may be that the entrepreneur is at the same time the
capitalist but these are two separate roles and it is as
capitalist alone that he takes risks.
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involve the planning, organizing, co-ordinating and controlling of
activities - the operation of the system of management, and
consequent management of the people involved. McClelland has found
no experimental evidence that a person with entrepreneurial skills
has superior administrative skills. ^ They appear to be completely
separate.
Finally, there are the technical skills required of a
manager and here technical is being used in a very broad sense.
These obviously vary tremendously according to industry and function
and change over time as the field changes.
THE ORGANIZATION
The type of organization and the part of that organization
into which a manager fits will determine the skills he is required to
use. It will also determine the degree to which his potential can be
realized, and the feasibility of certain types of management
training. Some of the factors that may influence a firm's management
requirements and its approach to management development are the level
of technology, the level of capital intensity, the industry, its
size, the growth rate, whether it is a new or old company, whether it
is a local company or a multinational, whether family-owned or a
public company and the management philosophy or climate.
Obviously, a number of these factors are closely
interconnected - the level of technology, for instance, with capital
intensiveness. In a high technology industry where there is constant
updating as the technology becomes more sophisticated a high degree
of training is demanded of its managers. Such a level of technology
also affects the design of the organization and the management
climate. Likewise, a labour intensive industry will have a
completely different structure and the skills required will emphasise
the management of labour rather than of sophisticated machinery.
There are obvious differences in the managerial requirements
of different industries. Managers in sales and marketing have
17 D.C. McClelland, The Achieving Society, p. 238.
13
been shown to have the highest achievement motivation, therefore one
might conclude that this is a requirement for managers in this
18
sector. The size of a firm will influence the range of skills any
single manager is required to have and the degree of
responsibility - the trend being toward increasing specialization in
the larger firms and toward decentralization of managerial
decision-making. It will also influence the feasibility of different
types of training. The age and rate of growth of a company will also
have a powerful influence on its management climate and the
opportunities for the growth and development of its managers.
The subsidiary of a multinational company in a developing
country not only brings with it the management philosophy and style
of its parent company, and has the resources of its parent in terms
of technical and management know-how and training, but tends to
operate according to a system laid down by and controlled by its
parent. Brooke and Remmers found in the case of multinational
companies,
...that a decentralizing ideology masks a
centralizing reality. The factors which create this
situation include an increasing integration of
multinational operations, an increasing speed of
technological change, and the rapid development of
global techp^ques, strategies and information
collection.
20
It may be argued, as Negandhi does , that the parent
companies are in touch with the best possible management practices
and that by imparting them to their subsidiaries they ensure their
maximum effectiveness. In his research he found that of 126
industrial firms in seven countries, 70 per cent of the U.S.
subsidiaries, as compared to 33 per cent of local firms were
undertaking comprehensive planning and that, "a greater number of
U.S. subsidiaries have paid considerable attention to the selection,
18 D.C. McClelland, op. cit., p. 267.
19 M.Z. Brooke and H.L. Remmers, op.cit. , p.285.
20 A.R. Negandhi, op. cit., p. 786 and p. 790.
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promotion, training and development aspect of their employees' . In
comparing American and local companies in Mexico Toyne found that the
company had a strong influence on managers' attitudes which varied
about such things as leadership, the sharing of information and
participation according to whether they were employed by a Mexican
company or a subsidiary of an American company operating in Mexico.
22
Toyne concluded that "management beliefs and needs are potentially
transferable, and MNC's can act as tranfer agents. However, the
"success" of this transfer process is dependent on certain industry
and company characteristics," and here he cites capital intensity,
research and development intensity, marketing intensity and company
23
size measured in annual sales.
Locally-owned companies obviously reflect the culture in
which they function and in many cases, a specific subculture. This
is particularly true in the Malaysian context where there has been a
tendency for particular clan or dialect groups to specialize in a
particular trade or industry . In this case, the style and manner of
management tends to be dictated by the subculture of the group.
Within the locally-owned group, there is also a marked
difference between the private and public company. Private companies
tend to be family-owned and run along patrimonial lines. Harbison
and Myers describe patrimonial management as,
...business management in which ownership, major
policy-making decisions, and a significant
proportion of other jobs in the hierarchy are held
by members of an extended family. The effective
decision-making authority is centred in the family,
and the goals of the enterprise are oriented towards
the interests and the aspirations of the family.
21 ibid., p. 789.
22 Brian Toyne, "Host Country Managers of Multinational Firms: an
Evaluation of Variables Affecting their Managerial Thinking
Patterns," Journal of International Business Studies, 7, 1,
(1976), pp. 39-55.
23 B. Toyne, op. cit., pp. 42-43.
24 F.H. Harbison and C.A. Myers, "Management as a Class,"
Culture and Management. T.D. Weinshall, ed. p. 216.
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They go on to say,
Patrimonial management may be especially effective in
the early stages of industrial development... If the
key members of the family dynasty are competent,
well-educated and diligent, patrimonial management
may be quite dynamic.
Not only does such a system put a great deal of responsibility in the
hands of a very few, and therefore the quality of their management
skills is vital, but the natural constraints of such a system are
such that is is only really well suited to "small and relatively
simple organizations such as retail and wholesale trade, craft
industries, and small or medium-sized industrial plants". A
company reaches a point where a change in the management structure is
essential. One thinks of Henry Ford who tried to run the giant Ford
Motor Company in a totally centralized paternal way and in so doing
27
brought it to the brink of collapse.
By 'going public' a company accepts a change from this
family-based pattern to professional management by technically
qualified managers, and a division of responsibilities. This is a
very major step that enables the company to expand past the
constraints imposed by family management. It affects the pattern of
decision-making which tends to move from the extreme centralization
of patrimonial management towards a decentralized pattern. It also
brings with it a need for more specialized and sophisticated training
and development of managers.
THE ENVIRONMENT
The economic, political, social and cultural milieu in
which a company operates is bound to impinge on the management of the
company. The overall health of the economy and the company's
position in relation to that will determine whether corporate belts




ibid. , p. 217.
ibid. , p. 218.
P.F. Drucker, op. cit. , pp. 141-144.
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too often considered 'non-essential', are left to fall by the wayside
or whether the company is booming and a great deal of effort is being
put into the recruitment and development of management staff. The
level of competition will affect profit margins, the degree of
efficiency demanded, and again the attitude towards training.
The influence of political factors is particularly
important to companies in developing countries. The most basic
prerequisite is political stability. The tensions of political life
can disrupt commercial activity and may be felt within the company,
influencing the way individuals react to each other, and so the
smooth running of the organization. Third World governments are
becoming increasingly involved in the economy, and the threat of
nationalization, and/or antagonistic government attitudes towards
private industry influence company attitudes. Whereas in colonial
times foreign firms tended to bring the bulk of their management
cadre from the metropolitan country, and considered the manager's
basic education and culture sufficent qualification for management,
today there is usually tight control of expatriate appointments and
frequently governments place conditions on foreign companies related,
amongst other things, to the training and development of local
managers and rapid localization of managerial posts. This means that
there is a political and commercial necessity for companies to
concern themselves with management development. Companies will be
expected to conform to the government's development priorities in
respect to such things as job creation, regional distribution and the
reservation of particular industries to nationals.
The financial, legal and physical infrastructure of a
country are important constraints on commercial activity as are
social factors - the general level of education, the local employment
situation, the existence of well qualified management recruits, and
local attitudes towards business. Companies require people with a
good basic education who can be trained for management, "trainable
28
people", as Harbison puts it, therefore the extent, quality and
28 F.H. Harbison, op.cit. , p. 84.
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orientation of the national educational system is important. It is
also important that it be in harmony with the needs of the economy,
so that it produces the technicians, engineers, and chemists industry
needs and not an overabundance of, say, arts graduates who cannot
readily be absorbed into the economy. The existence of an indigenous
entrepreneurial group is significant in that it is often from this
29
group that the new industrialists come. Migrant groups who in
many cases form a dynamic entrepreneurial class may be present in the
population and can perform a very valuable function in the
30
development of the economy. However, in some cases there are
tensions between these groups and the indigenous population which may
make it difficult for their skills and aptitudes to be put to best
use. Where there is no indigenous entrepreneurial talent a company
is faced with a very difficult task in developing managers, indeed it
may be advised to consider restructuring the company to maximise the
effect of the limited managerial skills that are available. Another
factor to contend with in developing countries is that managerial
skills are usually in such short supply that it becomes a sellers'
market. This puts both the price and the job aspirations of the
seller up to such an extent that it may be impossible to employ him
at a level where he can be most useful.
The response of the indigenous culture to a modern economy
and the compatibility of traditional values with modern commercial
values will affect the attitudes and values of managerial recruits.
Where these are completely at odds with those of the company some
means of coming to terms with the situation, of adapting the company
to the culture, needs to be found. Linguistic requirements may be
significant in developing countries, so many of which are
29 See for example the writing of Gustav Papanak on Pakistan, e.g
G.F. Papanak, "The Development of Entrepreneurship," American
Economic Review, vol. 52, no. 2 (1962), pp. 46-58.
30 As we shall see the Chinese in Malaya are one of the best
examples of such immigrant groups; others include the Indians in
East Africa, the Lebanese in West Africa and the Chinese and
Indians in the West Indies.
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multi-lingual, and the language in which business is conducted
obviously places constraints on recruitment.
In assessing the influence of local conditions upon
management development one must not forget the existence of local
training facilities. These may range from a Business School to a
Productivity Centre to the training programmes of private consultancy
firms. Where there is this sort of institutional support it can play
an important role in 'selling* the idea of management development,
not to mention providing needed training opportunities.
This has not by any means been a comprehensive list of the
local factors which influence the management and so management
development activities of a company but gives some indication of the
importance and complexity of the context in which companies operate
and some of the ways it may impinge upon them.
THE INDIVIDUAL
Argyris claims that "...all organizations... originate with
the attempt to fuse two basic components, the individual and the
31
formal organization," that is, they seek to align the needs and
goals of the individual with those of the company so that in
performing his functions as manager he not only fulfils himself as an
individual but also the aims of the company. The company can only
begin to do so if it knows what the needs, goals and abilities of the
individual concerned are. Because of this close relationship between
the individual and the role of manager it may well be that in Western
companies parts of the role have been built around the characteristic
entrepreneurial or managerial personality to be found in the West.
One might say the role has been defined by a specific personality
type. This not only creates problems when it comes to fitting a
non-Western personality into the role, but makes it difficult to
identify fully the pure requirements of the role.
31 C. Argyris, Personality and Organisation, p. 20.
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Education and Training
The level of the individual's educational attainment has
32
been found to be important in management. Hubert, referring to
European industry, stated: "A reasonably high and generalized
standard of basic education would appear a prerequisite for the
33
success of management education." Toyne found that one product of
education is that it "probably enhances the transferability of
U.S.-oriented beliefs about leadership and the management techniques
employed," however, "it may result in relatively greater need
34
dissatisfaction." This is to be explained by the fact that
education is a form of acculturation, and higher education, in
particular, tends to be oriented towards the West. However, in
acculturating students to the West it may separate them from their
own culture and hence their dissatisfaction. From the point of view
of Western firms operating in developing countries this very
acculturation makes the university graduate better suited to its
approach to management, or, put another way, minimizes the companies'
need to adapt to the local culture.
However, it is not always a university-type training that
is required. Douglas McGregor claims,
...there is not much evidence that high
academic achievement represents a necessary
characteristic for industrial leadership.
There may be a positive correlation, but it is
not large enough t^ provide a basis for a
recruitment policy.
32 For instance, Dunning attributes part of the success of U.S.
subsidiaries in Britain over their British competitors to the
better formal qualifications of the executives. J.H. Dunning,
"U.S. Subsidiaries in Britain and their U.K. competitors,"
Business Ratios, 1 (1966), pp. 16-18.
33 A.C. Hubert, "Small and Medium-sized Enterprises and Management
Training - the European Experience," Promotion of Small and
Medium-sized Firms in Developing Countries Through Collective
Actions. OECD. p. 82.
34 B. Toyne, op. cit. , p. 50.
35 D. McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, p. 186.
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It is the practical problem-solving orientation that is of most
importance to industry. Hanna Papanek's work in Pakistan shows that
formal education under the British proved to be a critical factor for
entry into the new occupations in the professions, government service
and the more modern sectors of commerce and industry, that is, for
36
professionals, administrators and managers; but not for
entrepreneurs. "In a group of twenty-five very large firms surveyed
slightly over half of the current heads of firms said they had
between zero and ten years of schooling while nearly 90 per cent of
37
their fathers were in this category." The vital skills for these
early entrepreneurs were literacy, some arithmetic and a little
English. For most companies with professional management sound basic
education is now an essential prerequisite. Ideally, this education
should emphasize problem-solving, linguistic and quantitative skills,
and, for much of management, technical skills.
Personality and Enterprise
The personality, the psychological make-up of the
individual, is a crucial factor in management and the most
culture-bound. David McClelland and his colleagues have done a great
deal of interesting work exploring the dimensions of the
entreprenurial personality. The vital element in this he has
identified as a need for achievement (n Achievement) and this has
38
appeared to remain constant over a wide range of cultures. He
worked out ways of measuring this need in literature and folk tales
and found it to be closely associated with a more rapid rate of
economic growth both in free enterprise and in Communist countries as
well as in societies just beginning to make contact with modern
36 H. Papanek, "Pakistan's Big Businessmen: Muslim Separatism,
Entrepreneurship, and Partial Modernisation," Economic
Development and Cultural Change, XXI, 1 (1972), p. 3-4.
37 H. Papanek, op. cit. , p. 23.
38 D.C. McClelland, op. cit., p. 70.
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technological society. Bradburn and Berlew, testing McClelland's
hypothesis, came to the conclusion that, "there i£>, in fact, a high
correspondence of n Achievement level and success in
entrepreneurial-type activities, but no relationship between n
40
Achievement and success in bureaucratic jobs." McClelland
differentiates between the ambitious individual who is high in need
for achievement and makes a natural entrepreneur, and the efficient,
conscientious, forward-looking individual who makes a natural
administrator, (he, in fact, uses the term 'manager', but that gives
a rather narrow definition to the role of manager.) ^ Exploring the
need for achievement further, McClelland found it was strongly
related to three characteristics - "the desire for personal
responsibility, the tendency to set moderate achievement goals, and
the need for concrete feedback of results". The entrepreneurial type
he found characteristically self-confident and optimistic, though not
42
in a hopelessly unrealistic way. However, not all people with a
high need for achievement go into entrepreneurial careers, rather
they prefer high-prestige careers and opt for the highest level
career within their reach. Since in many countries business is not
particularly highly regarded, this is not opted for by upper class
youths. On the other hand, business provides the greatest social
mobility of any occupation, and therefore, is highly attractive to
43low and middle status groups.
Frequently entrepreneurs come from groups marginal to, and
disadvantaged by, the mainstream of society. They may be immigrants,
and/or from a particular religious or ethnic group. The result is
39 D.C. McClelland, op. cit. , p. 105 and p. 202.
40 N.M. Bradburn and D.E. Berlew, "Need for Achievement and English
Industrial Growth," Economic Development and Cultural Change,
10, 1 (October 1961), p. 9.
41 D.C. McClelland, op. cit. , p. 227.
42 ibid., p. 223.
43 ibid., pp. 249-250.
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tension between the group and the rest of society and social cohesion
within the group. As a result of their marginality, many
opportunities within society are closed to them; business is one of
the few options that are accessible.
Another aspect of marginality is that it frees them from
some of the constraints of tradition and they are thus far more
receptive to change, more willing to take risks and more willing to
move to where opportunities lie. Not only is the entrepreneur not
confined by tradition but, according to Schumpeter,
...his characteristic task - theoretically as
well as historically - consists precisely in
breaking up old, and creating new, tradition.
Although this applies primarily to his economic
action, it also extends to the jn^ral, cultural,
and social consequences of it.
Innovation requires deviation from given social norms. This was
particularly noteworthy in the financial field since the Muslim
religion considers a preoccupation with material things and the
practice of 'usury' to be wrong. In the case of immigrant groups
these attitudes may be combined with particular skills in business,
which may not be possessed, or possessed to the same degree by the
local population.
Such groups cope with their marginality by the social
cohesion within the entrepreneurial group, reinforced by sanctions
45
applied to those who violate the community's code of behaviour.
This provides them with a network of business contacts. It
establishes an individual's creditworthiness when he wants to borrow
and provides employment when he seeks a job. All social contacts go
on within the group. His loyalty and commitment are thus assured and
the bonds of the community constantly reinforced. Generally such
44 J.A. Schumpeter, op. cit., p. 92.
45 See for instance G.F. Papanek's description of Pakistani
entrepreneurs in Pakistan's Development, Social Goals and
Private Incentives, p. 44. The Chinese in Malaysia also form a
socially and commercial cohesive entrepreneurial group.
23
groups extend trust only to friends and relatives and not to
strangers from outside the group of whom they may be intensely
suspicious.^ They are thus largely self-contained and
self-sufficient.
Entrepreneurial groups tend to be characterized by
frugality, and hard work. Where they come from poor countries they
are used to a low standard of living and so have lived very frugally,
managing to put something aside no matter how small their earnings
47
gradually building up capital and reinvesting their savings. Bauer
and Yamey mention another reason why immigrants have a propensity to
save, "because they tend to value the security provided by the
48
possession of capital". They also suggest that one reason why
immigrant groups such as the Chinese have succeeded so well abroad
while the same has not been the case at home, is that "the most
enterprising and ambitious section of the population tend to
49
emigrate." Gustav Papanek, studying the transition of traders into
industry in Pakistan, found that it was men with "foresight, ability
and ruthlessness" who were able to overcome the obstacles and make
the transition. ^
The new industrialists in a developing economy tend to come
51
largely from the old entrepreneurial groups. That is, factors
46 These attitudes are often manifested by Chinese Malaysians, see
p. 281 and the main reason why Chinese are reluctant to bring
Malays into their business.
47 The Chinese in Malaysia are a good example of this.
48 P.T. Bauer and B.S. Yamey, The Economics of Under-Developed
Countries. p. 109.
49 ibid., p. 108.
50 G.F. Papanek, "The Development of Entrepreneurship," American
Economic Review, 52, 2 (1962), p. 54.
51 Berna found that, in South India, "Men of trading background
constitute the largest single occupational group" establishing
medium-scale manufacturing enterprises in the light engineering
industries; Papanek, that, in Pakistan, "if firms owned by
E/n continued
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such as experience in a business setting, knowledge about
entrepreneurship, supportive social attitudes towards it, and
availability of capital are likely to be important. Indeed Berna
found such "access to capital, possession of business experience, and
technical knowledge" to be the single most important factors in the
52
emergence of industrial entrepreneurs in modern India.
The question of how entrepreneurial ability is developed
and transmitted remains. McClelland has related it to child-rearing
practices and the formative influence of the family. He found that
three factors were important in producing a high need for achievement
in the child - "parents' high standards of achievement, warmth and
encouragement, and a father who is not dominating and
53
authoritarian." He suggests that one of the reasons for the
decline of great civilizations might be that with success parents can
relinquish child rearing to servants who are overly indulgent, and
keep them dependent too long and so they lose their need for
foreigners, Hindus, and government and semi-government agencies
are excluded..., over half of industry is controlled by five
small "communities" (quasi-castes) of traditional traders,
totalling about one-half per cent of the population...On the
other hand, groups which had little experience with trade or
industry,..., are underrepresented among industrialists to a
startling extent"; and Alexander, that, in Turkey, "traders were
the most important single group from which industrialists were
recruited." In Malaysia, the same trend is evident: the Chinese
who are the principal entrepreneurial group are adapting their
interests to include industrial entrepreneurship. J.J. Berna,
"Patterns of Entrepreneurship in South India," Economic
Development and Cultural Change, 7 (1958/59), p. 346.
G.F. Papanek, "The Development of Entrepreneurship," op. cit. ,
p. 54.
A.P. Alexander, "Industrial Entrepreneurship in Turkey: Origins
and Growth," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 8 (I960),
p. 351.
52 J.J. Berna, op. cit., p. 358.
53 D.C. McClelland, "Business Drive and National Achievement,"
Harvard Business Review, 40, 4 (July-August 1962), p. 110.
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achievement.^^
He suggests that polygamy "promotes mother-son households
in which'the son stays dependent on the mother longer and does not
get the strong emphasis on independent achievement needed to develop
u 55
n Achievement. He advocates that one way of improving the
achievement orientation of children would to be promote the legal and
56
social rights of women. The exact relationship between
child-rearing and entrepreneurial ability is not clear-cut but
McClelland's findings do provide some interesting possibilities.
As has been noted, entrepreneurship is only one part of the
package of skills that make up the role of the manager although one
of the most interesting because it is so enigmatic. One thing does
seem to be clear about it, and that is that it is extremely
difficult, if not impossible, given our current level of
understanding on the subject, to train people to be entrepreneurs.
Whilst it is entirely possible to train people to be managers,
entrepreneurs appear to undergo a complex cultural and social
formation during their childhood which cannot readily be reproduced
by a company training programme.
A set of assumptions about managers that needs to be
considered is that related to motivation. Motivation involves the
factors that influence the individual's response to economic
activity. As Herbert Simon has put it, "Individuals are willing to
accept organization membership when their activity in the
organization contributes, directly or indirectly, to their own
54 D.C. McClelland, The Achieving Society, p. 128. Over-indulgent
child-rearing practices have been a characteristic of Malay
society and this may be one explanation for the disinclination
of Malays to enter commerce in the past.
55 ibid. , p. 374. Gustav Papanek, on the other hand, found no
characteristic pattern of child-rearing amongst the
entrepreneurs he studied in Pakistan. G.F. Papanek, "The
Development of Entrepreneurship,"
op. cit., p. 55.
56 D.C. McClelland, "The Achievement Motive in Economic Growth,"
Industrialization and Society. B.F. Hoselitz and W.E. Moore,
eds . , p. 93.
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personal goals. A certain amount of theory has grown up around
this that makes assumptions about the individuals that aspire to be
culture free. These are important because they affect the philosophy
of management applied particularly by foreign firms in developing
countries. Maslow has proposed a hierarchy of needs ranging from
physical, to safety, to social needs, to the need for self-esteem and
58
independence, and finally, the need for self-actualization.
Theoretically, as each succeeding need in this hierarchy is filled
the next need becomes predominant in motivating the individual. This
fits in with the findings of Hertzberg and his colleagues that
physical conditions (his hygienic factors) - such as adverse work
conditions, salary, etc. - had the power to dissatisfy whereas
favourable conditions could not motivate; rather it was factors
related to self-actualization - "achievement, recognition, work
itself, responsibility and advancement" - that proved to motivate
-i 59
people.
This brings one back to the need to identify what the goals
of the individual are in another culture. Also, if one takes
Maslow's hierarchy as given, it may well be that managers in a
developing country are at a different place on the hierarchy than
those in the West, ^ or that personal fulfilment consists of
different types of things. For instance, Heller found prestige and
authority to be the major motivating factors amongst managers
57 H.A. Simon, Administrative Behaviour, p. 110. Reprinted in
Management and Motivation. V.H. Vroom and E.L. Deci, eds., p.
23.
58 A.H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation,"
Psychological Review, 50 (1943), pp. 370-396. Reprinted in
Management and Motivation. V.H. Vroom and E.L. Deci, eds., pp.
27-33.
59 F. Hertzberg, Work and the Nature of Man. Chap. 6. Reprinted as
"The Motivation-Hygiene Theory," Management and Motivation. V.H.
Vroom and E.L. Deci, eds., pp. 86-90.
60 See K. Davis, "Managing Productivity in Developing Countries,"
Management International, 4, 2 (1964), pp. 71-72.
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in Latin American countries, and these findings are supported by
those of Everett Hagan. On the other hand, the cross-cultural study
conducted by Haire, Ghiselli and Porter found the needs for
self-actualization and autonomy to be the most important throughout
62
the countries of Europe as well as in Japan. Another factor to be
considered is Vroom's finding that "performance is low at low levels
of motivation, and reaches it maximum point under moderate levels of
motivation, and then drops off again under high level of
6 3
motivation". It is conceivable that a firm might unwittingly
provide excessive motivation in a developing country. Lawler and
Porter have proposed that the two key variables that combine with
effort in determining performance are abilities, including
64
personality traits, and role perception. both of which are, of
course, strongly influenced by culture. Douglas McGregor has added
to this framework what he calls Theory X and Theory Y. Theory X he
identifies as the traditional view of direction and control and is
based on the assumption that man dislikes work, must be coerced into
doing it and directed in the execution of it. Theory X fails, he
says, "because direction and control are useless methods of
motivating people whose physiological and safety needs are reasonably
satisfied and whose social, egoistic and self-fulfilment needs are
61 F.A. Heller, "Motivational Analysis of Managers in Developing
Countries," Management Development for Industrializing
Countries. G. Morello andM.B. Brodie, eds., pp. 95-99.
62 M. Haire et al., "Cultural Patterns in the Role of Manager,"
Industrial Relations, (February 1963), p. 111.
63 V.H. Vroom, Work and Motivation, pp. 204-209. Reprinted as "The
Nature of the Relationship between Motivation and Performance,"
Management and Motivation. V.H. Vroom and E.L. Deci, eds., p.
229.
64 E.E. Lawler III and L. Porter, "Antecedent Attitudes of
Effective Managerial Performance," Organizational
Behavior and Human Performance, 2 (1967) pp. 122-142. Reprinted
in Management and Motivation. V.H. Vroom and E.L. Deci, eds.,
p. 261.
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predominant."^ In contrast to this, Theory Y is based on the
integration of personal and organizational goals. It states that
work is a natural form of human activity, that man will exercise self
direction in working towards objectives to which he is committed,
that he seeks responsibility, and that "commitment to objectives is a
66
function of the rewards associated with their achievement." The
most important aspect of Theory Y is McGregor's central principle of
integration: "the creation of conditions such that the members of the
organization can achieve their own goals best by directing their
efforts towards the success of the enterprise.*^ This reflects
Argyris's view and echoes E. Wight Bakke's concept of the "fusion
process" which he defined as:
...the simultaneous operation of the socializing
process by which the organization seeks to make an
agent of the individual for the achievement of
organizational objectives, and of the personalizing
process by which the individual seeks to make an
agency of the organization for the achievement of his
personal objectives. It is the simultaneous attempt
of the organization to make over the individual in
its own image, and of the ind^idual to make over the
organization in his own image.
This discussion of some of the main theories of motivation
has highlighted the key role it plays in the development of managers.
A highly motivated manager, given an opportunity through careful
management development to fulfil his own best abilities, will be a
great asset to his company. It also restresses the point that the
company needs to understand its managers - their aims, needs,
aptitudes, aspirations - to know how to develop them and so to get
the best performance from them; and that the company needs to be
prepared to adapt to the cultural context of its managers, for
65 D. McGregor, "The Human Side of Enterprise," Adventures in
Thought and Action, pp. 23-30. Reprinted in Management and
Motivation. V.H. Vroom and E.L. Deci, eds., p. 31.
66 D. McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, pp. 47-48.
67 ibid. , p. 49.
68 E.W. Bakke, The Fusion Process, p. 5.
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fusion, "is a process in the course of which both the organization
69
and the individual are modified."
Social and Cultural Factors
"Personality cannot be understood without taking into
account the culture in which the personality exists. Culture and
personality are inseparable. It is actually not culture and
personality, but culture in personality and personality in
culture."^ Therefore, having looked at some of the theory related
to personality, now some of the social and cultural factors that may
be important in forming that personality will be examined.
The attitudes and values of a culture that are conducive to
economic growth are sometimes termed those of 'modern man', and those
that do not fit in, described as 'peasant'. An economy is the
product of, and in turn creates, a supportive cultural framework. If
the economy is characterized by high technology industry and
large-scale commerce it will be associated with a very different
culture to that of a fairly simple subsistence economy. ^ Although
these are two ends of a continuum, it may help to clarify the
problems by discussing the extremes. Countries striving to develop,
immediately face the problem of the incompatibility of the industrial
framework they build and the attitudes and values of their people.
These attitudes and values comprise a system of beliefs, feelings,
moral and social codes, a system which may be infused with a
72
sacredness which makes adherence to them of immense importance.
69 loc, cit.
70 C. Argyris, op. cit. , p. 48.
71 Raymond Firth defines a peasant economy as "a system of
small-scale producers, with a simple technology and equipment,
often relying primarily for their subsistence on what they
themselves produce." Elements of Social Organization. 3rd
edition, p. 87.
72 See E. Shil's discussion of this in "The Concentration and
Dispersion of Charisma," World Politics, 11 (1958), pp. 1-19.
30
The culture that supports a peasant economy has a strong
influence on work and work relationships and on the attitude towards
time. Work involves providing food and shelter for the family, it
therefore has a natural dignity and importance attached to it. Men
may work together to accomplish this but it is done in a spirit of
mutual co-operation and respect and on the basis of close personal
and/or family ties. The usual activity of simple farming tends to be
seasonally regulated; what is more, in a peasant economy there is no
need to provide for more than the family's wants possibly with a
little extra to barter in the market place. In a fertile land such
as Malaysia, this leaves a great deal of free time for the
cultivation of social relationships. A highly developed social and
ethical code which lays down patterns of obligation and respect based
on age, family, political and religious status tends to characterize
peasant culture. In a subsistence economy there is little scope for
entrepreneurial activities and so the values that support it do not
develop.
Hoselitz has identified this sort of peasant culture as
emphasising ascribed status, a division of tasks according to that
status, and diffuse work relationships linked to family, political,
social and religious relationships. In a developed economy the
reverse is the case: people are accorded status according to what
they have achieved; all jobs are, theoretically, open to everyone,
and work relationships are, formally, limited to the labour
* 73contract.
To the peasant, work is integrated into his daily life, his
personal and social relationships, and his religion. He is generally
tied to his village and his life has an unchangeable, God-given
quality about it. "The very concept of change is absent."
When change does come to a country the village is usually
the last to be influenced, the last stronghold of tradition and
73 B.F. Hoselitz, "Main Concepts in the Analysis of the Social
Implications of Technical Change," Industrialization and
Society. B.F. Hoselitz and W.E. Moore, eds. , pp. 18-19.
74 J.H. Kautsky, The Political Consequences of Modernization, p.
34.
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traditional values. So a dual society may develop - with a modern
economy and culture in the cities and a traditional one in the
countryside and villages. As a result when the young man moves from
the village to town he enters what amounts to a totally different
culture. This sudden transition from the security and predictability
of traditional life to the strangeness and alienness of city life may
be difficult and painful. All his values will be turned upside
75
down. The dignity of work will be reduced to the cash value of
labour. The constant change and pace of modern society is a problem
and industrial discipline difficult to accept after the flexibility
of agricultural life.
In the light of the difficulties experienced in adapting to
industry and the resentment created by the existence of a dual
society, one rich, the other poor, there may be a groundswell of
antagonism towards business activity in general, and towards foreign
enterprise in particular,^ which is seen as a threat to their
culture and society, and as consuming their country's wealth.
'Modern man' has been described as having a "mobile
sensibility so adaptive to change that rearrangement of the
self-system is its distinctive mode."'''' He is characterized by a
capacity for empathy, which enables him to see himself in the other
person's situation and so be able to adapt to new roles and new
75 Munshi Abdullah described this feeling well when he wrote of the
changes that had come about in Singapore with the arrival of
trade and commerce:
"Since Singapore has become a settlement, grasshoppers have
become eagles, bed-bugs tortoises and earthworms serpents.
These strange happenings have their origin in material
wealth and position."
Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir, The Hikayat Abdullah. Translated by
A.H. Hill. p. 30.
76 See, for instance, J.A. Lee, "Developing Managers in Developing
Countries," Harvard Business Review, 46, 6 (1968), p. 60.
77 D. Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, p. 49.
32
78
relationships. Kautsky describes a modern society as,
...characterized by a belief in the rational and
scientific control of man's physical and social
environment, and the application of technology to
that end. One could thus define the^process of
modernization as one of secularization...
The change in attitude towards the control of nature and the
environment, and the acceptance of the scientific method as the means
to knowledge about the world, together strike a blow at traditional
attitudes the abandonment of which would appear to be necessary to
80
the achievement of a modern society. Where it exists, the group
that seems to find the transition least difficult is the
entrepreneurial one because of its natural mobility and orientation
to change.
This discussion has stressed the extremes and it should be
noted that there is the full range of possibilities in between the
two poles of 'peasant' and 'modern'. The profound cultural gap
between traditional and modern culture and the problems of the
transitional stage form part of the context of business in developing
countries, affecting the attitudes and values of managerial recruits.
It is, therefore, only through a thorough appreciation of these
factors that the organization can come to terms with the individual.
MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT
It is the manager who makes a productive enterprise out of
the human and material resources at his disposal. In developing
managers, possibly the most obvious conclusion one must come to is
the need for flexibility and an individual approach. Ultimately it
is the individual who develops himself, the company's role is to
provide him with the opportunity to do this in an organized and
78 This fits in with McClelland's findings about the importance of
' other-directedness' to economic achievement. D. McClelland,
The Achieving Society, pp. 197-201.
79 J.H. Kautsky, op. cit., p. 20.
80 McClelland's findings support this view. The Achieving Society,
p. 192.
33
progressive way with feedback as to how well he is doing so that he
can continue to improve himself. The company will only succeed in
this if it first succeeds in motivating the individual. The
programme of management development will have to concentrate not only
on skills but also on the development of attitudes and values
required for business, and aim for the internalization of these by
the manager, with the caveat that the organization too must be
prepared to incorporate some of the attitudes and values of its
managers. Management development looks at the individual in the
context of the job, but as has been shown it cannot ignore the
society from which he comes.
The essence of management development is the systematic
development of managerial skills through the provision of planned
learning experiences - on-the-job, through training courses, by the
maintenance of a stimulus and challenge in his job and through
promotion - and the regular, objective assessment of performance to
provide feedback to the manager as to his progress and guide those
responsible for his future development. It is the means by which the
company assures the continuity of management, provides for succession
to top posts, and ultimately assures the continued health and success
of the firm.
A vital precondition is the commitment of top management,
without which no management development programme can be really
effective. It is top management that establishes the management
climate or philosophy that determines whether the company is
conducive to personal growth and development or not. "Special
manager-development activities can only be a supplement, but they are
81
a necessary supplement," and this is confirmed by McGregor:
Programmes and procedures do not cause management
development, because it is not possible to "produce"
managers the way we produce products. We can only
hope to "grow" them, and growth depends less on the
tools weg2use than on the environment which is
created.
81 P.F. Drucker, op. cit. , p. 227.
82 D. McGregor, The Human Side of Enterprise, pp. 204-5.
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Management development should be the clear responsibility of line
managers, who are in a position to create a suitable environment for
growth.
Linked to the company philosophy is the organizational
structure. Drucker firmly advocates a federal, decentralized
structure which he says, "...will develop, train and test a fair
number of managers for tomorrow without any additional
u 83
manager-development activity as such. The company needs to be
structured in such a way that the individual is given both a
challenge and a high degree of responsibility.
A management development model has been evolved which
provides a useful analytical framework. This model consists of a
number of clear-cut steps. The first step is to identify the
requirements of the job, to prepare a job description covering the
tasks and responsibilities involved in the job, its position in the
organization, its scope and its overall purpose. In the context of a
developing country this can require particularly careful
consideration since there may be a severe shortage of people with
certain specialized qualifications. Where rapid localization has
taken place and there are not the people with sufficient breadth of
experience to fill the senior posts vacated it may be necessary to
redesign such jobs. On the basis of this analysis of the job a man
specification is drawn up identifying the exact knowledge, skills,
and experience required to fill the post.
Having prepared a job description and a man specification,
the next step is recruitment and selection. It is the function of
recruitment to attract suitable candidates, and of selection to try
and identify those candidates with the skills required to do the job
and with the potential to develop into highly competent managers.
This may be done with the particular requirements of a job in mind
which is usually the case when recruiting experienced men.
Alternatively, it may be done in a more open-ended way taking in
young people with no previous business experience. In this case
83 P.F. Drucker, op. cit., pp. 226-227.
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selection may consist, amongst other things, of various skill,
intelligence and aptitude tests to try and assess their potential for
management as well as their suitability for the range of jobs the
company offers. In both cases, selection is normally done by more
than one person, sometimes it is by a panel, sometimes by a series of
interviewers. This selection process is of critical importance since
it determines the future management potential of the company.
Following selection comes a period of induction training
whereby the new recruit is introduced to the workings of the company,
the department and the specific job for which he was recruited.
There may be a period of overlap with the former occupant of the post
who may assist in training the new candidate.
After this the new manager may undergo a variety of
training experiences. These will be aimed both at extending his
theoretical knowledge of the subject and broadening and deepening his
practical experience. While knowledge can be transmitted through
training courses, experience cannot, yet it is the vital ingredient
that enables the manager to use the knowledge he has acquired. The
company should therefore endeavour to give the manager a combination
of training courses and planned job experience. The most important
means of training is on the job. This may consist of 'coaching',
that is, training by a successful senior manager in the day to day
operation of the job; rotation through a variety of different jobs
to gain experience of various functions or different problems and
situations; broadening of the scope of a job to give increased
responsibility and experience; and/or promotion through increased
levels of responsibility and challenge. A warning that Drucker gives
is that on the job training must involve real responsibility, "The
whole idea of training jobs is contrary to all rules and experience.
A man should never be given a job that is not a real job, that does
not require performance from him."
Other forms of training include in-company courses;
external courses run by professional associations and business
84 P.F. Drucker, op. cit. , p. 226.
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schools; and overseas training which may be within the company, with
associated companies, or with overseas management training schools.
It may also involve advanced education for people already in
management. University courses have been shown to "help motivate
continued learning, set the standards for further advances, and
85
exhilarate (sic) generally a sense of purpose." External courses
may be run on an industry-wide basis to provide specialized training
not feasible for any individual company to run. Further education
schemes may include anything from afternoon release and book grants,
to scholarships. In training and development the emphasis should be
on the manager's strengths, building on what he does well, helping
him overcome his weaknesses and allying his interests and needs with
those of the company.
The specific training programmes and training techniques
obviously will change according to the needs of the company,
environment and individual. For instance, Moursi found in his
research into training needs in developing countries that training in
policy and decision-making skills, and in organizational behaviour
and in human relation skills was particularly needed. By far the
least successful training method he found to be the lecture, followed
by role playing and the managerial grid. The more promising
techniques included computerized management games and programmed
. 86
instruction.
A key step in management development is systematic
management appraisal to provide information to the manager and the
company about his progress. "The ultimate test of management is
87
business performance." Appraisal is a sensitive area and therefore
needs to be conducted with the greatest possible objectivity. One
85 K.R. Andrews, The Effectiveness of University Management
Development Programs, p. 243.
86 M.A. Moursi, "The Applicability of Newer Management Training
Techniques in Developing Countries" Academy of Management
Proceedings, (August, 1975), p. 297.
87 K.R. Andrews, op, cit. , p. 21.
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means of ensuring this is identification at the beginning of each
year of a series of performance objectives, where possible expressed
88
in quantified terms, agreed between the manager and his superior.
At the end of the year, it is then possible to measure the attainment
of these objectives. This provides both the manager and his superior
with information about his performance, suggests areas where training
could be helpful, and indicates his potential for promotion.
This is normally done on a standardized appraisal form
which is completed by the superior and then discussed with the
manager concerned (and signed by him that he has seen it). The
emphasis should be on helping the manager to improve his performance
not on reward and punishment. Consequently it is recommended that
this appraisal of management performance and potential be kept
separate from annual salary review. Nonetheless, financial
incentives should be directly related to successful managerial
performance.
Another channel of feedback is that related to training.
When a manager has undergone a period of training, the company will
be concerned to enable him to put that training into practice and to
assess its impact on the manager's performance and the quality of the
training programme.
Finally, management development is linked to manpower and
succession planning. To ensure the continuity of management a
company needs to plan ahead, to plan for retirement, growth, and
unexpected changes in staffing, for changes in technology or internal
organization. Since competent managers take a long time to develop,
it needs careful forward planning in which the managerial
requirements of the company five years hence are estimated. The
results of management appraisal are fed into this plan, forming a
management inventory, so that a clear pattern emerges of the people
with potential for promotion and the management development plan can
ensure those managers receive the training and experience necessary.
88 This recalls McGregor's Theory Y that "man will exercise
self-direction and self-control in the service of objectives to
which he is committed." Douglas McGregor, The Human Side
of Enterprise, p. 47.
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A management development plan is thus oriented both to the
improvement of performance today and the preparation of managers for
the future.
A concept that has become part of the system of management
development in many companies is management by objectives (MBO).
This was developed both to correct the subjective,
personality-oriented assessment of managers, and to link the
objectives of the individual more closely with those of the
organization. Management by objectives is, "a dynamic system which
seeks to integrate the company's need to clarify and achieve its
profit and growth goals with the manager's need to contribute and
89
develop himself." It places emphasis on the joint setting of
objectives for the firm, the section and the individual, in such a
way that the objectives at each level contribute to the attainment of
those at the next level. As far as possible objectives are set in
quantified terms and attainment of them can therefore be measured
objectively. In a newly developing economy management is often in
short supply, yet it is such a key element its emergence cannot be
left to chance and needs to be consciously fostered. Management
development is a systematic approach to the training and development
of managers.
It provides a model sufficiently general that, if adapted - and
adaptation is the key word here - could prove highly useful in a
developing country. The objectives both companies and individuals
and the application of the model will obviously vary enormously, but
this does not invalidate the concept nor the underlying principle of
the need for conscious, careful analysis and planning, taking into
account the needs of both the manager and the organization in order
to develop the best possible managerial cadre for the present and the
future.
The process of transfer and adaptation is not easy. It is
the large expatriate firms which have the experience, expertise, and
resources to implement a management development programme and it has
often been suggested that they should act as transfer agents for the
89 J.W. Humble, Improving Management Performance, p. 1.
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concept, setting an example for local companies. However, they
also have the greatest need to adapt to the cultural differences
presented by a developing country. It would clearly be foolish to
apply the methods of developed countries mechanically to the
situation in developing countries; adaptation needs to be done with
care and sensitivity, but most important of all, with a keen
awareness and understanding of the individuals involved. For only
then can there be a marriage of interests between manager and
company.
The intention of this chapter has been to explore what is
meant by management development and its applicability to the needs of
developing countries. It is designed for the needs of a
professionally managed company although it can be adapted to those of
a family managed one; it originated in large high-technology
companies but can be and has been adapted to the needs of relatively
small, labour-intensive industries. It would thus appear to be a
highly useful tool in the improvement of management performance in
developing, as well as developed, countries.
The problems of adapting the normative model to the very
different situation companies in developing countries face have been
alluded to. Some of the many relevant areas of potential difference
that will influence the local management situation have been
examined, including the political, cultural, educational, economic
and industrial context. It is these factors that determine the
availability of trainable managers, their orientation and the
priorities in management development. The specific context of
Malaysia will now be examined to determine the key factors
influencing management development there.
90 See for instance, F.H. Harbison, op. cit., p. 126 and B. Toyne,




FIGURE 3.2 . Peninsular Malaysia.
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CHAPTER 3
MALAYSIA: THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT
There are a number of important factors that need to be
understood to appreciate the nature and complexity of the problem of
management development facing companies in Malaysia. The first,
related to the problem of racial balance, is the origin of Malay
political dominance, its characteristics, and the non-Malay position
towards it; a second set of factors is the priorities and concerns
that influence the Malaysian Government in its policy-making, and in
the role it chooses to play in the economy; and third, there is the
issue of racial balance and the measures being taken to deal with the
problem. This chapter will explore these factors through a review of
the historical background to the contemporary period, an assessment
of the current political context, and finally, an analysis of the
racial balance issue itself.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Prior to British intervention, the Malay peninsula
consisted of a series of Malay states, headed by Sultans, in which
rival chiefs vied for domination. Initial British involvment
consisted of the capture or founding of coastal strong-points to
protect the valuable trade route to China that ran through the
Straits of Malacca and around the end of the peninsula."^ However,
towards the latter part of the nineteenth century British interest
turned to the Malayan hinterland.
There were three reasons for this change:
1) growing British interest in the tin trade and concern
to ensure a steady supply;
2) Britain's fear of foreign, particularly French,
2
ambitions in the peninsula;
1 Penang was founded in 1706, Province Wellesley acquired in 1800,
Singapore founded in 1819, and Malacca captured in 1824.
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and 3) the increasing civil strife in the states. This
threatened European investment and the supply of tin.
It was this that provided the immediate excuse for
3
British action.
The opportunity came in 1874 when Raja Muda Abdullah
approached the British for support in his claim to be Sultan of
Perak. In return he was willing to accept a British adviser at his
court. By the Treaty of Pangkor, concluded between the British and
the Sultan and his chiefs, it was agreed,
That the Sultan receive and provide a suitable
residence for a British Officer to be called
Resident, who shall be accredited to his Court, and
whose advice must be asked and acted upon on all
2 In a minute arguing the case for British intervention,
Kimberley, Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs at the time,
stated,
"...Her Majesty's Government could not see with indifference the
interference of a foreign power in the affairs of the Peninsula,
and it would be difficult to justify an objection to the Native
States applying for aid to other Powers if the British
Government refuses to lend its aid." Draft despatch of
Kimberley, 6 September 1872, C0273/67, Straits Settlements
Original Correspondence 1838-1919.
3 Sir Frank Swettenham has admirably described this mixture of
commercial and humanitarian motives that led to British
intervention:
"Lord Kimberley has furnished Sir Andrew Clarke who became
Governor of the Straits Settlements in 1873 with instructions of
the first importance, showing a disposition to make an entirely
new departure, and to recognise the duty forced upon England, as
the dominant Power, to interfere in the Malay States and put a
stop to a disgraceful state of affairs. The duty was imperative
from motives of humanity alone: but it was equally certain that
to undertake it would be highly beneficial to British interests
and British trade, though these pleas had hitherto been
dismissed as of no importance. The most timid British taxpayer
will probably admit that it is not wholly unjustifiable to
define more clearly an existing responsibility in order to
create and to keep a trade which is wholly, or almost wholly,
British, and worth £12,000,000 annually". F.A. Swettenham,
British Malaya, p. 174.
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questions other than those touching Malay Religion and
Custom.
Between 1874 and 1889 Selangor, Pahang and all the states of the
federation of Negri Sembilan followed suit and accepted a British
Resident.
The importance of this early aspect of Malaya's history is
that it determined the key relationship between the British and the
Malays. The Malays were acknowledged to be the rightful rulers of
the peninsula and the British were there to advise and assist them in
that rule. W.G.A. Ormsby-Gore (later Lord Harlech) wrote after his
visit to Malaya in 1928:
They were, they are, and they must remain, "Malay
States" and the primary object of our share in the
administration of these countries must always be the
progress of the Malay inhabitants at the invitation
of whose forefathers we first assumed
responsibilities.
It also indicates the source of one of the great problems
of British administration in Malaya: the conflict between British
commercial interests and their obligations to the Malay rulers. An
important factor in Britain's intervention was the protection of her
financial interests and the possibility of further gain. Given the
dynamism of the British entrepreneur at that time, and the wealth of
Malaya, these factors came to outweigh the immediate obligation to
respect the position of the Sultans. The history of British
administration in Malaya is one in which the real power of the
Sultans was steadily and consistently eroded. Sir Frederick Weld,
Governor of the Straits Settlements, wrote to Kimberley in 1880 that
British policy in Malaya should be,
To gradually and gently increase our influence as occasion
offers...to determine never to relax our hold, but not to
annex whilst it is possible to go under the present system.
4 "Engagement entered into by Chiefs of Perak at Pulo Pangkor, 20
January 1874," Article VI in W.G. Maxwell and W.S. Gibson, eds. ,
Treaties and Engagements Affecting the Malay States
and Borneo, pp. 28-30.
5 W.G.A. Ormsby-Gore, Report on a Visit to Malaya, Ceylon and
Java, 1928. CD 3235. p. 18.
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In the meantime to work by and through the native
governments ^by advice discreetly but firmly
administered.
In 1895 the four states which had accepted Residents
- Perak, Selangor, Pahang and Negri Sembilan - were brought together
in a Federation and became known as the Federated Malay States (FMS).
Gradually the other states of Malaya were brought under the British
umbrella. In 1902, an agreement with Thailand brought the four
northern states under British influence, and in 1909, these
states - Trengganu, Kelantan, Kedah and Perlis - were formally
transferred to British Malaya. In 1910, Kelantan accepted British
protection and Trengganu agreed to receive a British agent. In 1914
Johore accepted a British General Adviser and in 1923 a treaty with
Kedah, and in 1930 a treaty with Perlis, brought those states into
the fold. They remained outside the centralised Federation, and so
were termed the Unfederated Malay States (UFMS). British influence
in them was less strong, and they retained their Malay character to a
far greater degree than the FMS. Partly as a result of this the UFMS
remained relatively undeveloped and did not experience to anything
like the same degree the profound economic and social changes that
were taking place in the FMS. The two states least influenced by
economic developments at the time - Trengganu and Kelantan - remain
the most economically backward of the states of Peninsular Malaysia.
While the economic and military basis of the Sultan's power
had been removed by the Treaty of Pangkor, and by subsequent
treaties, and the day to day administration of the country was being
taken over by British civil servants, the traditional authority of
the Sultans over the Malay people was never questioned. Indeed, it
was a matter of policy that their feudal status should be preserved
and their loyalty assured in order to guarantee the loyalty of the
6 CO 273/104 Weld to Kimberley, Confidential of 21 October 1880
Straits Settlement Original Correspondence 1838-1919
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"raayat", the peasantry.'' The one area that remained the exclusive
preserve of the Sultans was Malay religion and custom. As a result a
strong religious hierarchy, dependent upon the Sultan, was built up,
a religious hierarchy that even today wields considerable power.
Up until World War II a return to independence was
considered by the British Government to be out of the question.
Given the increasingly complex society and sophisticated economy that
had developed as a result of their presence in Malaya and the trust
they held for the Malay people, the British felt their continued
administration was a necessity:
It seems clear that the maintenance of the position,
authority, and prestige of the Malay rulers must
always be a cardinal point of British policy and the
encouragement of indirect rule will probably prove
the greatest safeguard against the political
submersion of the Malays which would result from the
development of popular government on western lines.
For, in such a government, the Malays would be
hopelessly outnumbered by the other races owing to
the great influx of immigrants that ghas taken place
into Malaya during the last few years.
World War II saw a number of significant developments.
During the period of Japanese occupation, the Japanese supported the
Malays and Indians in their struggle against 'Western Imperialism'.
7 This is in keeping with the policy of indirect rule articulated
by Lord Lytton in India in 1877:
"I am convinced that the fundamental political mistake of
able and experienced Indian officials is a belief that we can
hold India securely by what they call good
government...Politically speaking, the India Peasantry is an
inert mass. If it ever moves at all, it will move in obedience,
not to its British benefactors, but to its native chiefs and
princes, however tyrannical they may be...To secure completely,
and efficiently utilise, the Indian aristocracy is, I am
convinced, the most important problem now before us."
Lord Lytton to Lord Salisbury, in Lady Betty Balfour,
The History of Lord Lytton's Indian Administration, 1876 to
1880. p. 109.
8 Sir Samuel Wilson, Visit to Malaya, 1932. p. 12. See also the
very similar sentiments expressed by Sir Hugh Clifford in his
address as High Commissioner to the Federal Council.
Federal Council Proceedings, Nov. 16, 1927, p. B113.
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They confirmed the Sultans in their titles, property and religious
authority, and used the Malayan Police Force, which was almost
9
entirely Malay, to control the Chinese. It was the Chinese in Malaya
who suffered most at the hands of the Japanese: all active
supporters of the Kuomintang, all active Communists and all who had
fought in the Volunteer Forces and not surrendered were to be killed.
In response many Chinese fled into the jungle from where they fought
a battle of resistance. This set the Malay and Chinese communities
against each other. The Chinese resistance worked in collaboration
with the British Force 136 against the Japanese Occupation. Their
contribution to the liberation of Malaya won them a right to a
permanent stake in the country in their eyes, and those of the
British Government of the time. Finally, World War II saw the
British Government firmly commit itself to the independence of
Kf 1 10Malaya.
During the war the British Government worked out proposals
for the future government of Malaya based on the expectation of
British victory over the Japanese in Malaya, helped by the Chinese
resistance, and watched by the Malays many of whom were collaborating
with the Japanese. ^ The end of the war did not come to Malaya so
dramatically. Nonetheless, a proposal for a Malayan Union was put
forward that was intended to set Malaya on the path to independence.
Initially it would bring the whole of the Malayan Peninsula, other
than Singapore, under direct British rule. For the first time, the
rights of the Chinese and Indian communities in Malaya were to be
taken into consideration. The proposal put forward citizenship
requirements that would make most of the Chinese and Indians in
9 See V. Purcell, The Chinese in Modern Malaya, p. 37.
10 Lord Stanley, Secretary of State for the Colonies, announced in
the House of Commons on December 1 1943:
"...the main aim of His Majesty's Government as regards the
political future of Malaya (after its liberation) will be the
development of its capacity for self-government within the
Empire". 295 H.C. Deb. 5S, 384, Dec. 1. 1943.
11 T.H. Silcock and Ungku Abdul Aziz, Nationalism in Malaya, p. 25.
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Malaya eligible for Malayan citizenship and open to them the
Malayan Civil Service, previously restricted to Malays and Europeans.
This involved an abandonment of Britain's former policy of preserving
Malay privilege. It required that the Malay Rulers relinquish their
residual authority to the British Crown, which would be represented
in Malaya by a British Governor. The trappings of their positions,
their allowances, residences and titles, would be retained, but their
function would be merely to preside over an Advisory Malay Council
dealing with laws on the Muslim religion. The Malayan Union so
enflamed Malay feeling that for the first time Malays took to the
streets - men and women alike. The voices of retired British
Residents, who took Britain's trust for the Malay people seriously,
were added to these protests. The Union had to be abandoned a year
after its institution. Having recognized Chinese and Indian rights,
the abandonment that followed created tension and bitterness. The
Malayan Union proposal shocked the Malays out of their apathy and so
sparked off modern Malay nationalism in defence of the rights and
special position of Malays. It also awoke the aspirations of the
Chinese and Indians to a rightful share in the new nation. Thus
Malays and non-Malays developed different and opposing concepts of an
independent Malaya and the rights of each community within it. It is
this dichotomy that characterizes modern Malaysian politics.
Despite the fact that the immigrant communities outnumbered
the Malays, they did not seriously challenge the concept of Malay
privilege, or fight to defend the rights given to them by the Malayan
Union.
12 Citizenship was to be given to those Chinese and Indians born in
Singapore or Malaya or who had lived in either territory for a
certain period of time.
13 Silcock and Aziz seek to explain the lack of action on the part
of the Chinese as follows:
"The majority of the Chinese were wholly uninterested in
politics. The disorder of the Japanese occupation had
accentuated the almost pathologically concentrated self-interest
that was already in pre-war times a feature of Chinese society
in Malaya...The liberation brought vast possibilities for
smuggling and black market activity. Large fortunes could be
continued
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The Malays claimed that since they were the ones who had
entrusted authority to the British, it was to them that is should be
returned. The immigrant communities were there on suftrance and
should have only those rights the Malays chose to give them. This is
a view that has dominated Malay nationalist thinking and is still
very potent today. Out of the strength of feeling the Malayan Union
proposals provoked the United Malays' National Organization (UMNO)
was born, the first and most important Malay political party.
With the rejection of the Malayan Union an alternative
proposal was put forward: that of a Federation of Malay States. The
Working Committee that prepared the arrangements for the Federation
of Malaya consisted of representatives of, 1) the British Government,
2) the Sultans, and 3) UMNO; neither the Chinese nor the Indians were
represented. The Federation Agreement was to unite the Federated and
14
Unfederated States with Penang and Malacca. It proposed a central
Government consisting of a British High Commissioner, an Executive
Council and a Legislative Council, with the High Commissioner
ultimately answerable to the Colonial Office in London. However, a
promise was given that elections would be introduced later. It
stipulated that the High Commissioner was responsible for
safeguarding "the special interests of Malays" as well as "the
legitimate interests of other communities.""^ The citizenship
provisions were considerably stricter than in the Malayan Union:
while the entire Malay population were automatically citizens, for
non-Malays it was stated that the applicant for citizenship must be
of good character, intend to reside permanently in the Federation and
have "an adequate knowledge of the Malay language" which was
made by those who attended devotedly to their own business, and
politics had been shown to be an unprofitable and dangerous
pursuit...Another factor that set limits to what the Chinese
could do was the prevailing lawlessness and extortion. To
become prominent in any way was to invite demands for money."
ibid. , pp. 27-28.
14 Singapore was to continue under direct British rule.
15 Federation of Malay Agreement. Clause 19 (1) (d).
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interpreted to mean literacy in Malay. The Agreement also restored
authority to the Malay Sultans, an authority that had been eroded
over the years of British rule. In this way it reaffirmed the
principle that Malaya was a Malay country belonging to the Malay
people.
Although the Report of the Federation of Malaya
Constitutional Commission acknowledged that the Malays were in need
of certain privileges if they were to compete favourably with the
other communities, it was not considered that the privileges should
be permanent."^ The special privileges of Malays involved
preferences in the four fields of: reservation of land; quotas for
admission to the Public Service; quotas in respect of the issuing of
permits or licences for the operation of certain businesses; and
preferences in connection with scholarships, bursaries and other
forms of aid for education.
During this period when Malaya was moving towards independence
and the future political pattern being evolved, a part of the Chinese
community was confirming the worst fears of the Malays. The Chinese
guerrilla army that had fought with the British against the Japanese
included in their wartime aims the establishment of a republic, and a
18
government in which all communities would be represented.
According to Purcell,
There is no doubt that most of the guerillas had
been isolated from the world so long and separated
from all information except what was contained in
their own propaganda that they honestly believed
that the Japanese surrender had been due to their
own exclusive efforts , . . .
16 In 1947 only 1 per cent of Chinese and 2 per cent of Indians
over the age of fifteen were literate in Malay. 1957 Population
Census. vol. 14, p. 22. In 1952, the citizenship requirements
of the Federal Agreement were amended so that many more Chinese
qualified for citizenship: the amendment also safeguarded the
rights of those who were already citizens.
17 Colonial Office, Constitutional Proposals for the Federation
of Malaya. Cmd. 210. p. 14, para. 55.
18 See V. Purcell, op. cit. , p. 35.
19 ibid. , p. 36.
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They had hidden their arms at the end of the war and in the
late 1940"s decided to renew the struggle this time against the
British imperialists. So began the period of Communist insurgency
known as 'The Emergency' that lasted twelve years from 1948-1960.
This long drawn-out struggle brought the loyalty of the Chinese into
question, drained the Malayan coffers, and built up the resentment of
the rural Malays. The insurgents were almost all Chinese, and the
policy of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) "was based on the
20
implicit assumption of an extension of Chinese power...." They
operated from the depths of the jungle and relied upon the support of
Chinese squatters on the fringes of the jungle for food and new
recruits. These groups may have given support freely, but if they
did not, intimidation was used. The treatment of suspect Chinese by
the Government was draconian and even those born in Malaya were
subject to summary repatriation to China. The claims of Malayan-born
Chinese to a secure position in the country were ignored, and they
were treated as unwelcome aliens.
The insurgents claimed to be fighting for the liberation of
Malaya and to a degree they may have hastened it. At the Baling
c-naC
talks in 1955 between the Communist Leader, Chin Peng,/the Chief
Ministers of the Federation and Singapore; Chin Peng declared that if
Britain were to grant Malaya independence the communists would lay
21
down their arms. In 1957, Malaya did gain her independence and
shortly after that the Emergency was brought to a close. The end of
the Emergency assured a non-communist regime in Malaya and left a
legacy of political suspicion on the part of the Malays towards the
Chinese.
In the newly independent state the special position of the
Malays was enshrined in the Constitution, and its identity as
20 A. Short, "The Emergency", Malaysia, A Survey. Wang Gungwu,
ed., p. 151.
21 The MCP statement was "As soon as the elected government of the
Federation attains control of internal security and local armed
forces we will end the hostilities, lay down our arms and
disband our forces." ibid. , p. 159.
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a specifically Malay state affirmed in the national language, state
religion and the position of the Sultans. The Malays were, and are,
highly concerned to keep their very considerable political power, and
to be very wary of giving power to the non-Malays who might then be
in a position to challenge that special position.
Nonetheless, a political alliance was worked out between
the Chinese and Malays that took into account the anxieties and
aspirations of both groups. In the understanding reached between the
leading Malay political party, UMNO, and the Chinese political party,
the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), citizenship qualifications for
the Chinese were relaxed and it was understood that they would not be
hindered in the commercial sphere, while the continued political
hegemony of the Malays was accepted by the Chinese. However, as R.S.
Milne points out, this 'bargain' was not static: the Chinese aspired
eventually to eliminate the special privileges of the Malays, and the
22
Malays to an equal share in commerce and industry. However, as in
any bargain it was also influenced by the relative strength of either
side at any one time. At the point of independence the Malays held
the political power; the Chinese, the commercial power. Since then
various factors have impinged upon this to alter the balance.
In 1963, the state of Malaysia was formed uniting Sarawak,
Sabah and Singapore with the Federation of Malaya. Racially, the
union was a finely balanced one. Singapore is predominantly Chinese
while Sarawak and Sabah have an indigenous majority consisting of
Ibans, Dyaks, Melanaus, Kadazans, Muruts and other native people who
were considered, along with the Malays, as 'bumiputras' or sons of
the soil. Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore, sought to
create a Malaysian Malaysia in which no one group had special
privileges; he also aspired to the political leadership of Malaysia
and this threatened the position of the Malays. The result was the
expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia in 1965. It was thus made
abundantly clear to the Chinese in Malaysia that the Malay-dominated
Federal Government in Kuala Lumpur would not brook a Chinese
challenge.
22 R.S. Milne, op. cit., p. 231.
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From the beginning the Government was committed to
improving the lot of the peasant; however, the choice amongst
conflicting priorities is often difficult. On the one hand was the
goal of economic development; on the other, a more equitable
distribution of wealth and opportunities. And it was the Chinese and
Europeans who had the capital, expertise, experience and contacts to
develop the economy. A more equitable distribution of wealth could
only be attained at the expense of slowing the pace of development.
Until 1969 the former priority took precedence.
The year 1969, saw the near defeat of the ruling Alliance
followed by an explosion of racial violence that profoundly
influenced the direction of Government policy. The ruling Alliance,
which had drawn support from all racial groups, lost 23 seats in the
election and 14 of these had been lost by the Chinese partner, the
MCA. It was thus a firm statement of the dissatisfaction of the
Chinese community with Government policies and their desire for more
equitable treatment. A Chinese victory march to celebrate their
success was said to be marked by expressions of Chinese chauvinism
and insults hurled at Malays. The Malays felt that the Chinese had
grown too sure of their position and had reaped too many of the
rewards of development and the situation erupted into violence.
Though the real figures for the final casualties of May 13th will
probably never be known, even the official figures indicate the blow
23
the Chinese received.
May 13 was not just an attack on the Chinese; it was also
an attack on the Government. The hostility that erupted against the
Chinese was an expression of the dissatisfaction of the Malays with
their leaders. May 13th also demonstrated the ultimate weapon the
Malays had against the Chinese - force. Both the police and the army
were predominantly Malay. They thus had control over the means of






National Operations Council, The May 13 Tragedy, A Report, p.
88.
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enforcing Chinese acceptance of Malay supremacy.
For the Chinese, May 13th impressed upon them the present
impossibility of a democratic change of power. The Malays had seen
Chinese successes at the polls as allowing political power that they
felt was rightfully their prerogative to slip into immigrant hands
and acted to halt this.
Up until 1969 the Government followed a relatively safe,
conservative policy that reflected the lessons of the British. The
events of 1969 forced a complete reassessment of policy and a
24
reorientation towards the Malay community. So began the current
period of Malaysian political and economic development.
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL CONTEXT
Current Political Framework
Malaysia is a fully independent country within the British
Commonwealth. It consists of a federation of thirteen states, nine
25
of which have as their head the traditional Malay Ruler. The
Rulers and Governors form the Conference of Rulers who elect the King
from among the nine Malay Rulers. The country is a parliamentary
democracy with a fully elected House of Representatives, the Federal
Dewan Ra'ayat.
While the country consists of three main racial groups, the
Malays are considered the definitive people. They, and the
indigenous tribes of Sarawak and Sabah, are termed 'bumiputras', and
their interests are specifically safeguarded in the federal
consitution. Malay is the national language, the
24 C.T. Goh recounts that soon after the elections at which UMNO,
the incumbent Malay party, suffered severe losses, UMNO campaign
directors demanded a more Malay-oriented cabinet. UMNO and
Utusan Melayu, another Malay party, "felt that the 'immigrant'
vote could and should be written off and Malay voters wooed to
the fullest." Goh Cheng Teik, The May Thirteenth Incident
and Democracy in Malaysia, pp. 16-17.
25 The Head of State in Malacca, Penang, and Sarawak is the
Governor, and in Sabah, the Yang di Pertuan Negara.
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King is always Malay, and the State religion - Islam - is the
religion practised by the Malays.
Within Parliament the balance of power lies firmly with the
Malays. They form 53 percent of the population and the constitution
makes provision for rural constituencies to contain less than half
26
the electors of urban constituencies. Since the Malay population
is concentrated in the countryside this ensures Malay domination of
27
the Dewan Ra'ayat.
Politics in Malaysia is dominated by the need to strike a
delicate balance between what are almost entirely communally based
parties. As a result a system of power-sharing has been evolved
based on the acceptance of the Malays as the dominant political force
and the 'special position' of the Malay people. Following the 1969
riots more and more opposition parties have been brought into the
ruling Alliance to form the Barisan Nasional or National Front. In
the context of a racially divided country this has the advantage of
lending itself to "the resolution of sensitive national issues within
28
the structure of political consensus." In this way public debate
is avoided and the rifts in Malaysian society supposedly minimized.
It also means the Government normally has the two-thirds majority in
Parliament required to amend the constitution which gives it enormous
power.
Internal Priorities
The year 1969, was a watershed in terms of Malaysia's
internal policy-making. One of the first priorities after the
26 Malaysia, Federal Consitution. Thirteenth Schedule, Part 1,
2(c). Up until 1973 a rural constituency could contain up to
but no fewer than half the electors of an urban constituency,
but the August 1973 Act A206 deleted this provision thus
allowing the rural constituency to contain less than a half the
electors of an urban area.
27 See David Lim for a discussion of the unequal representation of
non-Malays. David Lim, Economic Growth and Development in
West Malaysia, 1947-1970. pp. 62-65.
28 Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-1980. p. 99. para. 303.
56
rioting was the need to create a united nation; related to this was
the need to solve the socio-economic problems that were the root
cause of the rioting.
The nation-building of the post-1969 era has particularly
concentrated on ensuring the loyalty of the non-Malay Malaysians.
One of the first measures was the articulation of a national ideology
in the 'Rukunegara'. This expresses the shared aims and assumptions
of a modern society oriented towards science and technology. It also
reveals the anxieties that lie behind the emphasis on national unity:
the questionable loyalty of non-Malays ("Loyalty to other countries
is inconsistent with undivided loyalty to this Nation".); the power
of communal loyalties (" The interests of the whole must come before
the interests of any sectional group"), the defensiveness of the
Malays regarding their "Special position" and the privileges that
they have accorded themselves ("it is necessary that the weak and the
disadvantaged be assisted to compete on equal terms".)
A second aspect of nation-building was the creation of a
national culture and identity based on the Malay culture. It has
also brought a reemphasis on Malay as the national language and the
development of the Malay language to enable it to cope with the
requirements of a modern society. Malay is now referred to as
'Bahasa Malaysia', meaning the Malaysian language. Education has
been seen as performing an important role in "moulding civic and
30
national consciousness and spiritual values" and the national
language has been progressively introduced throughout the educational
system. From the point of view of the business community the
insistence on Malay is a matter for concern since it is likely to
result in a decline in the standard of English spoken and English is
the principal language of business in Malaysia. The Third Malaysia
Plan seeks to alleviate such anxieties by stating that although
Bahasa Malaysia will be used as the main medium of instruction "the
29 The Second Malaysia Plan starts off: "National Unity is the
over-riding objective of the country." p.l, para. 1.
30 Third Malaysia Plan, p. 2. para. 5.
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use of English will be extended as a strong second language."
Along with the new cultural nationalism, has gone an
emphasis on economic nationalism. This is related to the idea that
the Malay people should have control over the country's natural
resources. It has involved the purchase of substantial interests in
key companies with the intention of subsequently reselling them to
Malaysians, and particularly Malays.
Another manifestation of this has been an increasing
hostility towards foreign enterprise. A good deal of publicity was
given to the figure presented in the Second Malaysia Plan (SMP) that
foreign ownership of limited companies in West Malaysia was 62.1 per
32
cent in 1969. As a result foreign companies experienced subsequent
difficulty and inflexibility in their dealings with Government
departments, reaching a climax around 1975-76. However, the Third
Malaysia Plan (TMP) reaffirmed the Goverment's commitment to and
reliance on foreign investment and the Prime Minister and Deputy
Prime Minister showed themselves open to discussion with the business
community and receptive to their arguments; as a consequence the
suspicion and hostility have begun to subside. This has been
confirmed by the appointment on 1 January 1978 of the Deputy Prime
Minister, a man largely trusted by the business community, as
Minister of Trade and Industry.
One of the key policy changes that came out of the 1969
disaster was the New Economic Policy (NEP) introduced in 1970. This
was aimed at what were seen as the two main causes of the rioting:
poverty and the identification of race with economic function, that
is, that the vast majority of Malays were poor, rural farmers and
fishermen and the more visible Chinese were relatively affluent,
urban businessmen. This policy has had far reaching effects on the
business community which will be dealt with in detail in Chapter 5.
The contemporary context of management development in
Malaysia can only be understood in the light of this situation: the
political domination of the Malay community, the determination
31 ibid. , p. 384. para. 1310.
32 SMP. p. 40, para. 130, Table 3-1.
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of the Government to correct the economic backwardness of the Malays
as fast as is possible without serious dislocation to the economy,
and the increasing power and centralization of the Government. It is
determined to play a direct and active role in the economy and in
society in order to achieve its aim. This means that it is
concentrating on promoting the interests of the 53 per cent of the
population who are bumiputras, and holding back the non-Malay
population, who consequently feel persecuted.
RACIAL BALANCE
The term 'racial balance' is used as a shorthand for the
whole process of restructuring society so that the three main races
that comprise Malaysian society - Malays, Chinese and Indians - are
engaged in all sectors and at all levels of the economy in the same
proportion as their proportion in the population. The 1969 race
riots highlighted the dangers of allowing social and economic
inequalities to continue unchecked and since then the correction of
racial imbalance has been, with the elimination of poverty to which
it is related, the main aim of the Government.
For historical reasons the Malays find themselves
politically dominant in a country in which much of the wealth of the
country and the fruits of economic development are in the hands of
non-Malays. The Malay population is characterized by being
predominantly rural and poor: in 1975, 82 per cent of Malays in
33
Peninsular Malaysia lived in the countryside, in 1970, 65 per cent
34
of Malay households were poor. The rural areas have not had the
same educational facilities as the cities and a 1967/68 Survey found
88 per cent of the rural population had attained no more than primary
35
education. Malays are
33 TMP. p. 150, Table 8-9.
34 ibid., p. 5, para. 21.
35 Department of Statistics, Socio-Economic Sample Survey of
Households - Malaysia 1967-68, Employment and Unemployment
West Malaysia, p. 72.
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concentrated in subsistence agriculture, utilities and services, and
are substantially underrepresented in raining, manufacturing,
36
construction and commerce. Within these industries the
underrepresentation is particularly marked in the more senior
administrative grades.^
One area to which Malays have been attracted is the Civil
Service which until 1953 was closed to non-Malays (other than the
British). When in 1953 non-Malays were allowed into the MCS for the
first time it was on a quota basis of four Malays to each non-Malay
and this system of a preferential quota for Malays in the Civil
Service has been incorporated into the Malaysian constitution. The
prestige, security and Malay orientation of the Civil Service tends
to make it a natural first choice for many young Malays. Added to
this is the fact that the vast majority of Malay students are on
Government scholarships that bond them to serve the Government. More
recently, with the extension of instruction in Malay to university
level, there has been a growing number of graduates who are unable to
use English fluently and so are unemployable by much of the business
community. That the Government takes its responsibility towards
these new Malay graduates seriously is witnessed to by the fact that
during 1975-78 Government employment increased by over 100,000 making
it second only to manufacturing in terms of its contribution to job
38
creation. "The alternatives open to individuals are important,
since we must take into account opportunity costs of entrepreneurial
39
acts." In the case of the Malays the opportunity costs of entering
the high risk world of business have tended to be prohibitively high.
Not only are the Malays underrepresented in the modern
sectors of the economy, they are grossly underrepresented in terms of
ownership of the private sector. In 1970 Malays and Malay interests
36 See Table 4.5.
37 TMP. pp. 181-182, Table 9-7.
38 Mid-Term Review of the Third Malaysia Plan, p. 64, Table 4-5.
39 G.M. Meier, Leading Issues in Economic Development, p. 660.
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owned 2.4 per cent of share capital in Peninsular Malaysia, rising in
1975 to 7.8 per cent. ^
The Malays see the reasons for their lack of participation
in the modern sector as due to a) lack of opportunity and of
facilities due to continuous official neglect, and b) the
entrenchment of non-Malay interests. In fact, the roots of the
problem go much deeper than that. Faced with the problem of moving
rapidly into the commercial and industrial sector, Malays tend to
lack the knowledge, experience, capital and contacts to do so. The
Government is concentrating its efforts on overcoming these
handicaps.
The restructuring of society to correct racial imbalance
has particularly focussed on the need to bring the Malays into the
modern sector, that is, "the creation of a Malay commercial and
industrial community in all categories and at all levels of
4- • If 41
operation.
The four main areas on which the Government has
concentrated are the modernization of the rural areas, the creation
of a Malay entrepreneurial class, the introduction of Malays into all
levels of management and increased Malay ownership of the economy as
a whole. The first of these will not be dealt with since it is not
relevant to this study; the Government's policies and practices in
the other three areas will be examined at greater length since they
substantially affect the management context in Malaysia.
The Creation of a Malay Enterpreneurial Class
In order to foster the development of a Malay
entrepreneurial cadre the Government has sought to help them overcome
their immediate disadvantages by the provision of capital,
opportunities, facilities, and training.
A number of institutions have been fostered by the
Government for the express purpose of providing financial facilities
40 TMP. p. 86, Table 4-16.
41 SMP. p. 1., para. 2.
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for Malays and in particular, easy loans. The most important of
these is Bank Bumiputra, which was initiated with $25 million from
the Government (and with the intention that shares would be sold to
Malays at a later date.) Because Malays do not always have security
for loans the Credit Guarantee Corporation (CGC) was set up in 1973
to underwrite bank loans to Malays. As a result of these measures
between 1971-1975 total loans and advances to bumiputras rose
ten-fold from $80 million at the end of 1970 to $791 million at the
end of 1975.^
The provision of opportunities for Malay entrepreneurs has
taken a number of forms. A certain quota of licences in the
transport and haulage business are reserved for Malays, a policy
started by the British in 1952, and laid down in the Constitution
(Article 153). A proportion of timber concessions is also reserved
for Malays. The Government follows a policy of Malay preference with
regard to its contracts: all construction contracts under $10,000
automatically go to Malay firms and over that they are open to tender
but Malay preference is still assured. Malay contractors are given
preference in the supply of goods and services up to $5 million for
prices 2-10 percent over other competitors, and 30 percent of the
value of all work contracted by the Public Works Department is
43
reserved for Malays. These measures are intended to assist and
encourage small Malay businessmen who can not compete with the
well-established Chinese firms. One result has been that a number of
smaller Chinese firms have been forced to the wall and competition,
and co-operation, amongst non-Malays has become even more intense.
There has been a tendancy for Malays to sell or lease their
44
concessions, or sub-contract to non-Malays.
42 TMP. p. 32. para. 14.
43 TMP. p. 32. para. 115.
44 The manager of one of the Chinese firms interviewed explained
that the only possibility for survival in his field - the supply
of provisions to the armed forces - was to obtain a sub-contract
from a Malay firm, and this was then shared out amongst a small
group of companies in the same field to enable each of them to
keep ticking over.
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Another approach taken has been for the Government to
create companies for Malays, get them started and then hand them over
to Malay private enterprise. Perbadanan Nasional (PERNAS) is the
chief Government body concerned with this. PERNAS was incorporated
as a private company in 1969 to speed up the entry of Malays into
commerce and industry. The degree of Government support for PERNAS
is indicated by the fact that under the First Malaysia Plan PERNAS
received $10 million, under the Second Malaysia Plan $100 million,
and under the Third Malaysia Plan $200 Million. It has six wholly
owned subsidiaries in insurance, construction, manufacturing,
property development, securities and trading. It also has a monopoly
on all trade with the People's Republic of China which gives it a key
position in the distributive trades. Not only does PERNAS initiate
its own companies, it also goes into joint ventures with other
companies, however, it demands a controlling share in the equity so
that it can insist on Malay employment at all levels up to at least
50 per cent of the workforce.^ Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA) has
recently started an Industrial and Commercial Division with the task
of facilitating direct Malay participation in tapioca processing,
fruit canning, timber processing and the like. The State Economic
Development Corporations (SEDC's) are involved in establishing wholly
owned Malay companies as well as joint ventures. They also assist
ailing industries owned by Malays.
Finally, the Government seeks to provide opportunities for Malay
entrepreneurs by forcing the private sector to give preference to
Malay companies. The distributive and service sectors are seen as
areas well-suited to Malay involvement. Consequently the Government
has set a target that 30 per cent of the distribution and service
business of the private sector be given to bumiputra companies by
1990. Indeed, there has been strong pressure on companies to comply
with this target well before 1990. This has caused a good deal of
resentment since established distributors have built up a reputation,
a market and a distribution network that the new bumiputra
distributors do not have. On the service side it is felt that
45 Tunku Razaleigh Hamzah, "Aids to Malay Development,"
Financial Times, 26.2.73, p. 16.
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bumiputra companies are not necessarily able to provide the range of
services of a well-established company. A further problem is that
the only companies that are considered to be bumiputra are those that
have 51 percent of equity in the hands of Malays, whereas companies
that have complied with the racial balance ownership target of 30
percent Malay participation are categorized as non-bumiputra.
The Government has involved itself in the provision of
suitable business premises for Malay enterprizes. The Urban
Development Authority (UDA) was established to acquire and develop
suitable land in Kuala Lumpur, state capitals and major towns to
ensure that Malay traders have the opportunity to operate in the main
commercial areas of the country. These facilities they sell or lease
on easy terms. MARA has built shop and office complexes for Malay
businessmen which it leases for nominal rents. Industrial estates,
business premises and shopping complexes are also built by the SEDCs.
To facilitate and sustain such rapid development of a Malay
entrepreneurial cadre requires a massive training effort. One aspect
of this is the improvement of Malay educational standards which will
be dealt with in the next chapter. On the job training is one of the
main purposes of the PERNAS and MARA ventures and PERNAS companies
have the luxury, rarely found in a fledging enterprise, of
substantial training funds. Where PERNAS enters into a joint venture
one of the requirements made of its partner is in-service training
both in Malaysia and in the overseas facilities of the partner. There
are also a host of training courses that have been initiated for the
express purpose of preparing Malays for business. Consultancy has
been made available to the Malay entrepreneur by the NPC; MARA, also
provides feasibility studies; FIDA, which likewise provides
feasibility studies; and MIDF Industrial Consultants Sdn Bhd.
Racial Balance in Management
Not only does the Government want to create a new
entrepreneurial class of Malays it is also committed to bringing
Malays into all levels of management of the private sector. The
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exact proportion of Malays to be attained is unclear. The SMP
states, "The Government has set a target that within a period of 20
years, Malays and other indigenous people will manage and own at
least 30 per cent of the total commercial and industrial activities
46
in all categories and scales of operation." However, the TMP
suggests a target of 53 per cent when it states that, "employment in
the various sectors of the economy and employment at all occupational
levels should reflect the racial composition of the country by
47
1990." Either target requires the private sector . to
recruit a very high proportion of Malays. The Government's own
estimates are that Malay employment will have to account for 64 per
cent of total new employment in industry and 54 per cent in services
48
during 1976-90. In 1970 22 per cent of all administrative and
managerial workers were Malay but this proportion varied between 35
per cent in the tertiary sector and only 15 per cent in the secondary
49
sector. By 1975, the proportion of Malays in the managerial and
administrative grades had risen to 27 per cent and by 1978 it had
50
reached 33 per cent. This rapid improvement is evidence of the
seriousness with which the problem of racial balance is being
tackled.
If the 53 per cent target is to be attained there will
still need to be a very large increase in Malay managers. In
companies that have been growing rapidly there has been room for new
employment; older companies, especially those with a slower rate of
growth, have found it difficult to improve their racial balance
without sacrificing existing staff and the Government has
specifically stated that no one is to be deprived to attain the
objectives; racial balance is to be achieved out of growth. New
46 SMP pp. 41-42, para. 135.
47 TMP. p. 76, para. 245.
48 ibid, p. 77, para. 248.
49 ibid., pp. 181-182, Table 9-7.
50 Mid-Term Review of The Third Malaysia Plan, p. 47, Table 3-4.
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industrial firms often apply for pioneer status in order to receive
tax incentives offered by the Government. A condition of these
incentives has been a commitment to employ a representative number of
Malays. This approach has been reasonably effective: pioneer firms
employ a considerably higher proportion than other manufacturing
companies, for example as early as 1968 pioneer firms employed 42 per
cent Malays compared to 24 per cent in modern manufacturing companies
as a whole.The difficulty lies at the level of senior management.
While foreign experts are allowed in during the early stages of an
operation they have to be rapidly phased out except for a very few
key posts, and it normally requires a considerable length of time to
train a man to take over at the senior level. In recognition of this
problem in the TMP the Government has made some allowance and has
committed itself to adopting a "flexible approach in the
implementation of the restructuring objectives for the modern
52
industrial sector."
Malay employment in management has been at the previous low
levels for a number of reasons. One, is the education policies of
the British, which will be examined in the next chapter. As a result
of these policies Malays lacked educational qualifications
particularly in the fields of science, technology and business
studies to enter management. And those who had the necessary
education tended to prefer to enter the Civil Service. Another
difficulty has been the special requirements, such as the need for
managers in sales divisions to speak Chinese, because the wholesale
and retail trades are dominated by Chinese. A further difficulty has
been their disinclination to enter business, and the Malay value
structure that runs counter to that of a modern industrial economy.
Finally, there has been the stereotype that has grown up of the Malay
being unsuited to the demands of business life.
51 D.R. Snodgrass, "Summary Evaluation of Policies Used to Promote
Bumiputra Participation in the Modern Sector in Malaysia,"
Development Discussion Paper. No. 38, Harvard Institute for
International Development, p. 5.
52 TMP. p. 84, para. 254.
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Malay Ownership of the Economy
The Goverment has stated that by 1990 Malays will own 30
per cent of the economy, other Malaysians 40 per cent, and foreigners
30 per cent. It is particularly concerned to correct the imbalance
in ownership in the Modern Rural and Modern Urban sectors of the
economy where they are greatest. Given that Malays and Malay
interests owned only 2.4 per cent of share capital in 1970, and 7.8
per cent in 1975, it is clear that an enormous leap forward is
required. This expansion of Malay ownership is to come mainly out of
53
growth so that existing owners will not be dispossessed. There is
a variable policy on the attainment of the objectives; "pioneer"
industries, for instance, are required to reserve at least 30 per
cent of their equity for Malays, while established companies are
required to work gradually towards the target. On the other hand,
the sensitive resource-based industries are expected to comply with
the target immediately. Where an established company decides to
restructure its ownership it is compelled to set aside 30 per cent
for Malays. This restructuring of the ownership of the economy is
overseen by the Foreign Investment Committee established in 1974.
One of the major difficulties in fulfilling this goal has
been the poverty of the Malay community - they do not have the
financial resources to take advantage of the shares reserved for
them. If the target of 30 per cent ownership is to be achieved,
Malays and Malay interests will have to acquire roughly one-third of
the total increase in equity capital between 1975-1990 or over $23
billion worth of shares as well as those reserved shares not yet
54
taken up. In order to accomplish this, the Government has stepped
in to purchase shares in trust for the Malay people. These will
53 TMP. p. 191, para. 588(i) states:
"Present imbalances in the ownership of equity stock in
individual enterprises will be corrected mainly through growth.
Disinvestment of existing stock will not be compulsorily
enforced for the purpose of executing the restructuring
objectives of the Government".
54 ibid. , p. 85-87, para. 258.
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then be resold to Malays as they become more affluent. However, it is
clear that Government bodies will have to hold an increasing
proportion of Malay shares and that only in this way will the targets
be achieved. Even by 1990 it is anticipated that private Malay
holdings will have been able to take up less than a quarter of the
reserved shares. This has created a problem for many companies who
have had to reserve 30 per cent of their equity and found that the
shares have not been taken up. A further problem is the fact that
the price of reserved shares is set not by the market but by the
55
Government and may be well below the market price. Having sold
shares to Malays there is also nothing to stop Malays reselling their
shares to non-Malays so diluting what has been an expensive balance
to achieve.
+ + +
One of the ideas underlying the aim of achieving a racial
balance in all sectors and at all levels of the economy by 1990 was
that this should be achieved through rapid growth so that no-one else
should be deprived of what he had to make room for the Malays. This
meant it was essential to maintain an attractive investment climate.
However, the very radical social change to which the Government
aspires cannot be achieved without a considerable degree of
dislocation and adequate time for preparation, training and
readjustment. When, in 1974-75, the timescale was reduced and
pressure applied for companies to comply far sooner and on an
individual basis this aggravated the dislocation and created the sort
of tension and uncertainty among investors that induces them to
reduce their time horizon for profitability. This fostered the sort
of attitude that led to 'window-dressing' on the part of companies in
relation to the restructuring of their management cadre.
A problem in the attainment of the Government's racial
55 Wong Sulong cites the example of Batu Kawan, a large plantation
and investment group, having to sell 15 million shares to
Bumiputras at $1.1 per share when the going price on the Kuala
Lumpur Stock Exchange was $1.7 per share. Wong Sulong. "Coming
of Age Difficulties," Financial Times, 1 February 1979, p.33.
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balance policies is that it has continued to foster the very
attitudes and values that produced the imbalance it seek to overcome.
Its extensive efforts to assist Malays has made them even more
dependent on benevolent Government action and obviated the necessity
of developing a 'need for Achievement' to use McClelland's term.
Malays have not succeeded in entering the modern economy in the past
partly because of their traditional, 'peasant' orientation. If the
restructuring of society is to succeed there will need to be a change
in the attitudes and values of the Malay people, a move away from
tradition towards hard work, self-reliance, and a desire for
achievement. It is interesting to note that the Government appears
aware of this need. The Rukunegara declares that Malaysian society
"shall be oriented toward modern science and technology." The
present Deputy Prime Minister advocated the urbanization of the Malay
community, back in 1970, as a means of bringing about rapid attitude
56
change. There is also reference to the important role to be played
by women, "no longer saddled by prejudice and traditional
conservatism",^ a reference which recalls McClelland's emphasis on
women's role in the creation of a dynamic society. In the
introduction to the Third Malaysia Plan the Prime Minister urges,
"There can be no substitute for hard work and a determination to
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succeed. Further on the Plan explicitly refers to the dilemma:
The community as a group is able to identify and
integrate its short and long-term needs, strive for
the satisfaction of these needs with the minimum
assistance from the Government and deal with all
forms of challenges as individuals and as a
community, thus, while Government assistance is
necessary in promoting development and change within
the community, such assistanc^ given injudiciously
may negate the above objectives.
56 Mahathir bin Mohamad, The Malay Dilemma, p. 105.
57 TMP. p. 105, para. 318.
58 ibid. , p. vii.
59 ibid. , para. 297, p. 97.
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Yet the political necessity for rapid progress towards racial
balance, to avoid another racial conflagration, but more immediately
because the Government is directly dependent on the Malay voters,
forces it to intervene to speed up the pace of change.
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CHAPTER 4
MALAYSIA: THE SOCIAL CONTEXT
The aim of this chapter is to examine the social context of
management development in Malaysia: the main characteristics of
Malaysian society in general, and the labour force in particular; the
origins of its multiracial society; the social and cultural features
of the three main racial groups; and the educational background. As
has already been shown in Chapter 2, the nature of the population
from which managers are drawn, the complex of attitudes and values of
a society, the level and quality of education and the availability of
technically qualified staff, are highly relevant to the problem of
developing competent management.
SOCIAL DIMENSIONS
The population of Malaysia as a whole in 1975 was estimated
to be 12,249,000, of which 10,385,000 or 85 per cent, were in
Peninsular Malaysia. Of this number 53.1 per cent are Malay, 35.5
per cent Chinese, 10.6 per cent Indian, Pakistan or Ceylonese, and
0.8 per cent Other.* This gives Malaysia the highest proportion of
Chinese of any country in South East Asia.
The population is concentrated in two main areas: a strip
down the length of the West Coast of the peninsula and in the north
east corner. There is also a particular concentration of population
in the state of Selangor which has seen a growing influx of people
from other states drawn by the prospect of employment in industry or
government in the Federal capital, Kuala Lumpur. (See Table 4.1.)
The distribution of the races is very uneven with the Chinese and
Indians concentrated in the four Western States which between them
1 TOP. p. 150, Table 8-9.
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Table 4.1
Population, GDP, and Racial Distribution by State, Peninsular Malaysia, 1970









Four Northern States: 2,167,545 610 83 12 4 1
Trengganu 405,539 614 94 5 1 0
Kelantan 686,266 480 93 5 1 1
Perlis 120,9914 690 79 16 2 2
Kedah 954,749) 71 19 8 2
Three Southern States: 2,156,004 933 55 38 7 0
Pahang 504,900 1,014 61 31 7 0
Johore 1,276,969 935 53 39 7 0
Malacca 404,135 828 52 40 8 1
Four Western States: 4,456,799 1,261 38 46 15 1
Negri Sembilan 481,491 1,017 45 38 16 0
Perak 1,569,161 1,019 43 42 14 0
c (iii)Selangor 1,630,707 1,678 35 46 18 1
Penang 775,440 1,025 31 56 12 2
Peninsular Malaysia
[i 4)
8,819,928 1,018 53 35 11 1
(i) Census population figures were used and these are at slight variance
with population figures for 1970 given in the TMP. Consequently,
GDP per capita in this table differs from the figure given in the
TMP.
(ii) Percentages do not necessarily add up to 100 due to rounding error.
(iii) Includes the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur. , , . . .. I vfcr+ai
(iv) -Tout i oclu(/et> 1,4%o persons o^loO" a.UocaUiA To
Sources: Malaysia, 1970 Population Census, Community Groups, p. 45.
TMP. p. 201, Table 10-1.
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enjoy the highest income per capita, and the Malays in the four
northern states which have the lowest income per capita.
Peninsular Malaysia has experienced fairly rapid growth in
the size of its urban population which has grown from 15.9 per cent
2 5
of the total population in 1947 , to 32.0 per cent in 1975. The
cities are characterized as being largely non-Malay: non-Malays made
up 72.4 per cent of the urban population in 1970, falling slightly to
70.1 per cent in 1975.
Table 4.2
Degree of Urbanization by Race, Peninsular Malaysia, 1970-1975
Racial % of Total 1970 1975
Group Population % of Urban % of Rural % of Urban % of Rural
Population Population Population Population
Malay 53.2 27.6 63.5 29.9 63.9
Chinese 35.4 58.5 26.2 56.4 25.8
Indian 10.6 12.8 9.7 12.5 9.7
Others 0.8 1.1 0.7 1.2 0.6
Sources: Department of Statistics, 1970 Population and Housing Census of
Malaysia, Community Groups, p. 30, Table XI.
Malaysia, Mid-Term Review of Third Malaysia Plan 1976-1980.
p.61, Table 4-2.
A significant problem is that of very rapid population
growth. A high post war birth rate has been compounded by
improvements in public health which have brought a marked drop in
infant mortality from 75.7 per 1000 in 1957 to 40.8 per 1000 in 1970,
and an increase in male life expectancy from 55.8 years in 1957, to
59.8 years in 1970, to 61.6 years in 1975. The overall result is an
estimated rate of population growth of 2.6 per cent per annum in
1976 - 80.4
A consequence of the fairly recent spurt in the birth rate
is a very young age distribution: 45 per cent of the population
2 Department of Statistics. Socio-Economic Sample Survey of
Households. p. 66, Statement 14.
3 TMP. p. 149, para. 452 and 455.
4 Mid-Term Review of The Third Malaysia Plan, p. 60, Table 4-1.
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were in the age group 0-14 years in 1970,^ compared to 23 per cent
in Great Britain, 26 per cent in Japan and 30 per cent in the United
States. This places a burden on the 52 per cent of the population
who are in the working age population, the 15-64 age group, and must
£
support such a large dependent group. This large youth group is
gradually moving onto the labour market resulting in the growth of a
very young, and consequently inexperienced, labour force with the
problems this poses for management development.
The youth of the population in Malaysia combined with the
achievement of independence and the rising aspirations that that
brought, has produced an enormous demand for education. The
improvement in the availability of education is reflected in the
improved literacy rate, particularly amongst the younger generation,
shown in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3
Literacy Rate by Age Group
% literacy in each age group
Age Group 1947 1957 1967/68
6 - 27.5 66.4 93.5
24 - 44 38.2 45.9 68.6
45 and above 29.4 28.7 39.4
TOTAL 30.8 50.8 76.8
Source: Department of Statistics Socio-Economic Sample Survey of
Households. p. 59, Statement 8.
In 1967/68 the Socio-Economic Sample Survey of Households
found that 68 per cent of the population over 25 had no formal
education at all, and of those who had attended school 80.5 per cent
had not received more than a primary education.'' Only 10 per
5 Department of Statistics, 1970 Population Census, Age
Distributions. p. 55.
6 loc. cit.
7 Socio-Economic Sample Survey of Households. pp. 61 and 63.
Statements 10 and 11.
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cent of those who had attended school, or 4 per cent of the
population in Peninsular Malaysia, had achieved middle secondary
education or above, that is, what might be considered the very
minimum education for a management recruit. By 1975 well over 90 per
cent of the appropriate age group was receiving primary education and
g
50-60 per cent, secondary education.
The figures for the population as a whole are of interest
but it is the characteristics of the labour force that are of
particular relevance. The labour force in Peninsular Malaysia was
3,035,000 in 1970 and 3,590,000 in 1975. Between 1966-70 it grew by
an average of 2.9 per cent a year, and 1971-75 by 3.2 per cent
overall. However, as a result of the demographic pattern already
mentioned the labour force between the ages of 15-29 increased by 4.8
per cent between 1971-75.
The pattern of employment by industry is given in Table
4.4. Roughly half the employed population are to be found in
agriculture, forestry and fishing. The next largest single group is
employed in the public sector, followed by commerce and
manufacturing. Employment in manufacturing has grown particularly
rapidly and is expected to continue to do so. The overall employment
figures conceal some very marked racial differences. Table 4.4
includes the breakdown of the employment in each sector by race.
Malays are over-represented in agriculture and substantially
under-represented in mining, manufacturing, construction and
commerce. The pattern of Chinese employment is almost exactly the
opposite of this, whereas the Indians are over-represented in
utilities and to a lesser extent transport, storage and
communications, and under-represented in manufacturing and
construction. Although the situation ameliorated between 1970 and
1975, the differences remain marked. It is this pattern of racial
dominance of specific sectors that lies behind the call for racial
balance.
8 Mid-Term Review of The Third Malaysia Plan, p. 83, Table 5-4.
TABLE4.4
EmploymentbRaceandSect r,Peninsu arMal ysia,1970-1975
Number%ofT talfTotalEmpl yedinSect r EmployedEmployment (000)MalayChineseIndi nOthers






























































































































Not only is there a racial concentration in different
industries but also at the different functional levels within the
various sectors as Table 4.5 shows. In 1970, the Chinese formed 70
per cent of the administrative and managerial workers in the primary
sector and 76 per cent in the secondary sector. In the field of
sales their share rose to 73 per cent in the primary sector and 81
per cent in the secondary sector. Their dominance in these fields
was largely at the expense of Malays who formed 20 per cent of
administrative and managerial workers and 19 per cent of sales
workers in the primary sector and 15 per cent and 9 per cent in these
fields in the secondary sector. The only occupation in which Malays
were over-represented was among agricultural workers where they
comprised 69 per cent overall. Indians were concentrated in clerical
employment in the primary and secondary sectors, where they made up
32 per cent and 17 per cent respectively; amongst production and
service workers, of which they comprised 24 per cent in the primary
sector; and amongst agricultural workers in the secondary and
tertiary sectors, where they made up 17 per cent and 23 per cent
respectively.
The Socio-Economic Sample Survey of Households brings these
differences out very clearly. These figures are presented in Table
4.6. The Malays are concentrated in agriculture and Government
employment, the Chinese in business and the Indians in estate work
and, to a lesser extent, Government employment. This identification
of race with economic function is one of the characteristics of the
Malaysian labour force and the extent of it accentuates the
difficulties involved in achieving the racial balance desired by the
Government.
In the face of the rapid rate of population growth and the
even more rapid growth of the labour force, Malaysia has been
struggling to expand its employment opportunities. Between 1962-67
employment rose at an average of 2.7 per cent a year, but the labour
force rose at 2.9 per cent a year; as a result unemployment rose from
6 per cent in 1960 to 7.4 per cent in 1970. Under the Second
Malaysia Plan, 1971-75, employment grew at the rate of 3.3 per cent
TABLE4.5
EmploymentbOccupationandR ce,Peni sularMalaysia,1970 PrimarySectorSecondarySe tor MalayChineseIndi nOthers





































































































































































































































































































(i)Agriculture. (ii)M ning,manufacturing,co structionut lities,tr nsportdcommunications. (iii)Trade,commerce,publidministrationa dotherservi s. Source:ThirdMalaysiaPl n,p.181-2,T ble9-7.
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Table 4.6








Family workers without pay (i)
% of total employed in sector






















Others 46.9 44.2 8.2
TOTAL 49.8 36.4 12.6
(i) Unpaid family workers shown here are by and large engaged in
agriculture though some of these are also engaged in trading
activities.
Source: Department of Statistics, Socio-Economic Sample Survey
of Households, p.90, Statement 8.
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Table 4.6
Percentage Distribution of Employed by Socio-economic Group and Race,
Peninsular Malaysia, 1967/68
% of total employed in sector
Malays Chinese Indians
Government department or
statutory body 57.9 18.7 20.7
Smallholding agriculture 77.2 20.1 1.6
Owner operator 82.3 15.8 0.5
Operator 89.3 8.0 1.2
Wage Earner 62.2 34.0 3.3
Family workers without pay^^ 67.9 29.0 1.5
Estate Workers 26.8 27.6 45.2
Private company, partnership, 27.6 62.2 9.4
or proprietorship other
than agriculture
Others 46.9 44.2 8.2
TOTAL 49.8 36.4 12.6
(i) Unpaid family workers shown here are by and large engaged in
agriculture though some of these are also engaged in trading
activities.
Source: Department of Statistics, Socio-Economic Sample Survey
of Households, p.90, Statement 8.
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a year, while the labour force grew at 3.2 per cent; this brought
9
unemployment in Malaysia as a whole down to 7.0 per cent in 1975 and
6.2 per cent in 197810. Although the tide seems to be turning,
unemployment remains a serious problem that could present a threat to
the stability of the country, and consequently the Government has set
itself the target of bringing the unemployment rate down to 3.9 per
cent by 1990. It is a problem particularly amongst the young, the
rate being as high as 22.8 per cent amongst the 15 - 19 age group
in 1971, brought down to 16.6 per cent in 1974 and 15.6 per cent in
1977. Unemployment amongst this age group in the urban areas was
even higher: 28.3 per cent in 1971, falling to 18.8 per cent in 1974,
and 17.3 per cent in 1977. Unemployment is also more acute amongst
non-Malays: amongst Chinese it rose from 7.0 per cent in 1970 to 7.2
per cent in 1975, amongst Indians from 11.0 per cent to 12.2 per
cent. While amongst Malays it fell from 8.1 per cent to 6.9 per
12
cent. These figures show the impact racial balance policies have
had on unemployment opportunities amongst non-Malays. As a result
13
competition for jobs is very keen.
THE ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF MALAYSIA'S MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY
In Malaysia racial considerations play a very important
part in the choice and development of managerial staff. It is
therefore essential to understand the nature of the racial problems
and the differences between the races.
In the economic development of Malaya following British
intervention, one vital factor was missing - a labour force. The
Malay community was already occupied as farmers and fishermen and was
9 TMP. p. 140, Table 8-1.
10 Mid-Term Review of The Third Malaysia Plan, p. 64, Table 4-5.
11 TMP. p. 141, para. 427. Mid-Term Review of the Third Malaysia
Plan, p. 65, para. 163.
12 TMP. p. 141, para. 429.
13 See p.282.
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unwilling to toil for foreign interests. In his Report as High
Commissioner for the Federated Malay States in 1901 Swettenham makes
this clear:
Malays cannot be regarded as an available source of
labour supply. When they work it is for themselves,
on their own land, and very few of them can be
persuaded to accept emplo^^ent as agricultural
labourers, or on public works.
The Chinese mine-owners solved this problem by arranging
for the transportation to Malaya of large numbers of Chinese workers.
By the mid-nineteenth century this was highly organized with
professional recruiters contacting potential immigrants in China and
accompanying them by ship to Malaya. The success of Chinese labour
was commended by Sir Hugh Clifford to the Royal Colonial Institute in
1902:
The Chinaman is an excellent labourer, and moreover a
very shrewd and reliable man of business. He stands
possessed of just that energy, enterprise, continuity
of purpose and dogged determijpation to succeed which
the Malay most signally lacks.
The stability of British control encouraged increasing
numbers of Chinese to immigrate. Nonetheless, Chinese labour was
so essential that direct measures were taken to further Chinese
immigration: in 1899 a scheme was instituted for assisting Chinese
immigration and in 1904 a convention was signed between China and
Britain to regularize the immigration of Chinese to British Colonies
and Protectorates. Most of these early Chinese labourers came in as
indentured labour and the abuses were many. In 1877 a Chinese
Protectorate had been established to be responsible for the position
14 F.A. Swettenham, "High Commissioner's Report for Federated Malay
States for 1901," Reports on Federated Malay States
for 1901. Cd. 1297. p. 4.
15 H. Clifford, "British and Siamese Malaya," Proceedings,
Royal Colonial Institute, XXXIV (1902-1903), p. 55.
16 Victor Purcell estimates that in Perak the number of Chinese
miners increased from 9,000 in 1871 to nearly 50,000 in 1882, to
90,000 in 1891. V. Purcell, op.cit. , pp. 8-9.
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of the Chinese in Malaya, and in 1914, the Labour Contracts Ordinance
abolished Chinese indentured immigration. For the most part though,
the Chinese looked after themselves and little was done on an
official level to relieve the hardship of Chinese immigrants.
With the opening up of rubber estates a more reliable
source of labour was needed. The Chinese were reluctant to work for
non-Chinese and so rarely accepted employment outside the few
Chinese-owned estates, except indirectly as contract labour working
for a Chinese go-between.
There was a certain amount of immigration of Malays from
Sumatra, Java, and the neighbouring islands who were fairly rapidly
assimilated into Malay society. Although they accepted some
employment on estates, this proved to be insufficient to meet the
demand for labour.
Many of the European planters came from Ceylon where they
had used Tamils as tappers. With the precedent of using imported
Indian labour established, and the convenience of arranging for such
immigration given a British colonial administration in India, it was
natural that they should turn to Tamils to work their Malayan
estates. To assist Indian immigration, in 1907 the Government set up
the Indian Immigration Fund which was a compulsory levy on employers
used to finance the transportation of Indian labour. But by 1910
indentured Indian immigration had been banned and all subsequent
Indian immigration was voluntary.
One of the advantages of Indian labour so far as the
Government was concerned was that it could be repatriated during a
slump. In this way the Government was able to avoid problems of
unemployment. In fact, Chinese immigrants also tended to flow back
to China during a depression but this was through choice rather than
compulsion.^
17 The figures for arrivals and departures during the period of the
1930's depression illustrate this. Because Indian labour flows
were dictated by the Government it was possible to begin
repatriation immediately the economy started to take a down




There was a constant need for the Government to recruit
more labourers. This was not only for the plantations; the
Government was forced to rely upon Indians for railway and road
building and other public works. As the country developed, the need
for labour continually grew. In 1901 there were already 301,463
Chinese and 58,386 Indians to 313,205 Malays, while by 1911 the
figures had jumped to 433,244 Chinese and 172,465 Indians to 420,840
Malays, and in 1921 they stood at 494,540 Chinese and 305,219 Indians
18
to 510,810 Malays. The Malays had become a minority in their own
country with the Government minimally aware of this and little
concerned first, because immigration meant an increased rate of
development, and second, because the immigrants were considered to be
temporary residents in Malaya.
Not only were the immigrants concentrated in the modern
sector of the economy but also in the towns. Table 4.7 presents the
population breakdown of the five largest towns in the Federated Malay
States in 1921.
Table 4.7
Population of the Five Largest Towns in FMS, 1921
Malay Chinese Indian Other Total
Kuala Lumpur 7,297 48,587 20,889 3,651 80,424
Ipoh 3,583 24,434 7,718 1,125 '26,860
Taiping 1,839 12,193 6,349 730 21,111
Seremban 1,283 12,110 3,058 821 17,272
Kampar 310 10,475 1,482 58 12,325
Source: Census of British Malaya 1921. p. 171-172 , Table XI.
Movement of Chinese and Indians into and out of Malaya
Indians Chinese
Arrivals Departures Difference Arrivals Departures Difference
1929 114,252 76,854 +37,398 264,591 164,826 + 99,765
1930 69,114 151,755 -82,641 218,868 199,800 + 19,068





1932 17,734 84,501 191,809 -1«5"8,275
1933 - - - 28,464 86,555 - 58,091
1934 89,828 28,608 +61,220 109,267 68,129 + 41,138
1935 65,191 38,869 +26,322 145,853 69,025 + 76,828
1937 122,566 45,167 +77,399 243,304 66,502 +176,802
Source: K.A.N. Aiyer, Indian Problems in Malaya, pp. 122-123.
18 Census of British Malaya, 1921. p. 29.
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This gave them access to the modern facilities the British brought
with them - schools, hospitals, communications, etc. While the
Malays remained isolated in the countryside. In the early years,
immigrant groups were transient. Few women came and the men tended
to return home to their families when they had accumulated sufficient
savings. An important change in the pattern of immigration came in
the 1930's. With the depression the Government decided to restrict
the immigration of Chinese men, but not women. The resulting influx
of women made the Chinese a far more settled population. Amongst the
Indians more direct action was taken. It was seen to be an advantage
to have a resident Indian labour force consequently men were
encouraged to bring their wives and children, and employers were paid
a higher recruiting allowance for married couples.
The result in both cases was withdrawal into traditional
culture and religion and the gulf between the communities grew
larger. Both groups arrived in such large numbers and came from such
rich cultural traditions that they did not assimilate. Religious
differences also kept them apart and discouraged inter-marriage, and
they were also given very few incentives to assimilate. Indian
labourers were repatriated during a slump and the Chinese were given
no reason to feel any particular allegiance to the country; like the
British commercial community, they were there to make their fortune
and then return home.
With the redressing of the balance of the sexes there was a
marked increase in the number of Chinese and Indians born in Malaya.
These figures are given in Table 4.8. The immigrant population that
had been assumed to be transient was rapidly becoming permanent.
Table 4.8
Percent of Malayan Chinese and Indians Born in Malaya
1921 1931 1947 1957
Chinese 20.9 29.9 63.5 75.5
Indians 12.1 21.4 51.6 65.0
Source: 1957 Population Census. Vol. 14, p. 15.
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Milne summed up the problem neatly: "Arithmetically, the
sin of the British was not deliberate division, but rather insouciant
19
addition, of immigrants." In fact, each racial group was, and
largely still is, concentrated in a different economic and geographic
sector: the Chinese in tin and trading in the towns, the Indians in
rubber tapping on the estates, and the Malays in peasant agriculture
in the countryside. The three major communities were geographically,




The Malays are considered to be the rightful owners of
Malaysia. They are not the original inhabitants of the peninsula:
the aborigines of Malaya - the Negritos, Semai, Semelai, Temiar and
Jakuns - settled around 3,000 BC, 2,000 years before the Malays
migrated from Yunnan. However, their numbers are so small (52, 449
20
or 0.6 per cent of the population of Peninsular Malaysia in 1970),
their life style so primitive and their participation in modern
Malaysia so slight that they may be ignored. The Javanese and
Sumatran Malays who immigrated to Malaya in sizeable numbers
21
throughout much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were
fairly readily assimilated due to similarities of language, race and
religion and are now considered part of the indigenous Malay
community.
19 R.S. Milne, "Politics and Government," Malaysia, A Survey. Wang
Gungwu, ed. p. 328.
20 1970 Population and Housing Census, Community Groups, p. 82.
21 See Vlieland's discussion of this in British Malaya, A Report
on the 1931 Census, pp. 71-72.
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There is now a difficulty in studying Malay society for it
is going through a period of very rapid change. The following
generalizations must therefore be regarded as provisional.
Traditional Malay society bears many of the characteristics
of a peasant society described in Chapter 2. Malay society was a
feudal and this has influenced contemporary Malay society which still
recognizes class distinctions between noble and commoner. Indeed, a
Malay is considered to be subject to the ruler of his state and the
Malay aristocracy enjoy a prominent place in the political and
economic life of the country. The mass of Malays were, and the
majority still are, peasant farmers and fishermen with a relatively
simple economy based primarily on fishing and the cultivation of rice
and other food crops. Money was not widely used prior to British
intervention, since the limited commercial transactions of the market
place could be conducted by barter. Tin mining was a source of
revenue for Malay rulers and chiefs but only affected a small area of
the country. Therefore, no commercial middle class grew up and there
was little accumulation of wealth. It has been mentioned by a number
of observers that to acquire wealth in pre-intervention Malay society
22
was to invite confiscation by local chiefs. Where wealth was
acquired it was held as jewellery, livestock or land. Jewellery had
the advantage that it was, and still is, almost as liquid as cash and
could be sold if the need arose. Livestock could be put to use in
padi cultivation. Land, however, is particularly valued as providing
the security of a source of food as well as a deep sense of
23
belonging.
It is often suggested that Malay-Muslim values discouraged
Malays from entering the commercial sphere, for the Muslim religion
forbids usury, and it is usury, interpreted loosely, that enables a
modern economy to function. Islam condemns the materialism of the
business world. It is true that such tenets influenced Malay
22 For example, see Richard Winstedt, The Malays, A Cultural
History, p. 120.
23 E.K. Fisk, "Rural Development Policy," The Political Economy
of Independent Malaya, edited by T.H. Silcock and E.K. Fisk. p.
183.
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attitudes to business but probably because they reinforced the
existing antipathy of a peasant society towards commerce.
As farmers Malays had long periods of free time during the
growing and fallow seasons during which they could concentrate on
village and family life. As a result social custom and etiquette
became highly developed and unstinting hospitality the norm. E.K.
Fisk has commented:
These institutions yfi.e Malay custom and social
organization/, many of which perform a valuable
social function in their original context, are liable
to abuse, and act as deterrents to enterprise. An
obvious example is the social obligation, felt
seriously by most Malays, for conspicuous
expenditure, often on a scale they can il^^fford, on
certain special occasions such as marriage.
The Malay farmer is highly conservative and resistant to
change, an attitude illustrated by the Malay proverb: " Let our
children perish rather than our customs." He values formality,
courtesy and ceremony and has a natural dignity and pride which
affects his attitude towards work in the modern sector. The strength
of community ties is one of the factors that stabilizes, or
25
immobilizes, the Malay.
The Malay peninsula is a fruitful, tropical land and so
Malays were largely spared the hardships of cold and starvation.
However, disease was a problem. The rural population suffered from
intestinal parasites, malaria, and other illnesses which sapped their
energy. The British built hospitals but they were concentrated in
the towns and viewed with considerable suspicion by Malays. Although
food was bountiful the diet was often unbalanced.
Dr Mahathir, the current Deputy Prime Minster, has sought
to explain the inadequacy of Malay performance in competition with
24 ibid. , p. 184.
25 In 1957 less than an eighth of the indign/eous Malay population
lived outside the states of their birth. J.C.Caldwell, "The
Demographic Background," The Political Economy of Independent
Malaya. T.H. Silcock and E.K. Fisk, eds. p. 87.
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the Chinese by the effect of these social and geographic factors upon
26
the Malay people. He has suggested that the very fertility of the
land almost eliminated the operation of the law of the survival of
the fittest, and that this, in conjunction with Malay marriage
customs that encouraged inbreeding and pairing off even the most
handicapped members of society, led to the perpetuation of all the
weakest strains in the Malay race. He has also criticized the early
age of marriage amongst Malays which tended to throw the
27
responsibility for child-rearing upon over-indulgent grandparents.
To this must be added the instability of Muslim marriages which often
led to the children being relinquished to the care of elderly aunts
or grandparents where discipline was minimal, and the child was so
showered with attention that there was no opportunity for it to be
adventurous or to show initiative. (Such explanations recall David
OO
McClelland's findings.)
Malay society could not be completely insulated from the
changes overtaking the country: the introduction of a monetary
economy, the influx of immigrants who were skilled businessmen, and
the pressure on land for new development. Unable to cope with these
29
changes, the peasant frequently fell into debt. Islam also
contributed to the impoverishment of Malays through its laws of
inheritance which resulted in the division of Malay land holdings
between relatives so that they became uneconomic
26 Mahathir bin Mohamad, op. cit., Chapter 3.
27 Judith Djamour has also commented on the over-indulgence of
Malay parents towards their children. Judith Djamour,
Malay Kinship and Marriage in Singapore, p. 35.
28 See Chapter 2, p. 24-25.
29 This happened in two main ways: first, the 'padikunca' system
whereby credit was granted to be repayed in padi at harvest
time, at an interest of 60-100 per cent; and the 'jual janji'
system where land was offered as security for a debt and when
the borrower defaulted the land was 'sold' for the amount of the





An interesting explanation of Malays' reluctance to work in
31
the modern sector of the economy is put forward by P.J. Wilson. He
found Malays classified work into two types: 'kerja', work considered
worthwhile, that has an essential dignity and importance - this
applies to the traditional agrarian tasks that directly provide for
the basic needs of the family; and 'makan ganji' , work done to make
money, that has no intrinsic value to it. In the situation Wilson
was studying, rubber tapping fell into the latter category therefore
only the minimum was done to provide for the family's needs and there
was no interest in adopting more modern methods to improve the yield.
Wilson suggests that it is this attitude that influences Malay
32
response to factory and office work. Wilson continues:
Employment within the village is not thought of as an
impersonal relationship bound by a legal contract or
subject to sanctions outside of the persons involved
in the relationship. It is a social relationship
first and foremost, and it is this view of employment
that is carried from the village to the towns... The
obligation to observe the contract as first priority,
especially a contract in which 'makan ganji' rather
than 'kerja' is concerned, ^ unlikely to rank high
in the Malay scale of values.
As already stated the Malay places considerable importance
on social relations and the key factors in such relations are
equality and mutual respect. Rice-production, for instance, was
based on a system of mutual help based on mutual respect. The
result, Wilson suggests, is that Malays consider work relationships
30 The independent Government has sought to overcome these causes
of poverty by the supply of credit through agricultural
cooperatives and through the opening up of large tracts of land
to provide farms of an economic size, particularly to the
landless.
31 P.J. Wilson, A Malay Village and Malaysia.
32 ibid., p. 97.
33 ibid. , p. 97.
89
as social relationships, and expect them to function the same way.
Unfortunately, modern commerce and industry does not work this way:
the relationships are fundamentally contractual and entail no social
obligations. Since industrial relationships have no parallel in
Malay society, the Malay acts in the only way he knows, that is, in
the traditional personal way.
As a farmer the Malay is surrounded by his community and
generally works for himself and his family. He has a particular
dislike of working under foreigners. This was reflected in the
Malays' early disinterest in employment in the modern sector of the
economy and the pattern of Malay advancement through a largely Malay
civil service with entry into business only at the top level.
The tactic of the British Government in Malaya was indirect
rule: to preserve the position and status of the Malay aristocracy,
and equally the position and status of the Malay peasantry, while
itself assuming power and authority. Religion and custom alone
remained the preserve of the Sultans and this goes some way to
explaining the religious conservatism of the Malays. The position of
the aristocracy was maintained in a number of ways including, the
maintenance of the pomp of their positions through civil lists,
palaces, and periodic durbars; the provision of an elite system of
education as will be discussed in the next section; and the creation
of the Malayan Administrative Service (MAS) to bring high-ranking
Malays into the Civil Service.
A further consequence of this policy was the maintenance of
a quiescent Malay peasantry. While Malays showed no inclination to
enter the wage economy they were also given no encouragement, indeed
they were actively discouraged from doing so. As the pace of
development and land alienation increased in the early twentieth
century it was feared the Malay peasantry would become landless.
This would endanger the political stability of the country and
Government policy towards the Malays, consequently Malay reservations
were created consisting of tracts of land reserved exclusively for
Malays and intended for use for rice cultivation and, the Rice Lands
34 ibid., pp. 106-107.
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Enactment of 1917 and the Malay Reservations Enactment forbade the
growing of rubber on such land. These reserves kept the Malay
community in isolation from changes taking place in the rest of the
country. The Selangor Malay Association described them as,
...land traps, in which Malays are forced to seek a
living like sheep allowed to eat only the grass
inside the pen, while non-Malays, like wild animals,
are given complete freedom to take their will
outside.
Thus it was not only their own inclinations but also Government
policy that held Malays in a traditional peasant society while all
around them the country was changing and developing.
It would be inaccurate to say that there were no Malay
businessmen. There are a very small proportion of Malays who are in
business. They tend to be concentrated on the East Coast which is
36
predominantly Malay. Oliver Popenoe's study revealed that Malay
entrepreneurs do in some ways conform to the characteristic pattern,
and the more they do so the more likely they are to be progressive
and successful. They seem to have chosen business as a result of the
closure of other, preferred, alternatives such as Government service,
and they were in some way marginal figures - through English
education, marriage to a foreigner, and/or association with
non-Malays. Almost two thirds of them had a tradition of business in
the family. The more innovative amongst them were particularly
'modern' in outlook and experience, as opposed to traditional: they
were better educated, far more likely to speak English, had travelled
abroad, were urbanized, read newspapers daily - often two or
more - had opinions on the problems of the nation, and they preferred
to hire professionals rather than family for management.
35 Mohd. Yunus Hamidi, Sejarah Pergerakan Politik Melayu
Semenanjong. p.4, quoted in W.R. Roff, The Origins of Malay
Nationalism, p. 240.
36 Oliver Popenoe, "Malay Entrepreneurs: An Analysis of the Social
Backgrounds, Careers and Attitudes of the Leading Malay
Businessmen in West Malaysia." PhD London 1970.
91
Interestingly enough, this group came from stronger religious
backgrounds than the population as a whole, and than the less
37
innovative. They also tended to be of a higher socio-economic
group than the less innovative, a factor that might have given them
the self-confidence required for success. Popenoe's study confirms
the idea that if Malays are to succeed in business they need to
abandon many of their traditional ways and become 'modern men'.
With the growth of the Government's programme to increase
the proportion of Malays in business, more and more Malays are
entering the private sector with no previous experience. They lack
the formal and the informal network that assists Chinese in business.
They often also lack the capital, and technical experience. In such
a case a Malay with a preferential licence may join up with a Chinese
who actually runs the business. This is often referred to as an
"Ali-Baba" arrangement. (The business being registered in the name
of the Malay 'Ali', while the Chinese 'Baba' operates it.) If he is
entering an established firm, the Malay may have little idea of the
demands of a management position. A great deal of reorientation is,
therefore, necessary.
Recent changes in the social pattern have begun the process
of modernization, a process that the Government is deliberately
undertaking. The Malay population is becoming increasingly urban,
better educated, healthier, and more self-confident. Yet some of the
measures to assist Malays through specialized institutions isolate
them from that contact with non-Malays which seems to have been
important to the innovative entrepreneurs Popenoe studied, and the
changes in education make it unnecessary for them to master English,
which again will isolate them from the more advanced forms of
technology and management and the international perspective that
appears to be an important characteristic of the 'modern man'.
Despite the changes that are taking place in Malaysian
society, the majority are still simple farmers and fishermen with
37 This factor can probably be explained by the fact that religion
was virtually the only avenue open to the Malay with leadership
potential.
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many of the characteristic attitudes and values of peasants towards
work, time, religion and rank.
The Malay community wants a share in education, senior
posts and affluence and it is motivated to get them in the way with
which it is familiar, by Government action. Since Malays have the
controlling influence in Parliament this is particularly effective
but it does not alter the dilemma of their position: wanting the
rewards of modern commercial and industrial life while seeking to
preserve traditional attitudes and values that are incompatible with
it. This is one of the major problems of management development in
Malaysia: to accept that the premises and assumptions of Western
enterprize are foreign to Malays, indeed, run counter to their own
set of premises, and to find some way of bridging this gap, of
modifying the assumptions of the company, and those of Malays so that
there can be a marriage of interests.
The Chinese
Chinese contact with Malaya dates from the Han Dynasty
(206BC - 205AD). During these very early years communication was
limited to the visits of official envoys, travellers and monks.
Their stays were brief and no permanent settlements were established.
In the sixteenth century the first small colonies of Chinese appeared
servicing Chinese traders, but it was not until the nineteenth
century and the discovery of tin that significant numbers of Chinese
migrated and it was the presence of the British that provided the
security and stability which invited the large scale migration of the
early twentieth century.
At the same time events in China were pressing many to the
point of desperation. Most Chinese emigrants were from the southern
provinces of Kwantung and Fukien. Although traditionally these were
amongst the richest provinces, the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries saw them afflicted by floods and famine as never before.
The extraordinary population increase that China experienced in the
eighteenth century aggravated the already acute problem of
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over-population. Besides these natural disasters, the southern
provinces were distinctly out of sympathy with the ruling Manchus,
and as a result of their provision of supplies to the anti-Manchu
pirate Koxinga, they felt the full force of Manchu reprisals. Malaya
was close at hand, of similar climate, and had already been visited
by traders from these provinces. Yet all these considerations
Purcell, who is one of the foremost authorities on the Chinese in
Malaya, considers secondary to the natural energy and enterprise of
the people of Kwantung and Fukien. "This," he says, "is probably
38
more important than all the other reasons put together."
This early period of settlement was marked by close contact
between Chinese and Malays. Since the Manchus forbade emigration
those who did emigrate and tried to return were liable to the death
penalty, so the Chinese who came during the first half of the
nineteenth century looked upon themselves as semi-permanent residents
in Malaya. Having left their wives and families behind them they
intermarried freely with the Malays. It was only as the male-female
ratio evened up in the twentieth century that intermarriage, in fact,
social intercourse of any sort between the Chinese and Malays,
ceased.
In 1860 the Manchu ban on emigration was disposed of in
39
treaties, and from then most Chinese who came to Malaya did so with
the intention of making enough money to retire to China in ease; a
more transient community than the early Chinese emigrants.
Chinese immigrants worked exceedingly hard; they had been
used to constant struggle and penury in China and so were willing to
endure the back-breaking toil of the tin-mines that promised future
rewards. They had left China out of economic necessity and entered
business also out of necessity. Since capital was scarce, mines were
often opened up on a profit-sharing basis where the labourer worked
unpaid until the mine began to make money and then, as the term
38 V. Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya, p. 6.
39 The law was not actually repealed until 1894 but it had ceased
to be effective.
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implies, was given a share in the profits. By such arrangements the
Chinese were able to make maximum use of virtually their sole asset:
labour.
Reinforcing these attitudes of hard work, cooperation and
frugality was the extended Chinese family. As the upbringing of
Malay children encouraged an easy-going approach to life, so that of
Chinese children encouraged a selfless, disciplined approach to life.
Family bonds were strong and the family unit, extremely stable. The
honour and well-being of the family as a whole was always placed
before the happiness of the individual, and the child saw himself as
only a part of a greater whole the interests of which were at all
times uppermost.
Isolated both from their motherland and the host society,
the Chinese drew comfort and support from their culture and
40
community. Learning has always been highly prized by the Chinese
and they took pains to establish suitable schools for their children.
They brought their customs, religions, and festivals and drew a
certain security from the great heritage of Chinese culture. This
contributed further to their isolation from the rest of Malayan
society. They also maintained family links with China by sending
money home to their relatives.
Besides their willingness to put up with long hours of the
hardest work, the Chinese did have another distinct advantage over
the Malays, their familiarity with a monetary economy. They
accumulated wealth because, in comparison with the people among who
they came to live, they were highly sophisticated in the handling of
money.
At the outset they knew not only how to work
themselves but also how to make their money work.
Their financial skill rested above all on three
characteristics of the society in which they were
raised: the respectability of the pursuit of riches,
relative immunity of surplus wealth from confiscation
40 It is the scholar who ranks highest in the Confucian social
order.
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by political superiors, and the legitimacy of careful
and interested financi^ dealings between neighbours
and even close kinsmen.
They had a developed set of attitudes and organizational
tools to facilitate trade and commerce. A code of honour hound them
to keep all agreements and informal social sanctions were applied to
those who did not. In a strange country where the individual needed
the support and protection of the community this was a powerful
penalty. They had learned the advantages of family
enterprises - complete honesty and commitment. Mutual help
associations of all sorts had been developed, one of the most
prominent and certainly most useful in Malaya being the Money Loan
Association which provided the sort of seed money needed to launch a
new business. Another form of organization they brought was trade
guilds; these established such matters as hours and rates of work,
and terms of apprenticeship.
The contribution of the Chinese to the development of
Malaya was enormous:
The Chinaman has been from the beginning the muscle
and sinew of the community, and also, in no small
degree, its brains as well. For every one commercial
enterprise which owes it success to the initiative of
the European in the Peninsula there are hundreds,
organised, financed, and managed entirely by
Chinamen, and the Federated Malay States owe an
incalculable debt to the courag^ persistency, and
ability of their Chinese citizens.
The one area into which they did not venture was politics.
It was taken as an almost unwritten law that they would have nothing
to do with it as long as they were left free to pursue their
commercial activities. The British on their part refrained from
41 M. Freedman, "The Handling of Money: A Note on the Background of
the Economic Sophistication of the Overseas Chinese,"
Readings in Malayan Economics. T.H. Silcock, ed. pp. 38 and 42.
42 H. Clifford, "British and Siamese Malaya", op. cit. , p. 55-56.
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interfering with the Chinese community, and so far as its internal
affairs were concerned the Chinese community governed itself, a
pattern they were used to from China. This reinforced the influence
of the family or clan.
But, the Chinese cannot be considered as a homogeneous
community. Within it there are many divisions - between the
different dialect groups, between the Straits Chinese who have been
settled in Malaya for centuries and the new immigrants, between the
English educated and the Chinese educated. To illustrate the range
of dialectical groupings, Table 4.9 gives a breakdown of the Chinese
population by dialect.
Table 4.9
The Chinese Population of Peninsular Malaysia by Dialect Group, 1970
Dialect Group Number %
Hokkien 1,068,803 34










Source: 1970 Population and Housing Census of Malaysia, Community
Groups p. 83.
There is a tendency for Chinese firms to specialize
according to their dialect group. Hokkiens dominate the rubber
trade; Hakkas and Cantonese, the tin mining industry; Cantonese, the
restaurants; Hainanese, the coffee shops; Hockchews, the bicycle
trade; Teochews, rice importing and goldsmiths shops; and Hakkas,
43textile shops and medical halls.
43 Goh Joon Hai, "Some Aspects of the Chinese Business World in
Malaya," Ekonomi, III, 1 (December, 1962), pp. 93-94.
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There are strong business and social links within each
industrial/dialect group with a mutual trust and co-operation between
the individuals concerned. Unity of the group is maintained through
strict discipline and adherence to a traditional code of behaviour.
This makes it extremely difficult for someone from outside the
dialect group, let alone a non-Chinese, to break into these
industries for they will have none of the supportive business network
to assist them and will find it impossible to compete.
The Chinese in Malaysia thus conform very closely to the
entrepreneurial pattern discussed in Chapter 2: they are a marginal
group in a state of tension within the main stream of Malaysian
society and with a strong degree of internal cohesion. They chose
commerce as the only route to advancement open to them. Indeed, it
was the new arrival from China who tended to be the most active
entrepreneurial businessman, those well established in Malaysia and
integrated into the rest of society had some of their drive sapped.
Having acquired a comfortable standard of living and alternative
routes to advancement many Chinese urge their children to train for
the professions rather than for business. In the Chinese value
system business is not a prestigious occupation. The classic story
in Malaysia is of the Chinese iced water seller, or food hawker who
has become a millionaire. He still dresses in shorts and vest and
lives little differently from his early days. It is this frugality
that has enabled him to save and invest his money. Indeed, it is
said that only a coolie can become a millionaire. His son is usually
at university and has probably lost much of his father's powerful
entrepreneurial drive. However, he is gaining technical
qualifications in considerable demand in modern Malaysian society.
The Chinese put great emphasis on achievement since in the
Malaysian Chinese context a man is what he achieves; financial
achievement is the chief criterion for social status. There is no
possibility of inherited social status since all the Chinese came as
impoverished peasants.
The pattern of Chinese social and commercial life has
enabled them to excel in business and to establish a virtual monopoly
over certain trades. This goes a long way to explaining
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why the Government has given the Malays such strong preferences to
enable them to begin to compete with the Chinese. Chinese companies,
themselves, face a problem of adapting to the new opportunities in
manufacturing where the need for technically qualified professional
management and a higher level of capitalization impose new conditions
for which the family concern is ill-suited. Overall the Chinese
continue to make an enormous contribution to business im
Malaysia.
The Indians
The Indians form a third, though smaller, element in
Malaysian society. They have never been so numerous as the Chinese
nor have they risen to such economic prominence. Like the Chinese
their association with the peninsula dates back a long time. There
was a small Indian quarter in old Malacca in the sixteenth century,
but the Indian culture and religion had been brought to Malaya even
earlier by the Hindu Kingdom of Srivijaya which left its imprint
firmly upon Malay culture.
Indians were first brought to Malaya in the modern period
as convict labour to build the roads and public buildings of the
Straits Settlements. This practice was abandoned before Britain had
extended her sphere of influence to the Federated Malay States, but
when large supplies of cheap labour were required for the rubber
plantations it was to India again that she turned. In Malaya where
provision of an adequate labour supply was a chronic problem, and
where the variability of the tin and rubber markets brought periodic
depression and retrenchment, the convenience of Indian labour was
very welcome.
For the most part, Indians in Malaya were desperately poor,
living in isolation on the estates, in the meanest conditions where
health standards were low and mortality rates, at times, shockingly
44
high . Like the Chinese they came from poverty, but unlike the
44 The Annual Reports give an idea of just how bad the situation
was at times. See for example: Report for 1911 on FMS. p. 12,
and Report for 1912 on FMS, p. 23.
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Chinese they never worked their way out of it. This was partly
because of the Hindu caste system that bound them to the bottom of
the social ladder, and partly because wages paid to Indian rubber
45
tappers were amongst the lowest in the Federated Malay States.
Not all Indians in the Malay States were labourers though.
A small number of Indians from the middle-class immigrated
independently, and they came with some financial backing, a trade and
a degree of familiarity with the ways of British rule. Coming from a
British-ruled territory they knew well the commercial value of
English education. They were, therefore, quick to take advantage of
the English schools opened by missionaries and the opportunities both
in Government service and in the professions such schooling afforded.
The conservatism of the Indian immigrant displayed itself
in his social life and attitudes. The labourer who came for only one
to two years turned to his customs and religion as his sole comfort
away from home. Likewise, the more affluent Indian relied upon his
culture and community for support. He eschewed intermarriage
preferring to send back to India for a wife than marry a non-Indian,
so creating a tightly-knit, inward-looking community. The notable
exception was the Muslim Indian: the faith he shared in common with
the Malay helped to bridge the racial gap and so made integration
easier.
45 Comparative Rates of Pay on Rubber Estates for Tamils, Javanese
and Chinese (daily wages in cents):
Perak Selangor N Semb ilan Pahang
High Low High Low High Low High Low
Tamil (men) 50 30 50 27 50 28 65 25
Javanese 50 25 50 35 55 26 50 35
Chinese 90 40 90 50 90 52 100 60
Source: Report for 1913 on FMS. p. 13.
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The Indian business community, like the Chinese, was
specialized largely along caste lines for they stuck to their
traditional occupations. The Gujaratis are usually merchants with
large business concerns. The Marakkayars were general merchants and
petty shopkeepers (being Muslim they intermarried with Malays);
Chettiars are bankers and money-lenders; Sikhs and Pathans, policemen
and watchmen as well as money-lenders; and Jaffna Tamils, lawyers,
46
doctors, and Government clerks, especially in the railways. Many
of their business concerns are run on family lines and recruitment
tends to be restricted to family and close friends. This is
particularly so in the field of banking and money-lending where
security considerations are uppermost. Indeed, in the past they
recruited staff from India with well-known family backgrounds, and
paid them in Indian currency. All accounts were kept in Tamil and
47
therefore businesses could not employ a non-Tamil speaker.
The Indian and Chinese communities responded to modern
economic developments very differently to the Malays. This was
partly because they were self-selected and formed the more
enterprizing part of Chinese and Indian society. Hunter has also
suggested that their own level of culture and sophistication was such
that they were not overwhelmed by Western concepts and technology but
48
were able to adapt them to their own advantage. The Malays lacking
their cultural self-assurance, felt themselves at an acute
disadvantage and acquired a sense of inferiority.
+ + +
Malaysian society is marked by a very high degree of ethnic
and occupational specialization. A specialization based on knowledge
and experience and reinforced by social, cultural and organizational
factors. The British, who had been responsible for the influx of
46 U. Mahajani, The Role of Indian Minorities in Burma and
Malaya. pp. 98-100.
47 ibid., p. 99-100.
48 G. Hunter, South-East Asia - Race, Culture and Nation,
p. 61.
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immigrants, tended not to interfere and so this situation became
firmly established.
The problem of achieving racial balance, therefore, is a
particularly daunting one. The fact that the Malays have virtually
no tradition of commerce, and come from a society whose values are
different from those of an industrial one, only makes it more
difficult and more challenging to companies to find a means of
effectively developing Malay managerial talent.
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION
A very important factor in the pre-experience development
of managers is education and in Malaysia it has had a particularly
significant effect. It is therefore appropriate that it be examined
in some detail.
When the British arrived in Malaya the only type of formal
education was instruction in the Koran. Indeed, Raffles was stirred
to propound in his Minute on Education,
...wherever our flag is carried, it should confer the
benefits of civilization on those whom it
protects,..., in proportion as we extend the field of
our own inquiry and information, we should apply it
to the advantage of those with whom we are connected,
and endeavour to bring among them the light of
knowledge ai^ the means of moral and intellectual
improvement.
The same year, 1838, he advocated the founding of a college
in which would be taught the languages of China, Siam and the Malay
Archipelago. It had been established subsequently in India in 1854
that it was the responsibility of the Government to provide a
complete system of schooling from lower primary to university.
Nonetheless, in Malaya education took second place to economic and
political considerations. Prior to 1920 at no time did expenditure
on education in the FMS exceed 1.6 per cent of total expenditure.
Money was needed to build the railways and roads that would stimulate
economic growth and it was only when this was well under way in the
49 Sir T. Stamford Raffles, "Minute on Education," Appendix in
C.E.Wurtzburg, Raffles of the Eastern Isles, p. 627-8.
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mid-1920's and 1930's that more was diverted into education.
There was no single comprehensive policy towards education,
rather it tended to evolve in a rather haphazard fashion according to
economic and political requirements. Education, like so much else in
Malaya, followed communal lines and will therefore be dealt with
first by looking at the history of the four school systems - Malay,
English, Chinese and Tamil - and then by examining the education
situation since independence.
Malay Education
The one area in which British thinking was fairly well
defined was Malay education. Here there were two discrete policies:
one for the Malay elite and one for the 'raayat', the masses, with
two separate schooling systems to take care of each group.
As in the political sphere, in education the British were
concerned to protect the position and prestige of the Malay leaders,
so ensuring their loyalty. This was to be done by educating them for
positions in Government administration. The official policy was
articulated by Sir Cecil Smith, Governor of Malaya, in a letter to
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in 1893,
...I wish to refer to the result of the policy
regarding the education of the Malays for employment
in the administration. This has been kept steadily
in view as a cardinal feature in the government of
the States, and has met with a considerable measure
of success. Throughout the States there is an
increasing number of Malays, who, with 'hereditary or
customary claims to office,' are being trained and
are helping to educate themselves to take an active
and responsible share in the Government. The
importance of the policy referred to, whether as
regards our simple duty towards the Protected States
or as regards the expediency of doing all that is
feasible to make the natives have the greatest
interest in t^ljp welfare of their own country, cannot
be overrated.
In pursuance of this policy, the Malay College was opened
at Kuala Kangsar in 1905. The College was itself unique, in that it
50 Quoted in F.A. Swettenham, British Malaya, p. 259.
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principally accepted children of royal blood, either the sons of
Sultans or close relatives and only occasionally the children of
lesser Malay leaders. Indeed, it was restricted to Malay nobility
until after World War II. Social distinctions were rigidly
maintained with royal children classified as Grade I students and
welcomed as boarders into the home of the Principal of the school
while the children of lesser chiefs were termed Grade III students
and assigned to dormitories. E.W. Birch, the Resident of Perak,
stated "As this school is exclusively for boys of gentle birth, all
51
the surroundings should be substantial and attractive." The cost
per student reflected this comfort: at the Malay College it was about
52
$290 a year; in an ordinary vernacular school, $15. The subjects
studied, the language of instruction, the emphasis on games, the
importance given to character training - these were all inspired by
the English Public School. Students were expected to become leaders
of their community and were groomed for that role with special
arrangements being made for prominent graduates to go on to a term of
study in England.
The Malay College also served the interests of the Malays,
in that it provided a small elite group of well-educated Malay
aristocrats who now make up the political and bureaucratic leadership
of the country.
Malay vernacular education was radically different, though
its primary concern was the same: the security of the State. In
fulfilling this end there were two main dangers to be avoided:
over-education and English education. A.N. Kenion expressed the
typical British view with regard to the education of Malays in an
address to the Federal Council:
The great object of education is to train a man to
make his living...You can teach your Malays so that
they remain in the padifields and so that they do not
lose their skill and craft in fishing and jungle
work. Teach them the dignity of manual labour,so
51 Perak Administrative Report for the Year 1905. p. 12.
52 Chai Hon-Chan, The Development of British Malaya
1896-1909. p. 245.
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that they do not all become "Kranis" /clerks/, and I
am sure you will not have the troqb^le which has
arisen in India through over-education.
Education had to be "safe", its object was to preserve the status
54
quo, the simple agrarian life. The fostering of docility and
obedience, of acceptance of their lot became a primary focus of Malay
vernacular education.
The risks inherent in teaching English were frequently
expounded upon by Swettenham who did all that he could as Resident in
Perak to prevent the spread of English education. In the Annual
Report on the State of Perak for 1890 he wrote:
The one danger to be guarded against is to teach
English indiscriminately. It could not be well
taught except in a few schools, and I do not think it
is at all advisable to attempt to give to the
children of an agricultural population an indifferent
knowledge of a language that to all but the very few
would unfit them for the duties of life and mgjse them
discontented with anything like manual labour.
The initial reaction of the Malay people to this form of
education was suspicion and hostility, seeing the white man's
teaching as a threat to their religion and customs. In order to
overcome resistance, Malay schools started by using the Koran
schools, giving normal classes in the morning and letting the Hadjis
56
give Koranic instruction in the afternoons. They used schools as
53 K.N. Kenion, Federal Council Proceedings 1915. p. B66.
54 Besides reading, writing and arithmetic, the curriculum included
tropical hygiene, gardening, poultry-keeping, and general
handiwork.
55 F.A. Swettenham, Report on the State of Perak for 1890. p. 16.
56 The Acting Lieutenant Governor, Penang, wrote to the Colonial
Secretary, in September 1871:
"I agree with Mr Skinner in his suggestion that we must
commence these Schools as supplementary to the existing system,
whereby the child is only required to know by heart a few texts
of the Koran. By this means we shall carry the Priests with us
continued
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distributing centres for quinine and exerted pressure on the village
'penghulus' , or headmen, to persuade people to send their children to
school. In 1908, it was made compulsory for Malay boys in the
Federated Malay States within one and a half miles of a school to be
in attendance there. The very fact that the British were willing to
go through the formalities of legislation to make schooling
compulsory for Malays indicates the seriousness with which they
viewed the subject.
Malay education for girls moved more slowly.^ Parents
were reluctant to let their daughters attend school and tended to
withdraw them at puberty to preserve their virtue. The curriculum in
these schools provided little of any intellectual worth. Winstedt
wrote in 1921:
The curriculum of the girls' schools is no longer
dead and uninspiring. Cookery, clay-modelling,
paper-cutting, drawn-thread work, and hygiene taught
by lady Medical Officers are romantic subjects for
the little Malay girl.
Those who attended Malay schools had few prospects open to
them; other than the traditional roles they could become school
teachers or possibly the most humble clerk. There was no secondary
education in the Malay language and further education was confined to
Sultan Idris Training College for teachers. If a child wished to
proceed with his education the only means was to transfer to an
and avoid the opposition that would doubtless arise to the
establishment of any Education where the Koran was not taught.
I have little fear that when these semi-Government schools have
been fairly started we shall be able to appoint duly qualified
School Masters in the place of these Hadjees, and thus improve
the standard of Education." Straits Settlements, Legislative
Council Proceedings, 1873. Appendix 34, p. civ.
57 In 1928, only 9 per cent of Malay girls of school age attended
vernacular schools compared to 75 per cent of Malay boys of
school age. W.A.A. Ormsby-Gore, Report on a Visit to
Malaya, Ceylon and Java, p. 44.
58 R.O. Winstedt, Annual Report on Education for 1921. Quoted in
R.O. Winustedt, Education in Malaya, p. 30.
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English language secondary school. Not only was there the barrier of
a new language to be learned but these schools were located in the
towns and were fee paying. (Malay education was free.) Consequently,
very few Malays received more than a rudimentary primary education.
The Malays were set in their traditional way of life,
isolated from all that was dynamic and modern in Malayan society, and
stuck at the bottom of the socio-economic scale. It is no wonder that
Malay feeling toward vernacular education was occasionally bitter.
Mohammed Unus bin Abdullah, one of the Malays in a position to see
what was happening, pointed out in a meeting of the Legislative
Council:
In the fewest possible words, the Malay boy is told
"you have been trained to remain at the bottom, and
there you must always remain." Why, I ask, waste so
much public money to attain this end when without any
vernacular school, and without any special e^ijprt,
the Malay boy could himself accomplish this feat.
There were warnings that Malay education needed to be
improved if the Malays were to play a significant role in the
country, as in the Report of the Retrenchment Commission in 1922:
The lack of training facilties, both technical and
literary, is appalling and constitutes another
important reason for the failur^gOf Malays to take up
technical and professional work.
Yet, the British were committed to separate through unequal
development of the modern and traditional sectors of Malaya and the
result was that until recently the Malays lacked the education to
enter the modern sector.
59 Straits Settlements, Legislative Council Proceedings, 1929. p.
B150.
60 "Report of a Committee on Employment of Malays in the Government
Service," in Interim Reports of the Retrenchment Commission,




The Government initially played little part in English
education and was highly sceptical of the wisdom of providing it.
Consequently it was left to the missions to take the initiative.
However, as the bureaucracy of Government and business expanded the
demand for English-educated staff grew and the Government was
compelled to give some financial assistance to the mission schools.
Although the Government never actually took over the
mission schools they were very much a part of the English-speaking
commercial establishment and were geared expressly to serving it.
The Annual Report on Education for 1894 stated that the aim of
English education was
(to) supply certificated candidates for nearly the
whole of the subordinate appointments under
Government in the Colony and Native States and for
clerica^ and other appointments in mercantile
houses.
As a result, the education provided in such schools was almost an
exact replica of that provided by schools in England. While one may
criticise this strongly English orientation, they did provide
students with the knowledge, the tools and the values of the modern
society the British had brought to Malayan shores.
Since it was English schools that served the commercial and
Government establishment they got preferential treatment when it came
to Government grants. See Table 4.10
Table 4.10
Comparative Grants Paid to English, Chinese and Tamil
Aided Schools in 1932
Aided Total Grants Paid Average Cost Per




Chinese $ 81,164 $ 7.25
Tamil $ 62,710 $ 4.09
Source: FMS, Annual Report for 1932. pp. 46, 47, 51.
61 Quoted in J.S.Nagle, "Educational Needs of the Straits
Settlements and Federated Malay States." p. 105.
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The English schools provided the only complete system of
education, the only one in which, should the student so desire, he
62
could go on to secondary school and university. The graduate of an
English school was virtually guaranteed a position with the prestige
and income that would catapult him into the upper echelons of Asian
society.
However, English schools cannot be assessed simply in terms
of the degree to which they served the commercial community or the
advantages made available to those who attended them; they must be
viewed in the larger context of Malayan society as a whole. Their
urban location effectively limited them to the children of people
already involved to some degree in the modern sector of the country,
and, the population of the cities was predominantly Chinese and
Indian. They were in a far better position to make use of the
education provided in English schools which in terms of the quality
of the teaching, the standards of the buildings and equipment, and
the amount of money spent per pupil, was vastly superior to anything
else found in Malaya. Unlike the Malays,the Chinese and Indians were
little deterred by the Christian character of the schools. English
schools also charged relatively high fees and it was the Chinese and
Indians who were in the best position to pay these. Despite the
considerable problems of attending English schools faced by Malays
the Annual Report of the Education Department stated in 1935:
For the past decade Malays have been growing more and
more anxious that their boys shall learn English and
they have avail^ themselves eagerly of scholarships
and free places.
Nonetheless, Ormsby-Gore estimated in 1928 that 6.6 per cent of
Malay boys were being educated in an English school, as compared
62 There was in fact one Chinese secondary school and the prospect
for a tiny proportion of its graduates of going to university in
China or Hong Kong, but for the vast majority of Chinese
educated students schooling stopped at the end of primary
school.
63 F.M.S., Annual Report of the Education Department for 1935. p.
7.
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with 17 per cent of Chinese boys and 15 per cent Indian boys.
The effect of English schools was to sharpen racial
divisions that already coincided with socio-economic status, and so
they reinforced the barriers between urban and rural dwellers, the
immigrant and the native communities, the affluent and the poor by in
each case discriminating in favour of the former. Yet they did weld
together those who attended them into a single social entity; the
English-educated form a discrete, and racially integrated, part of
Malaysian society.
Chinese Education
The British Government had no intention of providing
Chinese schooling for the children of the Chinese community. "It
/"was7 not proper policy for the Government to undertake the education
of the children of the alien temporary population in their own
languages.It was held that vernacular education would inhibit
the learning of Malay and the assimilation of the Chinese into
Malayan society; yet nothing was done to prevent the Chinese
establishing their own schools.
The Chinese did open schools and modelled them exactly on
those they had known in China. Teachers and textbooks were imported
from China, indeed, there were initially no training facilities for
Chinese teachers in Malaya so this was essential. In the upsurge of
nationalism that followed the Chinese Revolution of 1911, political
sentiments made an appearance in the schools. In place of the
numerous dialects that had previously been used ' kuo yu' , the
national language of China was adopted as the medium of instruction.
Despite the fact that a strongly China-oriented school system
encouraged racial separation and discouraged assimilation, very
little was done to bring the Chinese schools under Government
control. In 1923, the Government did try and lessen Chinese sofport for
64 W.A.A Ormsby-Gore, op.cit., p. 44.
65 W.H. Treacher, "Annual Report for the Year 1901 on the Federated
Malay States be the Resident-General," Reports on the
Federated Malay States for 1901. p. 21.
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nationalist movement by trying to encourage a return to the dialects
as media of instruction by offering grants to Chinese schools which
submitted to Government inspection, but it was too little, too late,
and many of the schools that had been independent for so long
preferred to forego the money and retain their freedom. Indeed in
the 1930's the Chinese Central Government sent representatives to
inspect the schools and even instituted its own system of
grants-in-aid. Initially Chinese schools offered only primary
education, but after the war the demand for Chinese secondary
education grew rapidly and the number of pupils in Chinese middle
schools rose from 5,000 in 1947 to over 40,000 in 1957.
Such schools isolated the Chinese-educated Chinese not only
from the Malays and Indians but also from their English-educated
brethren. They fostered a feeling of racial exclusiveness, even
racial arrogance, on the part of those who attended them and intense
suspicion and distrust in those who stood on the outside. The
schools became strongholds of Chinese politics and fertile ground for
6 7
the growth of Communism.
Indian Education
Government-sponsored Indian education was initially ruled
out under the policy of non-support for all non-Malay vernacular
education. However, the shortage of plantation workers constantly
threatened to hamper work on the rubber estates, so to try and
encourage more Indians to come and settle on the estates it was
decided to provide Tamil schools. These were of very low quality.
Until the 1930's there were no training facilities for Tamil teachers
and so teachers, qualified and unqualified, were brought over from
India and installed in a rudimentary shelter called a school. An
indication of the lack of Government interest
66 V. Purcell, The Chinese in Modern Malaya, p. 21.
67 Short states: "Nowhere among the Malayan Chinese was potential
support for the MCP /Malayan Communist Party/ greater than in
Chinese Schools." A. Short, The Communist Insurrection in
Malaya, 1948-1960. p. 428.
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is the difference in grants paid to English and Tamil schools given
in Table 4.11. As a result of inadequate facilities, the poverty of
the Tamil labourers, and the transient population, the pupil wastage
rate was high and these schools made a minimal contribution to
Malayan education. Indians with any money moved to the towns and
cities where they sent their children to English schools.
+ + +
Colonial schools did more to divide than unite the races
who inhabited Malaya, and they permitted, even encouraged, the growth
of communal loyalties because the British Government had not expected
that j Chinese and Indians would become permanent parts of Malayan
society. There was no such thing as a national school system or a
common curriculum, but then there was scarcely even the idea of a
Malayan nation. The most serious effects^ Malayan education policy
fell upon the Malays who needed rapid advancement, holding them back
while providing the Chinese and Indians with the opportunity to
advance.
CONTEMPORARY EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Independence brought a major change in the way in which
education was regarded by Government: it became an item of investment
rather than consumption and a major tool for the Government's
policies of restructuring society and nation-building. The
independent Government has greatly increased expenditure on education
and training from $86.3 million in 1955, to $575.78 million for
1971-75, and $1,282,593 million allocated for 1976-80^
The post war years leading up to independence had seen a
very rapid increase in the demand for education: the number of
children in school had risen from 469,990 in 1947 to 1,121,523 in
69
1957, an increase of 139 per cent. The demand for English
68 All figures refer to Peninsular Malaysia, SMP. p. 70, Table 5-1.
TMP. p. 241, Table 12-3.
69 Ministry of Education, Educational Statistics of Malaysia
1938 to 1967. pp. 32-47, Tables 4-19.
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education increased most with enrolment growing by 225 per cent,
compared to Malay, Chinese and Tamil schools where it grew by 161 per
cent, 105 per cent, and 46 per cent respectively.^ There was seen
to be a need to improve the vernacular schools, the quality of which
was far behind English schools. Provision of places at secondary
level was very limited: in 1947 there had been only 16,549 students
enrolled at secondary level, by 1957 this had increased to
105,879 - 67,646 in English schools, 35,478 in Chinese, 2,315 in
Malay and 440 in Tamil classes. But the schools could accommodate
only 10 per cent of the primary enrolment, and in the case of Malay
classes a mere .5 per cent of primary enrolment.^
The progress of education since independence has
demonstrated the evolution of a system of national schools based on
Malay as the only medium of instruction and a rear-guard fight on the
part of the Chinese community, in particular, to preserve instruction
in the Chinese language and literature. It has also seen a struggle
to preserve instruction in English, as the language of business and
international scholarship, but, on the whole it has been a losing
battle.
In 1956, Tun Abdul Razak, then Minister of Education,
proposed the Razak Plan which formed the basis of the Education
Ordinance of 1957. This introduced a common syllabus for all schools
in the Federation. It allowed for two types of schools - standard in
the Malay medium, and standard-type in Chinese, Tamil and English
medium. Malay and English were to be compulsory subjects in all
primary and secondary schools and Chinese and Tamil were to be taught
where the parents of 15 or more children asked for it. In an attempt
to discourage Chinese education it offered better conditions and
bigger grants to Chinese schools that changed over to teaching in
English and by 1962 three-quarters of Chinese secondary schools had
accepted this condition. One result of these developments was that
70 loc.cit.
71 loc.cit. There were no Malay or Tamil secondary schools, but
secondary classes were attached to some primary schools.
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secondary education in Malay was provided for the first time.
This was taken one step further in the Education Act of
1961 which declared in the preamble:
The education policy of the Federation... is to
establish a national system of education which will
satisfy the needs of the nation - and promote its
cultural, social, economic and political
development...and for the progressive development of
an educational system in which t^ national language
is the main medium of instruction.
The Ordinance Act established free, universal primary education. In
1965 the examinations restricting entry to secondary school were
abolished and nine years universal education provided. Enrolments
expanded rapidly, almost quadrupuling in secondary schools between
1957-67. Since then they have continued to increase at a very rapid
rate, rising by 48 per cent in lower schools and 81 per cent in upper
secondary schools between 1971-75.
This rapid expansion resulted in a severe shortage of
teachers. The Second Malaysia Plan estimated the shortage of
graduate teachers in West Malaysia to be 3,599 in 1970. In 1975 the
demand for graduate teachers was estimated to be 9,829, yet output
from all the training institutions in the Plan period 1975-80, was
only 5,348. Writing in 1961, Silcock claimed,
The situation is being met by allowing large
disparities in standards between urban and rural
areas, betwe^i English-medium and vernacular schools,
to continue.
In 1971, a survey found 16,355 primary teachers were
74
underqualified. At the secondary level, there was a wide disparity
in levels of achievement between English and Malay medium schools.
(See Table 4.11). In Malay-medium schools between 1967-72 11.2 per
cent of candidates sitting the Higher School Certificate Examinations
72 Quoted in The Education Planning and Research Division, Ministry
of Education, Education in Malaysia, p. 5.
73 T.H. Silcock, "Economic Potential of Malaya," Readings
in Malayan Economics. T.H. Silcock, ed., p. 100.
74 New Straits Times, 8 February 1972.
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received a full certificate in Science, and 31.3 per cent in Arts,
compared 66.6 per cent in Science and 65.2 per cent in Arts in
English-medium schools.
Table 4.11
Full HSC Certificates, 1967-72
Science Arts
Malay-medium assisted schools
Total number of candidates 1,251 3,758
Total number of full certificates 141 1,176
Total number of full certificates as %
of total number of candidates 11.2 31.3
English-medium assisted schools
Total number of candidates 12,081 9,589
Total number of full certificates 8,047 6,249
Total number of full certificates as %
of total number of candidates 66.6 65.2
Source: Chai Hon-Chan, Education and Nation-Building in Plural
Societies: The West Malaysian Experience, p. 46.
The Dropout Report of 1973 confirmed these conclusions.
English-medium schools were found to be larger, better endowed withUnci
physical plant.,j(had younger, better-qualified teachers; non-teaching
expenditure per pupil was higher - three times, on average, than in
Malay-medium schools; and the children who attended them came from
75
more affluent families. As a result pupils from English-medium
schools achieved a higher level of education and did better on
assessment tests. One problem the Report drew attention to was
that,
The rapid expansion of education in West Malaysia in
one generation creates a situation where larger
numbers of school children do not receive the
informal pre-schoo^.-, training which literate parents
typically provide.
75 Lapuran Jawatankuasa Pi Atas Kajian Pendapat Mengenai Pelajaran
Dan Masyarakat (Lapurcan Keciciran) /Dropout Report.] p. 34.
76 ibid., p. 43, Table 32, p. 45, Table 34.
77 ibid. , p. 68.
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Yet despite the handicaps faced by Malay pupils they were found to
be, on the average, more highly motivated to suceed than either
78
Chinese or Indian pupils.
The riots of 1969 resulted in major reassessments in many
fields and brought about a significant reorientation in education.
This took the form of a "New Educational Policy" which proposed the
gradual introduction of the Malay language as the sole medium of
instruction. As from January 1970 teaching in Standard One classes
would be conducted wholly in Malay, except during English, Chinese or
Tamil language sessions, and each year the use of Malay would be
extended to a further year until the entire primary, secondary and
tertiary school system would be converted to the use of the Malay
language. The object of this was to build a common national identity
through the schools based on the Malay language and culture. It also
had the effect of giving Malay children an advantage over Chinese and
Indian children who first had to learn the Malay language before they
could progess in their studies. This was in keeping with current
Government thinking that the Malays should be given preferential
treatment until the Malay community had caught up with the
non-Malays. From 1970 a pass in the Malay language paper has been
compulsory for attainment of the Malayan Certificate of Education
(MCE), a situation that threatened to produce an explosion when in
1972 over 14,000 non-Malay students failed their MCE solely because
they failed to pass the Malay paper
The problems of implementing this change have been
enormous. It has required the re-training of about twenty thousand
teachers and lecturers in the Malay language and the translation of
an enormous number of textbooks and reference books.
Despite the Government's policy of introducing Malay as the
sole medium of instruction it has begun to realise that English also
has a vital role to play. The Third Malaysia Plan states that
"measures" will be taken to ensure that English is taught as a strong
second language." It goes on to say, "This is important if Malaysia
is to keep abreast of scientific and technological developments
78 ibid. , p. 69.
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in the world and participate meaningfully in international trade and
„79
commerce.
Rural schools that served the bulk of the Malays have been of
very poor quality. They were often isolated and had multigrade
classes because of the small numbers in any one class. There has now
been a move to improve rural roads and bring children together in
large centralized schools, and to improve the standard of science and
mathematics teaching particularly in the rural areas through the
establishment of residential science schools.
Vocational and technical training has lagged behind other
developments in the field of education. The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) Report in 1963 mentioned "The
need to improve technical education and training, especially in
80
industrial skills, and more advanced agricultural techniques." And
the First Malaysia Plan was committed to creating a better balance
between general academic education, on the one hand, and vocational,
technical and science education, on the other.
There are now a number of secondary vocational schools
providing training in motor mechanics, woodworking, building
construction, sheetmetal work, welding, electrical installation,
maintenance, fitting and machining, radio, television and electronics
servicing. In 1969 the Ungku Omar Polytechnic was opened in Ipoh
with the aim of training engineering technicians and sub-professional
81
personnel in Accountancy and Business Studies, and the Kolej Tunku
Abdul Rahman in Kuala Lumpur offers certificate and diploma courses
in business studies, arts and science at the sub-professional level.
Prior to the opening of these two institutions the only
post secondary vocational or technical training was given by the
Technical College, the College of Agriculture and Mara Institute of
Technology. The Technical College was established in 1906 primarily
79 TMP. p. 397. para. 1362.
80 IBRD, Report on the Economic Aspects of Malaysia, p. 17.
81 Courses are provided in Accountancy, Electrical Engineering,
Mechanical Engineering, Civil Engineering and Business Studies.
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to meet Government requirements for technical personnel and provided
three-year diploma courses in Architecture, Civil Engineering, Civil
Survey, Electrical Engineering, Land Surveying, Mechanical
Engineering, Quantity Surveying and Town and Country Planning. The
College of Agriculture (established in 1931 for Malays only) provided
82
three-year diploma courses for agricultural technicians. However,
in 1971, the College of Agriculture and in 1972 the Technical College
were upgraded to universities.
Enrolment in upper secondary vocational and technical
schools grew from 4,899 in 1970 to 14,338 in 1975, an increase of 193
per cent, and in tertiary level colleges it grew from 4,993 to
83
16,827, in the same period an increase of 237 per cent.
Nonetheless, there are severe shortages at the craftsmen, technical
and professional levels and the Third Malaysia Plan gives particular
emphasis to overcoming these to meet the needs of commerce and
industry. Nine more vocational schools are to be built and a
polytechnic constructed in Kuantan.
University education has also made advances. In 1957 a
division of the University of Malaya was set up in Kuala Lumpur and
in 1961 this became a university in its own right, established as the
national university of the Federation of Malaya.
In response to rising demand for tertiary education, four
further universities have been established:
1) The Universiti Sains Malaysia (the Science
University) in Penang in 1969.
2) The Universiti Kebangsaan f^laysia (the National
University of Malaysia) in 1970
3) The University Pertanian Malaysia (the Agricultural
University) in 1971.
4) The Universiti Teknologi, (the University of
Technology) in 1972.
82 These courses covered the basic sciences, plant science, animal
science, agricultural economics, plant protection, crop and
animal husbandry, farm management, extension and research
techniques.
83 TMP. Table 22-1, pp. 385-386.
84 The official constitution was promulgated on 1 April 1974.
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The Universiti Kebangsaan was established as the logical
extension of the New Educational Policy and uses Malay as the main
medium of instruction; the vast majority of its students are Malay.
One of its main tasks is to develop the Malay language so that it can
cope with modern developments in science and technology and so be
fully used as the National Language. It both encourages members of
staff to write textbooks in the national language and to translate
foreign textbooks.
The Universiti Sains provides degree programmes in the Pure
Sciences, Applied Sciences, Social Sciences and Humanities. The
Universiti Pertanian, which was formly Serdang Agricultural College,
now provides degree courses in agricultural science. The Universiti
Teknologi includes faculties of Engineering, Surveying and
Architecture.
In the field of economics and business administration there
are courses at the University of Malaya, the Universiti Sains and the
Universiti Kebangsaan. The University of Malaya offers a degree in
Economics and Administration as well as a Diploma in Public
Administration and in Accounting. The Universiti Kebangsaan began
offering a degree in Economics and Commerce in the Session 1974/75.
However, the Malay language policy of the Universiti Kebangsaan
presents a number of problems: first, there are virtually no books in
Malay in these subjects, and second, the lingua franca of the
business community is still usually English or Chinese.
There had been very rapid expansion of university
85
places - enrolments rose from 323 to 4,560 between 1959-67 and,
with the opening of the new universities, increased from 8,148 to
14,254 between 1970-75,^ and to 18,064 by 1978.^ A major problem
these universities have to face is a shortage of academic staff often
with half the posts vacant, particularly in the fields of economics
85 Ministry of Education, Educational Statistics of Malaysia 1938
to 1967. p. 69, Table 60.
86 TMP. p. 401, Table 22-7. These figures refer to enrolments for
degree courses only.
87 Mid-Term Review of the Third Malaysia Plan, p. 203, Table 14-3.
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and business administration where the opportunities in the private
sector are attractive (See Table 4.15 below), and even more so among
Malays for whom there are now many other opportunities. For the most
part academic staff are, therefore, very young and at any time a
relatively high proportion may be away on study leave completing
higher degrees abroad. The move to introduce Malay as a medium of
instruction in all universities first by duplicating all courses in
Malay and English put additional strain on staffing and on those not
yet fluent enough to deliver a university-level lecture in Malay.
The University of Malay has in the past had to face the
problem of racial imbalance in enrolments and a concentration of
Malays in the Arts field. Table 4.12 gives a breakdown of the entry
into the first year of the University of Malaya during the sixties.
Table 4.12
Student Enrolment into Year One of the University of Malaya
by Faculty and Race, 1960-70
Malay Non-Malay
No. % No. %
1960/61
Agriculture 1 6 18 94
Arts 66 32 140 68
Engineering 3 5 63 95
Science 7 10 61 90
TOTAL 77 21 282 79
1965/66
Agriculture 21 45 26 55
Arts 294 45 359 55
Engineering 3 3 98 97
Science 13 7 169 93
Medicine:
Pre-Med 11 26 31 74
Year 1 4 5 76 95
TOTAL 346 31 759 69
1969/70
Agriculture 25 26 70 74
Arts 722 59 505 41
Engineering 5 5 109 95
Science 79 26 228 74
Medicine:
Pre-Med 26 65 14 35
Year 1 24 19 102 81
Economics &
Administration 197 64 308 36
TOTAL 1078 45 1336 55
Source: Malaysia, Towards National Harmony, pp. 11-12, Table 1.
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Table 4.12 illustrates the imbalance there has been in
racial representation at university and the fairly rapid correction
of this. Between 1960-70 Malay entry into the University of Malaya
increased from 77 to 1078, and their proportion in terms of total
entrants, from 21 per cent to 45 per cent. However, they tended to
be concentrated in the Arts Faculty: of the incoming year in 1960/61
86 per cent of Malays registered to study Arts, by 1970 this had
declined to 70 per cent, but there was no change in the very small
proportion of Malays studying Engineering over the decade, and in
Science and Medicine the increase was very small.
The very small number of Malay graduates in Science and
Technology is illustrated in Table 4.13. Between 1964-70 a total of
119 Malays had graduated from the University of Malaya in these
fields. This goes a long way towards explaining the very real
difficulty companies in the survey had in recruiting Malay engineers.
Table 4.13
Output of Malay Graduates in Science and Technology
at the University of Malaya, 1964-70
Faculty Total number graduated Malay graduates
(all ethnic groups) Number %
Agriculture 216 39 18.0
Engineering 366 3 0.8
Medicine* 129 12 9.3
Science 1626 65 4.0
TOTAL 2337 119 5.1
* The Faculty of Medicine was established in 1963, and the first batch
of doctors graduated in 1969.
Source: Malaysia, Report of the Committee Appointed by the National
Operations Council to Study Campus Life of Students of the University
of Malaya, p. 44, Table IX.
The opening of the new universities and Government policy
towards the correction of racial imbalance in tertiary education has
resulted in a very rapid increase in the number of Malay students
enrolled at university. Indeed, Malays are now slightly
over-represented in terms of their proportion in the population. In
1975, 57 per cent of all students enrolled for degree courses
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were Malay. (see Table 4.14), and by 1978 this had risen to 64 per
89
cent. . They were particularly heavily represented at the new
universities: in 1975, at the Universiti Pertanian 77 per cent of
students were Malay, at the Universiti Teknologi 85 per cent, and at
90
the Universiti Kebangsaan 93 per cent. The racial distribution of
students in the various subjects has improved considerably although
there is still a tendency for Malays to choose Arts and Humanities
and to avoid Science and Medicine.
Table 4.14
Enrolment in University Degree Courses by Race and Subject, 1975
Degree Malay Non-Malay Total
Course No. % No. % No.
Arts 1826 74 631 26 2457
Economics 1287 74 444 26 1731
Law 124 59 87 41 211
Humanities 1833 76 579 24 2412
Islamic Studies 486 100 0 0 486
Diploma in Education 240 41 34-8 59 588
Diploma in Public Admin 15 65 8 35 23
Science 799 26 2295 74 3094
Medicine, Dentistry,
Pharmacy 399 39 622 61 1021
Agriculture 273 70 116 30 389
Vetinary Science & Forestry 105 74 37 26 142
Agriculture Business/Engin 179 81 42 19 221
Engineering 361 32 774 68 1135
Architecture 226 65 118 35 344
TOTAL 8153 57 6101 43 14254
Source: Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-S0 . p. 402-403, Table 00oqCN
This dramatic change in the pattern of racial distribution
in the universities has come about with the help of a system of
preferences that favours Malays. In the 1950's there was a practice
88 If enrolment for diploma and certificate courses and preliminary
and pre-university courses is taken into account, Malay
enrolment in tertiary education in 1975 would be 65.1 per cent
of the total.
89 Mid-Term Review of the Third Malaysia Plan, p. 203, Table 14-3.
90 TMP. p. 401, Table 22-7.
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of awarding three scholarships to Malays for every one to a
non-Malay. In 1969-70, 88.6 per cent of the Malay students at the
University of Malaya were on public scholarships or bursaries,
compared with 22.8 per cent of Chinese students, and 20 per cent of
91
Indian students. In order to rectify the remaining imbalances in
the fields of Science and Technology the Campus Report recommended in
1971:
First...the University should decide and state
clearly that it is university policy to ensure as far
as possible that the racial composition of the
student population not only in the University as a
whole but on a faculty by faculty basis should
reflect the racial composition in the country...
Secondly, the University authorities should ensure
that faculties with poor Malay
representation...should make every conscious effort
to obtain the admission of Malay students. It is
clear to us that there were more Malay students who
had the required qualifications than were admitted.
They could have, therefore, been admitted if the
University authorities had been clearly directed to
provide for a proper racial balance in the different
faculties.
Thirdly, in each faculty, students who come from
rural areas where the facilities for the study of
science are limited, should be given special
assistance and tuition...Turning to the criteria for
admission, we wish to state first of all that the
criteria should not only be of an academic
character...
Fourthly, we therefore recommend that the criteria
for admission should include other factors besides
the H.S.C. results and that the University
authorities should give weightage to those from the
rural areas...
Fifthly, we recommend that the scholarship awarding
authorities should award more scholarships in the
sciences to Malay students in order to ratify the
present racial imbalance in these faculties.
91 Chai Hon-Chan, Education and Nation-Building in Plural
Societies: The West Malaysian Experience, p. 50.
92 Malaysia, Report of the Committee Appointed by the National
Operations Council to Study Campus Life of Students in the
University of Malaya, pp. 44-45.
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Such preferences are enshrined in Article 153 of the
Constitution of Malaysia which states that not only shall Malays be
given preferences in the award of scholarships but that provided they
have the minimum entry qualifications, preference should be given to
them for places in university. In implementing this policy it is
93
difficult to avoid a drop in academic standards, and an increase in
the number of non-Malay students with good HSC results who cannot get
into local universities. For the affluent, foreign universities have
provided an alternative. Of the Malaysian students in tertiary level
institutions in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand in
94
1975, 80 per cent were non-Malays. However, the Government has now
decided to impose racial balance quotas on the number of students
studying abroad. The emphasis on giving special consideration to
rural Malays, who will tend to be more traditional in their outlook,
will present special problems to the companies who ultimately employ
them. Although higher education in itself tends to be a modernising
influence, rural Malays will be closer to the attitudes and values of
the village than their urban counterparts, and they will need to
adapt to the values of modern commercial life.
The result of the historical Arts bias of the educational
system has been severe shortages of professionally and technically
qualified staff. See Table 4.15. Despite such shortages, 4 per cent
of the unemployed in 1973 were categorized as "professional,
technical and related workers: administrative, executive, managerial
95
workers". Clearly the products of the colleges and universities
93 In order to cope with this problem the University of Malaya
provided a one year pre-science course for Malay students with
weak HSC results. In 1977 it started a special two-year course
for rural Malay students to prepare them for admission to its
Science, Medicine, Dentistry and Engineering Faculties.
New Straits Times, 15 July 1976.
94 TMP. p. 399, para. 1375.







Employed (%) 1976 - 80
PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL 145,517 10.4 65,309
Chemists and Physical Scientists 354 20.6 327
Laboratory and Science Technician 3,824 27.8 2,137
Architects and Town Planners 353 22.4 180
Engineers 2,244 22.4 2,764
Engineering Assistants and Technicians 11,824 24.0 5,538
Surveyors 168 19.6 346
Draughtsmen 2,979 9.1 2,041
Agronomists 652 38.0 540
Life Science Technicians 2,070 29.1 1,396
Veterinarians 162 19.8 95
Veterinary Assistants 352 15.6 127
Medical Doctors 1,915 24.0 728
Medical Assistants 2,323 16.4 2,414
Professional Nurses 5,623 19.4 5,297
Dentists 379 20.1 205
Dental Assistants 1,030 10.1 578
Accountants 1,774 19.1 1,971
Lawyers 809 5.2 284
Higher Education Teachers 1,844 50.9 286
Primary and Secondary Teachers 79,527 3.1 19,872
Other Professional and Technical 20,353 16.7 18,183
ADMINISTRATIVE AND MANAGERIAL 22,605 8.6 12,264
Managers 12,535 3.3 10,472
CLERICAL 129,374 7.1 58,755
SALES 54,041 1.7 31,776
SERVICE 64,917 6.3 145,300
AGRICULTURAL 105,742 3.1 142,309
Farm Managers and Supervisors 7,238 3.2 13,701
PRODUCTION 210,331 4.4 190,123
(i) Estimated from output and employment targets of the TMP and adjusted for undercoverage
and exclusions.
Source: Third Malaysia Plan, p. 153, Table 8-11.
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did not entirely 'fit' the needs of the economy. The Third Malaysian
Plan recognised this problem of orienting the educational system to
the national manpower needs especially in science and technology and
it forms one of the main objectives of the Plan in the field of
96
education. The Government intends progressively to reduce the
intake into the liberal Arts and put emphasis on the fields of
engineering, science, medicine, agriculture and business studies. It
is anticipated that the output of degree holders in these fields will
increase from 45.5 per cent of the total in 1975 to 54.4 per cent in
97
1980.
The small numbers of Malays in the Faculties of Science and
Technology are, predictably, reflected in the racial distribution of
employment in these fields, despite substantial progress between 1957
and 1973 there are still very few Malay chemists, engineers or
doctors. Table 4.15 highlights the small proportion of Malay
managers and estate managers. The Government itself found difficulty
98
in recruiting the calibre of staff it required. Considering the
bias of Malays towards Government employment and the fact that many
Malay scholarship holders are bonded to serve the Government, the
difficulties experienced by the business community are clearly going
to be even greater.
The problem companies are faced with in recruiting,
training and developing their managerial staff reflect the historical
evolution of Malaysian society and the educational system, as well as
the political and social priorities of the Government.
96 TMP. p. 391, para. 1333.
97 ibid. , p. 399, para. 1370.
98 The TMP states: "Given the shortage of skilled and experienced
personnel, the rapid expansion of manpower in the public sector
has perforce led to some fall in productivity due to the
recruitment of relatively inexperienced staff and lack of proper
supervision." ibid., p. 42, para. 156.
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CHAPTER 5
THE MALAYSIAN ECONOMY 1
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the economic
context in which industry operates, and in particular, those factors
which affect the training and development of managers. It will look
at the historical development of the economy, the evolution of
Government policy towards private enterprise, recent developments
within each of the main industrial groups, and the organizational
pattern of these groups.
REVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMY UP TO
INDEPENDENCE
Prior to British intervention the economy of the Malay
peninsula consisted mainly of peasant farming and fishing with a very
small amount of tin mining carried out by Malays. However, as
European interest in the Far East increased, Malaya's key position on
the trade routes brought it to European attention and coastal ports
1 The research on which this thesis is based was restricted to
incorporated industry and the sampling was based on the
Government's 1969 Financial Survey of Companies. The latter
omitted peasant agriculture and fisheries, and very small-scale
industry in the form of individual proprietorships and
partnerships, banks, insurance companies, airlines and shipping
companies. It also excludes the very large number of parastatal
organizations established since 1969. Since there are these
gaps in the coverage of the study the following review of the
economy will not dwell on the missing sectors.
The study was concerned with Peninsular Malaysia and as far as
possible this chapter will confine itself to the position there.
However, in some cases the official figures are not broken down
into Peninsular and East Malaysia, for this reason some of the
data applies to Malaysia as a whole. In assessing the data it
should be borne in mind that Peninsular Malaysia contains 82 per
cent of the population of Malaysia and generates 85 per cent of
the GNP. (Rf: TMP. p. 201, Table 10-1.) Note: all dollars refer
to Malaysian dollars unless stated to the contrary.
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were acquired both to protect the trade route and to act as entrepots
for the produce of the region.
With the extension of European influence to the Straits
Settlements the demand for tin increased and the Malays came to an
2
arrangement with Chinese miners to extract the tin. In 1848 the
discovery of rich tin deposits in Larut led to a tin rush and Chinese
flocked to the region. Fighting broke out between the Chinese clans
over control of the tin deposits reducing the region by 1862 to a
4
state of anarchy, so threatening the tin trade. As a result in 1874
5
Britain intervened to restore order.
Trade
The initial economic emphasis at the beginning of the
period of British rule in the Malay States was thus on trade. The
large merchant houses long established in Singapore and Penang,
with their well-developed contacts with local producers, on the one
hand, and with western markets, on the other, were able to
2 H.C.Chai, The Development of British Malaya, 1896-1909. p. 98.
According to L.K. Wong, "without any known exception, the early
Chinese miners came at the invitation of the Malay chiefs."
L.K. Wong, The Malayan Tin Industry, p. 21.
3 In 1848 there were 3 Chinese in the district of Larut; in 1862,
20-25,000 Chinese miners; and by 1872, 40,000 Chinese miners had
flocked to the district of Larut. Y.H. Yip., The
Development of the Tin Mining Industry of Malaya, p. 58.
4 "So complete was the ruin brought about by this most disastrous
warfare, that the country became almost depopulated - villages
were demolished wholesale, thousands of people were massacred,
the destruction of property was enormous, the land laid waste
and not only did Larut itself thus suffer but the returns of the
value of imports at Penang during 1872 and 1873 showed a
decrease of nearly 1,000,000 dollars, owing to the cessation of
the importation of tin to that island from Larut." L.Wray, "Some
Account of the Tin Miners and Mining Industries of Perak,"
Perak Museum Notes, no. 3, Taiping 1894, p. 9. Quoted in Y.H.
Yip, op. cit., pp. 58-59.
5 See pp. 42-43.
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extend their activities to the Malay states concentrating initially
on the export of tin and import of manufactured goods. They were
well placed to take advantage of the later development of the rubber
industry and were responsible for floating many rubber companies.
They provided an important link between the financial resources of
London and the developing economy of Malaya, and in this way they
extended their interests into the production of tin and rubber, and
assured themselves a virtual monopoly over the export-import trade
that persisted up to about 1920.^ Even though the Chinese began to
make inroads into the export trade after that, British trading
companies retained their control over large sectors of the rubber
industry.^
While the large merchant, or agency, houses controlled the
export-import trade, it was the Chinese that collected the produce
for export and provided the wholesale and retail outlets for imports.
As Puthucheary put it "Chinese capitalists are in the main
9
compradores of European capital." Indians were also active in trade
particularly in the import and retail of textiles, drugs and patent
medicines.
Some of the agency houses extended their interests into
shipping, banking and insurance, and by the end of this period a very
few had begun to diversify into manufacturing. They thus played a
key role in the development of the commercial sector of the Malayan
economy.
6 J.C. Jackson, Planters and Speculators, p. 245.
7 J.J. Puthucheary, Ownership and Control in the Malayan Economy,
p. 24.
8 ibid., p. 25. Puthucheary states, with reference to 1953, "It
is fair to estimate that the 12 big agency houses do between a
quarter and a third of both the export and the import trade of
the country." ibid. , p. 50.
9 ibid. , p. 123-124.
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Tin
While the protection of trade was one of the main reasons
for British intervention, tin was the commodity in the trade of which
Britain was particularly interested. One of Malaya's most valuable
natural resources has been the rich deposits of tin found
particularly in an area along the west coast running parallel to the
central mountain range from Kedah in the north to Kuala Linggi in the
south. Much of it has been washed down from the granite rocks in the
mountains and is found in alluvial deposits on the coastal plains.
As a result it is relatively accessible and of high quality which has
given Malayan tin a considerable cost advantage over that of other
tin producers.
The value of Malayan tin had long been appreciated but
the turning point for the industry came as a result of two main
factors. First, British intervention which stabilized the internal
situation and provided official support and encouragement for the
expansion of the tin trade, and second, the growth of demand in
Europe and North America. ^ These factors gave considerable impetus
to tin mining; by 1883 Malaya had become the world's largest tin
producer and by 1895 output of Malayan tin had risen to 55 per cent
12
of the world's production.
Tin had been and remained for some time the monopoly of
10 In the sixteenth century the Portugese tried to monopolize the
tin trade and later the Dutch tried to do likewise by concluding
treaties with local Malay chiefs. L.K. Wong, op. cit., p. 3.
11 From the latter part of the 19th century on, the world
consumption of tin ore increased rapidly. The most important
single use was in the manufacture of tin plate used in canning,
oil barrels and roofing. The best kind of tin ore for the
manufacture of tin plate was alluvial tin because of its great
purity. Tin was used in an increasing number of machine parts
in the motor, electrical and mechanical industries for which the
demand was steadily growing, and in the manufacture of dyes for
the textile industry. L.K. Wong, op. cit. , pp. 119 and 212.
12 ibid. , p. 53.
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13
the Chinese. They brought a knowledge of mining and smelting
technology with them from China and adapted it to local conditions.
They used highly labour intensive methods, the equipment used was
relatively simple and mining operations could be started with limited
capital outlay. In some cases mines were opened on a cooperative,
profit-sharing basis. This gave the Chinese the advantage of
maximising limited investment resources, keeping overheads to the
absolute minimum, enabling flexibility in abandoning mined out sites
and moving rapidly to new ones. This pattern of labour intensive
methods, low budget operation and almost exclusively Chinese work
force has persisted and characterizes contemporary Chinese tin mining
in the peninsula.
Initially European companies found it impossible to compete
14
with the Chinese. However, by 1910 many of the richest deposits
had been worked out and new techniques were required to cope with the
lower grade ore. The introduction of the tin dredge in 1912 met this
13 Swettenham wrote of the Chinese contribution to the tin
industry: "...it was the Chinese who began the work /of opening
up the tin mines/, who have continued it ever since, and whose
efforts have succeeded in producing more than half of the
world's tin supply. Their energy and enterprise made the Malay
States what they are today, and it would be impossible to
overstate the obligation which the Malay Government and people
are under to these hard-working, capable and law-abiding
people." F.A. Swettenham, British Malaya, pp. 231-2.
14 "Usually, European mining is done by companies... there is the
manager and the sub-manager, the accountant, the engineer, the
smelter...Machinery is bought, houses are built, in fact the
capital of the company is spent...and then, it is found that the
tin raised is infinitesimal in value when compared to the rate
of expenditure, and that the longer the work goes on the greater
will be the losses. This is usually discovered when the paid up
capital is all but exhausted. The company is wound up and the
State gets a bad name with investors, and the only people who
really enjoy themselves are the neighbouring Chinese miners who
buy the mine and the plant for an old song and make several
large fortunes out of working on their own ridiculous and
primitive methods." F.A.Swettenham, About Perak. p. 34.
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need and gave the European companies an advantage that changed the
pattern of the tin mining industry. The dredges were large, complex,
costly pieces of equipment and it was the European companies alone
15
that had access to the financial, technical and organizational
resources to operate them. They required large tracts of land to
operate economically and British land policies favoured Europeans.^
Not only did the Chinese miners lack the technical expertise
necessary, they were reluctant to reorganize their enterprises on the
joint stock basis necessary to raise the capital involved.
The European companies were generally managed by mining
agencies, firms that specialized in the management of tin mines,
providing secretarial functions and technical management.
Financially, these companies were closely integrated with
interlocking ownership and directorships that made it a tightly knit
industrial group. All but one of the dredges in Malaya in 1954 were
operated by European-owned and controlled tin companies. About half
of these were locally incorporated and Yip Yat Hoong calculated
foreign ownership as 78 per cent of total shares.^ Chinese mining
concerns, on the other hand, were almost entirely individual
ownerships and partnerships and their capital came from relatives,
1B
friends or the clan. Their management practices remained
traditional and their methods relatively simple - mostly gravel
pumping. Nonetheless, they retained more than a one third share
15 With the introduction of the tin dredge came the joint-stock
company and the participation of Western banks to finance the
huge investment involved.
16 G.D. Ness, Bureaucracy and Rural Development in Malaysia,
p. 32.
17 Yip Yat Hoong, op. cit., p. 352, Table V-3.
18 J.J. Puthucheary, op. cit., p. 84.
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19
in the total production of tin.
The significance of tin in the early development of Malaya
was enormous. In the last decades of the nineteenth and the first
decades of the twentieth century tin was by far the single most
important revenue producer with duty on tin accounting for up to
20
almost half of the total revenue of the Federated Malay States.
Chai Hon-Chan states:
...the success of British rule in Malaya was due
almost entirely to a thriving tin industry. From
the export duty of tin the Government derived the
bulk of its revenue to pay for Civil List and
general administrative charges, for an expensive
road and railway system, for schools and medical
services, and for numerous other public v^(j>rks which
made for stable and efficient government
19 Production of Tin-in-Concentrates
in Malaya by European and Chinese Mines
Year European Chinese Dulang Washing^^ Total
000 % 000 % of 000 % of 000
tons tons total tons total tons
1930 40.9 63 23.1 36 1.0 1 65.0
1935 26.7 66 13.2 32 0.9 2 40.8
1940mi 57.7 72 22.0 27 1.0 1 80.7
1945 3.2
1950 3379 59 2172 37 275 4 57.6
1955 36.4 60 23.7 39 1.1 2 61.2
(i) Dulang washing is panning for tin in streams
(ii) During the Japanese Occupation, the extraction of tin was
disrupted.
Source: Federation of Malaya, Bulletin of Statistics Relating to
the Mining Industry, 18 (1950), p. 8, Table 9, and (1956) p.5,
Table 6.(Note: There is a slight discrepancy between the 1950
and 1956 Bulletin statistics. The 1950 Bulletin has been used
for all figures in this table except those for 1955.)
20 FMS, Manual of Statistics Relating to the Federated Malay
States, 1924. p. 270 and p. 276.
21 Chai Hon-Chan, The Development of British Malaya, p. 163.
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Rubber
The development of the rubber industry in Malaya was the
product of a combination of official encouragement, British
entrepreneurship, suitable physical conditions, and a rapid rise in
world demand brought about by the coincidental rise of the motor car
industry.
Early British efforts in agriculture had met with little
success. The first planters were amateurs for whom agriculture was a
22
part-time activity and it inevitably suffered from ignorance and
23
neglect. The professionalization of farming began in the 1870's
24
and 1880's with the arrival of coffee planters from Ceylon. The
introduction of coffee-planting prepared the way for the future
development of rubber in that it brought about the extension of
large-scale agriculture and the proprietary estate began to give way
to ownership by companies.^
In 1877 Brazilian rubber seeds were brought to Singapore
Botanic Gardens from Kew Gardens in London. Plants and seeds were
distributed to Government officers in the Malay States and handed out
to planters. As the price of coffee fell and that of rubber rose the
first pioneer plantings were made. In 1905-1908 rubber prices soared
and the planting community began to switch to rubber on a large
2 6
scale. By 1908, rubber was the main crop of the plantation
industry in Malaya.
Since the communications network was concentrated in the
tin bearing states of Selangor, Perak and Negri Sembilan, it was
22 J.C. Jackson, op.cit. , p. 91.
23 ibid., p. 126.
24 ibid., p. 91.
25 loc.cit.
26 Rubber increased from 38,000 acres in 1905, to 100,000
acres in 1906, and by 1926 2,250,000 acres were planted
with rubber - more than half the total world
acreage. Dun J Li, British Malaya, An Economic Analysis,
p. 60.
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here that rubber planting tended first to be concentrated.
The cultivation of rubber raised two main problems: the
first, was the problem of capital; the second, of labour. The
problem of a labour force to work the plantations was a serious one
for rubber is a highly labour-intensive industry. The solution found
was to import Tamil labour from India.
Financing was a problem since rubber trees take seven years
to come into production and the methods used in Malaya favour fairly
large estates. Considerable investment was required and the returns
were slow. London was the best source of such investment capital and
the private joint-stock company met this need.
The agency houses in the Straits Settlements channelled
such funds into the planting industry and in the process acquired
increasing financial and management interests themselves. A number
of agency houses took on the role of supervising the management of
the estates of European-owned rubber companies and marketed the
produce as well. As managing agents they were responsible for the
recruitment, training and supervision of managers and labourers for
the estates. Allen and Donnithorne give an excellent description of
the rationale of the managing agency:
The managing agency system is in essence a method of
industrial and commercial organisation designed to
reduce the risks of foreign investment in countries
where business expertise and managerial skills are
scarce. It is based upon a division of function
between the firm in the metropolitan country which
owns the business properties and the firm which
manages them in the colonial territories. Under this
system relatively small concerns can engage
experienced managing agents to administer their
estates or factories, and investors are encouraged to
subscribe capital for a diversity of companies in
specialized undertakings abroad. Thus the scarce
managerial resources are mobilised in the services of
numerous proprietory companies, and specialisation in
investment is combined with a co-operative use ^ the
expertise available in the country of operation.
29 G.C. Allen and A. Donnithorne, Western Enterprise in Indonesia
and Malaya, p. 52.
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These agency houses linked together the commercial, mining and
agricultural interests in Malaya with the technical and managerial
knowhow and financial resources of Britain. The success of the
managing agency is testified to by the fact that it is still the most
important form of management in the plantation industry in Malaysia.
The large amounts of capital required to open up an estate
and Government preference for European firms ensured that the estate
28
side of the rubber industry was European-dominated. The Chinese
initially preferred crops that required little investment and gave an
29
immediate return on that investment. With the growing success of
rubber, the Government actively discouraged the old Chinese style of
30
cultivation, and many Chinese moved into rubber. Nonetheless, the
31
reluctance of the Chinese to float public companies, and their
reliance on private finance limited the size of their estates.
The Government gave official encouragement to the planting
industry and in particular to the European planters who were regarded
as "the backbone of the country... deserving of the utmost
32
encouragement which Government can give them." In 1904 a scheme of
Government loans to bona fide planters was introduced, the vast
33
majority of these went to Europeans.
28 Writing with reference to 1953, Puthucheary states, "The 1.6
million acres owned by European companies are mostly in large
units: 92% is in estates of more than 1,000 acres. Asian-owned
estates are generally small. Only 16% of Chinese-owned estates
and 13% of Indian-owned estates are more than 1,000 acres." J.
Puthucheary, op. cit. , p. 26.
29 J.C. Jackson, op. cit. , p. 89.
30 ibid. , p. 229.
31 In 1953, 95 per cent of Asian-owned estate rubber was owned by
individuals, families, partnerships, or private limited
companies. Federation of Malaya, Rubber Statistics Handbook,
1953.p. 38, Table 11.
32 Annual Report of Lower Perak, 1906. p. 6, quoted in
J.J. Jackson, op, cit. , p. 234.
33 J.J. Jackson, op. cit. , p. 237.
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The Tamil Immigration Fund was established by the Government to
provide free passages for Tamil labourers to come to Malaya to work
on the rubber estates. Transport and communication facilities were
provided in the form of roads and railways and in Selangor all land
34
with rail or road frontage was reserved for estates, the vast
majority of which was European-owned.
Despite, possibly because of, its advantages the estate
sector does not appear to have been quite as well managed as one
might have expected. One commentator observed:
On the eve of the Second World War, Malaya's rubber
industry still comprised far too many individual
units of uneconomic size and continued to support at
ruinous expense an absurdly large number of
superfluous directors. Too few estates had replaced
their obsolete trees with higher yielding stock; and
many were in none too good a position to compete
profitably with Asiatiq^mall holders, whether inside
or outside the country.
Manufacturing
During the period of British rule the Malayan economy
developed along typical colonial lines with primary commodities being
developed to supply industry in the colonial power, and local
manufacturing growing up, only as was needed to serve the two main
export industries. In fact, there was little industry stimulated by
tin and rubber other than a light engineering industry to supply
36
equipment. Besides this there was the manufacture of foodstuffs
and tobacco, handicrafts, the processing of commodities such as




35 V. Thompson, Postmortem on Malaya, p. 98.
36 J.T. Thoburn, "Exports and Economic Growth in West Malaysia,"
Oxford Economic Papers, XXV, 1 (1973), p. 98-100.
37 IBRD, The Economic Development of Malaya, pp. 418-419.
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The sector was small and static: it employed 7 per cent of
38
the working population in 1947, and 6 per cent in 1957. The
majority of enterprises were very small: IBRD estimated in 1955 that
39
the average firm had 20 employees, the majority less than 10. While
European capital was concentrated in the mines, plantations and
trading houses, it was Chinese capital that dominated the
40
manufacturing sector. In the Federation in 1955, 80-90 per cent of
industrial employers and 75 per cent of wage earners were Chinese.
The problem the manufacturing industry faced were a small
domestic market, competition from the lucrative tin and rubber
industries for investment capital, and official disinterest. It was
not until the beginning of the Second World War that official policy
towards manufacturing changed and then in response to the need for
defence materials. However, in the period immediately prior to the
Japanese occupation, ship-building was "the only important new
industry born of the war". This Virginia Thompson puts down to 1)
"the difficulty of building up industrial centres overnight"; 2)
"the traditional distaste of British manufacturers for developing
rivals within the imperial frame"; and 3) "the reluctance of colonial
Businessmen to expand output on a scale that would be unprofitable to
them after the war".^
38 Federation of Malaya, 1957 Population Census. No. 14, p. 31.
39 IBRD, The Economic Development of Malaya, p. 422.
40 Manufacturing was dominated by the Chinese, with the exceptions
of smelting, which was a European preserve, and the
manufacturing activities of the two agency houses, Borneo
Company and Sime Darby. J.J. Puthucheary, op.cit., pp.
xviii-xix, pp. 55-56.
41 IBRD, The Economic Development of Malaya, p. 422.
42 V.Thompson, op.cit., p. 117.
43 ibid. , p. 113.
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The Traditional Sector
While the modern sector of the economy flourished, the
traditional sector languished. While revenue was poured into roads,
railways, waterworks and modern cities that served the foreign
commercial establishment, the rural sector was all but ignored. Not
only were the Malays unwilling to provide labour for the mines and
plantations but they were unwilling to change their traditional
practices to provide the agricultural counterpart of that economy.
Consequently, the country never attained self suffiency in food and
Malaya was a net importer of rice throughout most of the century.
Fish alone appeared on the market and was widely distributed
throughout Malaya. To the Malayan peasant, farming or fishing was a
way of life not a commercial undertaking.
The British administration, unable to co-opt the Malay
peasantry into the modern economy, became increasingly reluctant to
disturb their agrarian life-style and so made a policy of preserving
it, and although the Chinese were ready and willing to go into rice
cultivation, and the British would have gladly seen it become an
44
economic concern, it was feared that the competition would be fatal
to Malay enterprise. So all land suitable for the growing of padi
was set aside as Malay Reservations and to ensure that they would not
be seduced into growing the easier and more remunerative rubber it
was legislated that padi land should be used for growing rice and
rice alone. Haynes, Secretary for Agriculture, wrote in a Memorandum
on Rice Cultivation:
Our trusteeship for the Malay people demands that we
administer the country on lines consistent with their
welfare and happiness, not only for today, but for
44 Clifford wrote in despair in his report on Pahang in 1897: "So
indolent,....,are the people of this State, and so wedded are
they to their old antiquated methods of cultivation, that I
cannot but think that if Pahang is ever to produce rice in
sufficient quantities for its requirements, the planning must be
entrusted to immigrants from other countries." H. Clifford,
"Annual Report by the British Resident of Pahang for the Year
1897," Reports on FMS for 1897. p. 61.
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the future ages. That end will be attained rather by
building up a sturdy and thrifty peasantry living on
the lands they own and living by the food they grow,
than by causing them to forsake the life of their
fathers for the glamour of the new ways which put
money in their pockets today but leave them empty
tomorrow, and to abandon their rice-fields for new
crops which they cannot themselves utilise and the
market for which d^gends on outside world conditions
beyond their orbit.
Such policies bound the Malay to a subsistence economy at a period
when the rest of the country was rapidly developing.
+ + +
The product of this period of development in Malaya was the
creation of a second, modern economy alongside the indigenous,
peasant economy. One was efficient, rapidly growing and highly
profitable. It was linked to the world economy but as a supplier of
raw materials to the industrialised nations, not as an industrial
power itself, and consequently it was vulnerable to the vagaries of
commodity prices. It was heavily reliant on two main exports - tin
and rubber, which during 1948-56 together made up 83 per cent of the
46
value of total exports. It had been built almost entirely on
imported capital and, therefore, was in the hands of foreigners and
immigrants. Both groups were interested in transferring their
profits back to their homelands and this meant a steady drain of the
47
wealth created by the new economy out of the country.
Not only was a second economy established alongside the
first, but the two had almost no contact with each other. They were
45 A.S. Haynes, "Memorandum on Rice Cultivation," in FMS, Federal
Council Proceedings, 1933. Appendix No. 28, p. C293.
46 United Nations, "Export Instability in the Primary Exporting
Countries," Readings in Malayan Economics. T.H. Silcock, ed.,
p. 110.
47 In 1957, the level of remittance of profits by foreign companies
was equivalent to 6.3 per cent of national income. J.G. Butler,
"The Contribution of Exports to Growth: A Study of Economic
Policies in Malaysia." p. 122.
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physically separate: the modern sector concentrated in the towns and
on the west coast, the traditional in the north and east; the modern
almost entirely immigrant, the peasant sector, almost entirely
indigenous. Within the modern sector the races were again divided:
tin being the preserve of the Chinese and rubber tapping that of the
Tamils. The verdict of one who knew Malaya well was that "The
British produced in Malaya a plural society with no corporate soul:"
48
it was "a glorified commercial undertaking rather than a State."
Despite, or indeed because of, these social problems that were to be
so important in the future, the economy thrived. The IBRD mission
that visited Malaya in 1955 reported:
By Asian standards, the Malayan economy has reached a
relatively advanced stage, not only in the level of
per capita income, but also in structure: it is a
more varied and complex economy than is
characteristic of most underdeveloped countries.
Power, transport, communications and other basic
facilities are reasonably well developed, a
considerable foundation of secondary industry has
been established; there is a substantial nucleus of
skills and enterprise; standards of public
administration are high; and institutional patterns
and habits of commerce and finance are
correspondingly advanced. Industrial, commercial,
professional and governmental activities outside the
fields of primary industry now probably account for
nearly half the national income; they, as well as
primary raw material and food production, can be
expected to continue to expand. Accordingly, further
economic development will undoubtedly follow a
broader and more vajr^ed pattern than prevailed until
fairly recent times.
GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC POLICY SINCE INDEPENDENCE
Inherent in the economic situation bequeathed by the
British to Malaysia were a host of socio-economic problems that had a
deciding influence of the direction of the independent Government's
48 V. Purcell, Malaya - Communist or Free?, p. 12 and p. 39.
49 IBRD, The Economic Development of Malaya, p. 20.
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economic policy. The Government's response to these problems can be
divided into two stages - pre-1969 and post-1969.
The basic strategy of the Government during the first stage
has been termed "capitalist, conservative and open." The
Government adopted a policy of development through private enterprise
with limited Goverment interference, freedom to repatriate capital
and to remit profits, guarantees against expropriation, and the
continued provision of a supportive infrastructure. That is, it
continued the same basic approach as the British administration. One
commentator accounts for this as follows:
.../Malaya/ achieved independence in a fairly smooth
and friendly manner, in conditions in which the main
distraction was a communist insurrection mounted
mainly by the Chinese with aims conditioned not by
Malaya but by the general pattern of South-East Asia.
Part of the political motive power behind the
Alliance is anti-colonialism and a desire to maintain
Malaya's independent status. But because of the
recent successful anti-communist war, and the fact
that the Alliance leaders are mainly Malay
aristocrats working with Chinese businessmen, its
anti-colonialism is distinctly more right-wing, and
more sympathetic to the West, than ^Jiat of its
powerful neighbours, Indonesia and India.
A major plank of the Government's early economic policy was
development of the country's two main revenue earners - tin and
rubber. The IBRD mission that visited Malaya in 1955 was convinced
of the long-term importance of the rubber industry and considered
replanting with high yielding plant material "to be the country's
52
highest and most urgent development priority", and that a major
50 T.H. Silcock, "General Review of Economic Policy," The Political
Economy of Independent Malaya. T.H. Silcock and E.K. Fisk, eds.,
p. 251.
51 T.H. Silcock, "Communal and Party Structure", The Political
Economy of Independent Malaya. T.H. Silcock and E.K. Fisk, eds.,
p. 24.
52 IBRD, The Economic Development of Malaya, p. 30.
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deterioration in the rubber industry "could only mean something near
53
eventual disaster for the Malayan economy." The First Five-Year
Plan, 1956-60, gave high priority to the replanting of rubber
producers, both smallholders and estates, and to prospecting for, and
the development of, new deposits of minerals.
By the Second Five Year Plan, 1961-1965, there was
considerable concern over the future of rubber. While on the one
hand the Plan stated, "There is every reason for confidence that
54
rubber will continue to compete in world markets," it also stressed
55
the danger of dependence on rubber. This reassessment was
reflected in the main objectives of the Plan which included that of
widening
...the variety of Malayan production, emphasising the
development of other suitable agricultural products
in addition to rubber, and giving every reasonable
encouragement to industrial expansion which in the
long-term offers perhaps the greatest promise for
sustained development and diversification of the
Federation economy.
One of the main innovations of the independent Government
was its commitment to industrialization. It was hoped that through
the introduction of manufacturing industries it would be possible to
diminish the country's reliance on the export of primary products,
provide employment for the country's very rapidly growing population,
and provide the impetus for rapid economic growth.
The First Malaysia Plan, 1966-1970 (FMP) articulated
Government policy in the industrial field thus:
As in the past, responsibility for the manufacturing
operations themselves will be left to the private
sector. The Government's role will be to maintain a
favourable investment climate; to provide industrial
53 ibid. , p. 49.
54 Second Five Year Plan, 1961-1965. p. 15.
55 loc.cit.
56 ibid. , p. 16.
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estates and transport, power and communicat^m
facilities; and to grant tax and other inducements.
The main direct Government action was taken with regard to
the traditional sector of the economy. After years of neglect and
resulting poverty, the Government made a special commitment to
improve the lot of the rural population, the vast majority of whom
were Malay. It particularly concentrated on raising the output per
family of peasant farmers, fishermen and foresters by providing more
land, irrigation supplies, improved seed grain, and cooperative
marketing and credit facilities. It was also committed to improving
basic social services in the rural areas especially in health and
education. However, its programs made slow progress partly through a
lack of skilled managerial staff, and partly because of the
relatively small scale on which it was carried out compared to the
size of the need.
The result of these policies was that the dynamic modern
sector grew at an even faster pace than before and the gap between it
and the traditional sector grew ever wider. Regional disparities
increased as did social disparities. The Chinese and, to a lesser
extent the Indians, had the capital and business experience to invest
58
in the growing economy and so they derived the greatest benefits.
European and American investment increased and so the position of
foreign interests in the economy grew stronger. Since generally the
Chinese and Indians had received a better education, and a far higher
proportion of them had studied in English schools than Malays, they
were brought in to European companies as managers. Malays did not
have the capital, the experience, or the education to take advantage
57 FMP. p. 9, para. 26.
58 "Independent Malaya actually opened up for them /the Chinese/
more and better avenues for the acquisition of wealth," stated
Dr Mahathir, currently Deputy Prime Minister, in his polemic
against Government policy written in 1970 just after the '69
riots. Mahathir bin Mohamad, op.cit. , p. 42.
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of the growth of the economy and thus racial inequalities grew ever
larger.
As a result there was a complete reassessment of the
Government's economic policies and a significant change in priorities
and methods. These were articulated in the New Economic Policy (NEP)
first put forward in the Second Malaysia Plan (SMP). The NEP shifted
the main focus of Government policy from economic growth, to the
attainment of its social objectives. Economic growth is still
considered of vital importance but as a means to the attainment of
the Government's social goals rather than as an end in itself. It is
this major shift in official policy that forms the backdrop to the
study and one of the most important factors influencing management
development in Malaysia. The period of this study coincides with the
SMP, 1971-1975. The situation studied in 1971 was both a product of
the colonial and pre-1969 policies and strongly influenced by the
changes in Government policy taking place at the time; by 1975, the
full effects of the NEP were being felt.
The NEP has two main aims: (1) "to eradicate poverty among
all Malaysians," and (2) "to restructure Malaysian society so that
the identification of race with economic function and geographic
location is reduced and eventually eliminated": both of these
objectives to be realized "through the rapid expansion of the economy
59
over time." As part of the second objective, the Government is
committed to "raise the share of the Malays and other indigenous
people in the ownership of productive wealth including land, fixed
assets and equity capital. The target is that by 1990, they will own
at least 30% of equity capital with 40% being owned by other
Malaysians," ^ and 30 per cent by foreign investors. In 1970 in
Peninsular Malaysia foreign ownership of share capital of limited
companies was 63.3 per cent of the total, with other Malaysians
holding 34.3 per cent, and Malays and Malay interests, 2.4 per cent;
by 1975 the comparable figures were
59 TMP. p. 7, para. 27.
60 ibid. , p. 49, para. 183(5).
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estimated to be 54.9 per cent, 37.3 per cent and 7.8 per cent.
The restructuring target with regard to management is that
Malays should form 30 per cent of the managerial staff at all levels
6 2
and in all categories of staff. Again attainment is to come
63
through growth. However, the historical imbalances in management
are slow to overcome. For instance, in 1970 Malays were severely
under-represented amongst administrative and managerial workers, and
sales workers in the secondary sector, while Chinese were
64
substantially over-represented in these fields, in 1976, the
Government reported "In Peninsular Malaysia the employment of Malays
in the manufacturing sector increased significantly during the SMP
period although the increase took place at the lower levels of the
occupational hierarchy.
Private industry tends to be naturally reluctant to
relinquish control over its enterprises and the Government has
developed a number of ways to encourage compliance. Foreign
companies have needed to seek Government cooperation in order to
obtain work permits for their expatriate staff, import licences for
equipment and the like. There has therefore been a ready means of
applying Government pressure on a limited but effective scale.
Companies wishing to apply for the various tax concessions that went
with pioneer status were required to conform to very specific
Government conditions. They included a stipulation that Malaysians
must have 51 per cent of equity holdings. They also include a
61 TMP. p. 87, Table 4-17.
62 The TMP refers to the restructuring of employment patterns to
reflect the racial composition of the country, which would
suggest a higher target of around 50 per cent. Since there
seems to have been no clear restatement of the target as 50 per
cent it shall be assumed that the lower target is still
operational.
63 TMP. p. 30, para. 107.
64 See ibid. , pp. 82-83, Table 4-15.
65 ibid., p. 316, para. 1040.
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personnel policy designed to foster the development of Malaysian
management:
All approved projects are required to employ
Malaysians at all levels. Foreign personnel are
allowed entry for employment where there are no
qualified Malaysians available to do the job. In
such cases, the company has to formulate a proper
training programme to train Malaysians within a
reasonable period of time with the view to eventually
replacing such foreign personnel. However, to enable
foreign investors to look after their investment and
interests, a certain number of key posts are allowed
which can be permanently held by foreign personnel.
This numl^r depends on the size of the investment
involved.
The regulations sometimes also state that a specified per cent of the
output must be exported, and that 50 per cent of the jobs at all
grades must be reserved for Malays. ^
All new manufacturing companies have been required to seek
approval for their operations since 1 January 1972 and the Ministry
of Trade and Industry has been empowered to impose equity conditions
on them in line with the NEP objectives. In 1974 the Government
introduced regulations to control takeovers and mergers of companies
which would only be allowed if they led to a more balanced Malaysian
ownership and control, greater economic benefits to Malaysians in
68
terms of employment, growth, exports and training. A Foreign
Investment Committee was set up to implement the new regulations.
In 1975 the Government provided itself with a much more
comprehensive form of control in the Industrial Coordination Act
(ICA). This Act required the licensing of all manufacturing
establishments for the purpose of ensuring the orderly development
of manufacturing activities in Malaysia. It also provided
66 Jamil Jan, "Malaysia's Experience with Multinational
Corporations," Malaysia and the Multinational Corporations. S.
Chee and S.M.Khoo, eds., p. 80.
67 loc.cit.
68 Wong Sulong, "Malaysia announces wide-ranging takeover
controls," Financial Times, 21 February 1974.
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that,
The Minister, in issuing a licence, may impose such
conditions as he may think fit and such conditions
may be varied either on the application the
manufacturers or on the Minister's own motion.
At the time no mechanism was provided for appeal against the
Minister's decision, an aspect of the Act that particularly aggrieved
the business community. Elaborating on this in an address to an
investment seminar in 1975, the Minister of Trade and Industry
stated:
As the policy of Malaysian and Bumiputra
participation is also relevant in the area of
employment, training of workers, distribution of
products and the utilisation of professional
services, appropriate conditions will be imposed
relating to these factors.
This suggested that the Government could, and might insist
on immediate compliance with racial balance targets in order for a
firm to be granted a licence to operate. It also meant that
companies' training activities could be examined. The ICA affected
both the foreign business community, and the Chinese and Indian firms
which until then had managed to operate without close Government
scrutiny. It is thus a major tool whereby Government policy can be
enforced.
A second important change in the exercise of Government
control was the Petroleum Development Act (PDA) of 1974 and its
Amendment (PDAA) of 1975. The most significant feature of this Act
was its introduction of the concept of management shares. This was
to be a special class of shares which would only be issued to the
Government's petroleum corporation, Petronas. These would be sold to
Petronas at the price of ordinary shares but would entitle the holder
to five hundred votes for each management share on "any resolution
69 Industrial Coordination Act. Section 4(4).
70 Address by the Minister of Trade and Industry entitled
"Industrial Development Opportunities for Investment" at the
Investment Seminar in Kuala Lumpur on 28 October, 1975.
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relating to the appointment or dismissal of a director or any member
of the staff of the relevant company."^ For a very small investment
the Government would acquire effective control of the petroleum
companies which appeared to many companies to be akin to
nationalization. The PDAA extended the authority of the Act to
include the marketing and distribution of petroleum and its products,
thus bringing the entire petro-chemical industry in Malaysia under
its umbrella. Since then the concept of management shares has been
withdrawn and the ICA has been amended to include an Advisory
Council. However, at the time of the survey these were matters for
considerable concern throughout the business community. Indeed, the
ICA remains a very sore point particularly with the Chinese business
community.
In order to achieve the targets it set for itself in the
NEP the Government decided to break with previous policy and become
directly involved in industry. For this purpose it set up a number
of parastatal bodies, the principal one being PERNAS, the state
trading corporation. Through the activities of PERNAS, and the other
parastatal bodies, companies have been set up often as joint
ventures, for the purpose of providing opportunities for Malays to
72
enter business. While this is a large and important area of
management development it unfortunately lies outside the scope of
this study.
Despite the sharp controls the Government has placed on the
private sector it continues to rely heavily on foreign investment.
The Third Malaysia Plan states:
The Government will continue to ensure that foreign
investment is attracted into the country for the
significant contributions it can make to income and
employment creation. It seeks, in addition, the
skills and technology which accompany foreign
investment. This is an important adjunct to
Malaysia's own efforts in the development and
modernization of the economy. The widening access to
international markets that foreign entrepreneurship
provides for the country's exports goods is
71 Petroleum Development (Amendment) Act, 1975, Section 3.
72 See p. 62.
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another important-^contribution that Malaysia will
continue to value.
Under the TMP it is expected that the private sector will be the main
source of gross capital formation, whereas under the SMP it was the
Government that was the principal source. The investment target of
the TMP is $22.9 billion in real terms (1970 prices) and $44.2
billion in current prices, which amounts to an increase of 49.3 per
cent; of this 40.3 per cent or $9.2 billion is expected to come from
the public sector and the 59.7 per cent or $13.7 billion from the
private sector.
The apparent Government hostility to foreign investment
74
which marked 1974-75, and the sudden imposition of tight Government
control over the private sector had a profoundly demoralizing effect,
an effect that was particularly felt in 1975-76, in the aftermath of
the ICA and PDA. One result was that real private investment
declined by 25.0 per cent in 1975. In 1976 the official attitude
became more conciliatory.
This trend has continued and has expressed itself in such
concrete measures as the abandonment of the concept of management
shares, the institution of an Advisory Council to oversee the working
of the ICA, and the moderate approach taken in the implementation of
the ICA.
This change in attitude is tacit recognition of the crucial
role the private sector is expected to play in the achievement of the
economic, and closely linked to that, the social targets of the TMP.
The attainment of the rapid growth anticipated by the TMP presupposes
73 TMP. p. 89, para. 264.
74 An example of this hostility is the statement made by an officer
of the Penang Development Corporation: "We of Southeast Asia are
familiar with the MNC of old - the East India Co., the Dutch
Co., the merchant adventurers; and we are also aware of the
times when activities of the MNC's included plundering,
pirating, cheating, espionage - all of which were considered
legitimate and fair game. The MNC's have nowadays merely taken
on new and subtle forms.". Anwar Fazal, in Malaysia and the
Multinational Corporations. S. Chee and S.M. Khoo, eds., p. 101.
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the existence of both internal and external factors conducive to it,
neither of which appeared to exist in 1975, athough since then both
the internal investment climate and the conditions of world trade
have improved. If the rate of growth even approximates to the
targets it will involve the rapid expansion of the managerial cadre
and an enormous effort to develop a managerial cadre to cope with the
needs of the private sector.
The emphasis the Government has placed on racial balance in
management has made compliance with these targets a matter of
urgency. Yet educational standards have tended to decline and the
rapid social changes taking place in the Malay community mean that
many potential candidates may be the first generation to have left
the traditional life of the village. This has implications for
companies' recruitment and selection policies, as well as the
training provided for new recruits. The pressure to correct racial
balance at all levels of management has meant that many companies
have felt obliged to implement a programme of accelerated promotion
for Malays, which has in turn brought a host of problems related to
the development of such managers and repercussions on the morale of
existing staff.
The emphasis on manufacturing industry has created a new
set of management requirements for technically and professionally
trained staff - engineers, chemists, technicians, and the like. The
Government looks to manufacturing industry, as a leading growth
sector, to play a major role in correcting racial balance in
management, yet it is in science and technology that there is a
shortage of trained Malays.
One of the main problems of the Government's NEP is that it
entails two conflicting objectives. On the one hand there is the
Government's social objective to bring the Malays up to the
educational, social and economic standard of other Malaysians and
integrate them into the modern economy of the country in a very short
space of time: on the other, there is the economic imperative of
rapid economic growth out of which the social objective is to be
achieved. However, pressure for the attainment of the former tends
151
to retard the latter, and vice versa. It is impossible completely to
restructure the social and economic order of the country without
disrupting and slowing down the rate of growth of the economy, but if
the economy is given free reign and social factors are not paramount
the fact that the modern sector is growing at a faster rate than the
traditional will mean that the gap between the two will grow ever
wider. Prior to 1969 it was the economic objective that was given
precedence; since 1969 it has been the social objective. The
Government has had to conduct a careful balancing act in order to
achieve its objective while minimising the necessary dislocation of
the economy.
BASIC DIMENSIONS OF THE ECONOMY
Malaysia is a relatively prosperous country. Income per
capita rose by 40 per cent in the sixties,^ by 1975 it had reached
$1304, and by 1978 $1,644 (at 1970 prices).^ The country is
comparatively rich in resources - both physical and manpower - and
this has enabled it to achieve a growth rate in GDP in real terms of
7.4 per cent per annum between 1971-75, the period of this study,''''
78
rising to 8.7 per cent per annum in 1976-78.
Malaysia's balance of payments is regularly in surplus,
(See Table 5.1) and the Malaysian currency has remained remarkably
stable. The country accumulated $1.9 billion in external reserves
over 1971-75, giving the dollar 164.9 per cent backing in 1975, and
79
providing reserves to sustain six months of retained imports. Nor
75 TMP. p. 3, para. 11.
76 Mid-Term Review of the Third Malaysia Plan 1976-1980.p.1, para.
2.
77 TMP. p. 53, para. 195.
78 Mid-Term Review of the Third Malaysia Plan 1976-1980. p.l para
1.
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is the economy unduly burdened by external public debt, which
80
represented 11 per cent of GNP in 1975, with debt servicing taking
81
up only 3.4 per cent of external earnings.
Malaysia has suffered far less from inflation than some
developed countries. Between 1963-70 consumer prices in the OECD
countries rose by roughly 30 per cent, in the USA by 25 per cent, in
82
the UK by 35 per cent, and in Peninsular Malaysia by 6 per cent.
However, in the seventies the effect of inflation in the developed
countries began to be felt in Malaysia and as a result, from the
second half of 1972 domestic prices began to rise sharply and this
83
trend accelerated in 1973. By 1975 the rate of inflation had been
brought under control and the consumer price index was up by only 4.5
84
per cent; in 1976-78 it was lower still at 4.1 per cent per
85
annum.
Despite the overall rate of growth of the economy during
1971-75, there were considerable fluctuations. 1971 was a year of
mild recession which was followed in 1973, by a boom year with
commodity prices rising sharply. By the end of 1973 the tide began
80 ibid., p. 24, para. 81
81 ibid. , p. 25, para. 82
82 R Chander, "Price Stability and Inflation in Malaysia,"
Malaysian Economic Development and Policies.
S.Chee and S.M. Khoo, eds. p. 112.
83 The consumer price index for Peninsular Malaysia, based on 1967
= 100, rose on average 1.6 per cent in 1971, 3.2 per cent in
1972, 10.5 per cent in 1973 and 17.4 per cent in 1974. Yet this
still compare very favourably with the rate of inflation in 1973
in other countries in the region with Indonesia experiencing a
rise of 27 per cent, the Philippines 12 per cent, Singapore 25
per cent and Thailand 15-16 per cent. TMP. p. 129, Table 7-3.
S.Y. Lin, "The Inflation Syndrome and Its Implications for
Policy," Malaysian Economic Development and Policies.
S.Chee and S.M. Khoo, eds., p. 92.
84 TMP. p. 129, Table 7-3.
85 Mid-Term Review of the Third Malaysia Plan 1976-1980. p. 21,
para. 58.
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to turn in the developed economies, particularly in the aftermath of
the oil crisis, and commodity prices were beginning to fall. In
86
Malaysia, the first half of 1974 saw a surge of investment but by
the end of the year production and sales were down and by 1975 the
full impact of the world recession was being felt. This pattern
needs to be borne in mind in assessing the data on management
development in the following chapters since it applies to the two
years 1971 and 1975 when companies were affected by recession and is,
therefore, likely to understate the picture.
Turning now to the composition of the economy, Table 5.2,
presents a breakdown of GDP in Malaysia as a whole by sector of
origin. Agriculture is clearly the dominant sector although its
relatively low growth rate means that is is slowly being superseded
by the more dynamic manufacturing sector. Mining which was once the
largest revenue earner in the economy has been declining as tin is
exhausted, but, petroleum has now taken over as the main source of
growth in the industry and accounts for the 11 per cent growth rate
in 1976-78. Manufacturing is a sector of increasing importance
expanding at a rate well above that of overall GDP. The large
service sector increased from 43.7 per cent of GDP in 1971 to 46.6
per cent in 1975.
One of the chief characteristics of the Malaysian economy
87
is its openness. It is an economy based on the export of primary
commodities, reinforced by policies that have encouraged active
88
foreign participation with few controls on foreign exchange.
Exports continue to provide the impetus for growth, accounting for 41
89
per cent of GDP at market prices between 1970-75. Although
manufactured goods have been claiming an ever larger share of export
86 Private investment increased by 22.3 per cent between 1973-74.
TMP. p. 15, para. 58.
87 See W. Kasper, Malaysia, A Study in Successful Economic
Development. p. 63.
88 ibid.,p . 51.
89 TMP. p. 19, para. 68.
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earnings, primary commodities continue to be the mainstay of the
economy. Table 5.3 illustrates the main problem of such dominance:
wild fluctuations in commodity prices, and consequently export
income.
In employment terms agriculture is the dominant sector
absorbing just under half of the employed labour force in 1975,
declining slightly in 1978. (See Table 5.4) Although the absolute
number of people employed in agriculture has increased,
proportionately there has been a decrease from 50.3 per cent of the
employed labour force in 1970 to 46.2 per cent in 1975, to 43.9 per
cent for Malaysia as a whole in 1978. Manufacturing employs over 10
per cent of the labour force and its share is growing rapidly, and
the tertiary sector - utilities, transport, commerce and
services - employ more than one third .Si
In the future it is predicted that the economy will grow at
the high level of 8.1 per cent of GDP per annum (at factor cost in
90
1970 prices), during 1979-90 with the fastest growing sector being
manufacturing which is expected to continue growing at over 12 per
92 93
cent per annum and private investment by 10 per cent per annum.
Agriculture
Agriculture, including forestry and fisheries, is the most
important sector of the Malaysian economy accounting for 29.8 per
cent of GDP in 1975, contributing 45.5 per cent of foreign exchange
94
earnings, and employing 43.9 per cent of the total work force.
However, it is growing more slowly than any other sector and by
90 Mid-Term Review of the Third Malaysia Plan 1976-1980. p. 22,
para. 61.
91 loc.cit.
92 TMP. p. 54, para. 196.
93 ibid., p. 40, para. 146.































































































19751 2,0169.12.2 1,2178.13 4 63212.87.0 363.84 0 1,2687.4.0 1070.12 8537.89 4 1232.14 18-0.2 109.32 520.86 1,9128.521.0 4198.16 9,089100.0.









































































(i)FiguresapplytoM laysiawhole,notjusPeninsul rl . Sources:ThirdMalaysiaPl n,p.142ble8-2. MidTermRev ewofh rdalaysiaPl n,p.64,ble4-5.
159
1978 its share had declined slightly to 25.0 per cent of GDP and 44.0
95
per cent of employment. Despite this it is expected that by 1990 it"
will still be the second largest sector in terms of contribution to
96 97
GDP and the largest in terms of employment.
Table 5.5 gives a breakdown of agriculture in terms of land
use. Rubber is the dominant crop, followed by oil palm and padi.
The sector comprises a large number of peasant cultivators who grow
padi and some who also grow cash crops such as rubber, estates
specialising in cash crops largely for export, and more recently,
large Government land development schemes often run on a cooperative
98
basis. It is the estate sector that is the concern of this study
and upon which this description will concentrate. This sector is
dominated by two perennial crops - rubber and oil palm, although
other crops such as coconuts, and more recently, cocoa are also
found. Being perennial, rubber and oil palm involve long term
investment, and are relatively inflexible in responding to changes in
supply and demand. Both crops are highly labour intensive.
Table 5.5
Agricultural Land Use, Peninsular Malaysia, 1975
Crop Estimated Area under Crop
Acres I
Rubber 4,188 51.1
Oil Palm 1,496 18.3
Coconut 576 7.0
Padi 1,471 18.0
Other Crops 459 5.6
Total 8,190 100.0
Source: Malaysia, Annual Bulletin of Statistics, 1976.
p. 5
95 Mid-Term Review of Third Malaysia Plan, p. 125, para. 299.
96 TMP. p. 58, Table 4-4.
97 ibid. , p. 68, Table 4-10.
98 Over one million acres of land were opened up by the Government
during 1971-1975 and a further 647,000 acres during 1976-78.
TMP. p. 288, para. 900; Mid-Term Review of Third Malaysia Plan,
p. 131, para. 327.
160
Rubber
Malaysia is the world's largest producer of natural rubber,
Peninsular Malaysia accounting for over 40 per cent of world
production. Rubber is the single most important crop in Malaysia
responsible for 30 per cent of all value-added in the agricultural
99
sector in 1970-75 and 51 per cent of major agricultural land in the
peninsula.
The two principal problems facing the industry are the
competition of synthetics and fluctuations in the world rubber price.
Synthetic rubber became a serious threat to natural rubber when in
the 1960's stereo-regular rubbers were developed that were virtually
a perfect substitute for natural rubber, and for specialised uses,
superior to rubber. It was feared that synthetics would force the
world rubber price down to a point below which it would be uneconomic
to produce natural rubber. However stereo-regular rubbers are a
by-product of petroleum and the oil crisis of 1973 radically changed
the situation by boosting the base price of synthetics and giving
natural rubber a competitive edge. This means that while
stereo-regular rubbers are still a serious source of competition they
no longer present a mortal threat to the industry.
The effect of the competition of synthetics has been a
marked improvement in the efficiency and productivity of rubber
estates. This has focussed on four main areas: research into the
development of improved plant material; the reduction of labour costs
by experimenting with longer cuts, less frequent tapping and the use
of yield stimulants that considerably prolong the flow of latex; the
improvement and standardization of the quality of the end product
with the introduction of standard Malaysian Rubber (SMR); and finally
management efficiency of estates has been improved as estate
management has become increasingly professional and the area under
one manager progressively increased. The result has been that
99 TMP. p. 113, para. 344.
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productivity has increased from 500 pounds per acre in 1956"^^ to
1,136 pounds per acre in 1975^^ and over 1,500 pounds per acre on
estates with high yielding plant material.
Oil Palm
Oil palm has experienced dramatic growth since the Second
World War. By 1966 Peninsular Malaysia had become the world's
leading producer of palm oil, a position that she has continued to
maintain. The decline in rubber prices in the 1960's made oil palm
more attractive: in 1962 the big plantation companies began to switch
over and the Government began planting it on its land development
projects. Between 1970-75 the area planted with oil palm increased
102
from 667,000 acres to 1,496,000 acres and production rose almost
103
three-fold from 395,952 tons to 1,118,839 tons. This trend has
104
continued with acreage rising to 1.7 million acres in 1978.
Oil palm is more than twice as profitable as rubber or
coconut and starts to bear fruit in three years compared to the
minimum of five years for rubber. It then yields continuously until
the height of the palm makes harvesting uneconomic. However, it
cannot suffer neglect: oil palm fruit must be harvested; its mineral
requirements are more substantial than rubber, indeed fertilizer is
the singe largest cost on an oil palm estate; and most important, the
fruit must be processed within twenty-four hours and a processing
factory requires very large capital investment. As a result oil palm
is ideally grown on an estate, or a well-organised co-operative with
at least 2000 acres, and optimally 5000 acres, to support a factory.
Oil palm is an industry that demands efficiency, first
because of the capital cost and technology involved in its
processing, and the necessity of getting the fruit to the factory
100 Rubber Statistics Handbook, 1969. p. 170.
101 Malaysia, Annual Bulletin of Statistics, 1976. p. 8.
102 ibid., p. 5 .
103 ibid. , p. 6.
104 Mid-Term Review of Third Malaysia Plan, p. 128, para. 306.
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as quickly as possible, and second because it is in competition with
many other edible oils and fats, which are virtually interchangeable,
in particular soya bean oil. With the growth in the use of edible
oil, the price of palm oil is likely to come down in future and
therefore increasingly high levels of efficiency will be required of
the oil palm industry.
Mining
Tin
Tin was the most important mineral in terms of export value
and employment in 1975: the value of tin exports was $1,217 million,
or 58 per cent of mineral exports, compared to $853 million or 41 per
cent for crude and partly refined petroleum, and $18 million or 1 per
cent for copper (See Table 5.3) and tin employed 98 per cent of the
mining industry's labour force in Peninsular Malaysia. However,
tin has gradually declined from its earlier position of pre-eminence
as known deposits have been worked out. In 1971, the value of tin
exports amounted to 18 per cent of total gross exports, but this had
fallen to 13 per cent by 1975, and 12 per cent by 1978. Nonetheless,
Malaysia produced 33 per cent of world tin exports in 1976.
The two main methods of tin extraction are still dredging
and gravel pump mining which together account for more than 80 per
cent of production. In contrast to the period immediately before and
after the Second World War, gravel pump mining is now the largest
producer accounting for more than 53 per cent of total production in
1975."''^ The gravel pump mines tend to be small and very numerous
compared to the larger more capital intensive dredge mines: in 1976,
there were 51 dredges in operation compared to 724 gravel pump
108
mines.
105 Department of Statistics, Annual Bulletin of Statistics, 1976.
p. 80, Table 10.5.
106 Far Eastern Economic Review, September 10 1976.
107 TMP. p. 324, para. 1077.
108 Department of Statistics, Annual Bulletin of Statistics, 1976.
p. 20.
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The main problems of the industry are the exhaustion of
known tin deposits, the competition of substitutes such as aluminium,
and the instability of world prices. The exhaustion of tin reserves
is such that despite record prices in 1977-78 tin production declined
109
substantially from 1975-76. Prospecting is taking place for new
tin deposits and it appears likely that alluvial tin may be found in
Perak and Selangor, off-shore in the Straits of Malacca, and primary
sources of tin may be discovered in the Main range of mountains.
The demand for tin is threatened by the development of
canning methods that reduce or even eliminate the need for tin, and
by research into tin-free steel. The price of tin is highly variable
ranging, for instance, from $10,576 per ton in 1971, $15,975 in 1975,
to $27,826 in 1978.p0 try and stabilise prices export controls
have been brought into force, but, the combination of controls and
the fluctuations in price make it extremely difficult for the
marginal mines to survive and the Government was forced to introduce
a "hardship quota pool" in 1975 so that miners with too restricted a
quota to operate economically could apply to the pool for an
additional allocation.
The working out of tin deposits has had an important effect
on the management needs of the industry for as the large deposits
have been exhausted it has become increasingly uneconomic to use
dredges and the low cost gravel-pump methods have become suitable and
have regained their prominence. This has meant a shift from high
technology European controlled operations to low technology Chinese
ones and consequently a different type and level of management
expertise. Dredges do still extract a significant proportion of the
country's tin and they require skilled mining engineers, but,
dredging companies are shrinking in size and are likely to be
reluctant to invest in management development, indeed in present
circumstances it may be an unnecessary and unwise investment.
109 Mid-Term Review of Third Malaysia Plan, p. 9, Table 1-4.
110 TMP. p. 20, Table 2-4. Mid-Term Review of Third Malaysia
Plan, p. 9, Table 1-4 (Mid-Term Review figures used for 1975).
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Petroleum
Petroleum is the basis of a new and rapidly growing
industry. In 1971 crude and partly refined petroleum made up 8 per
cent of the value of exports, in 1975 9 per cent despite a sharp drop
in volume of exports, and in 1978 crude petroleum alone made up 14
per cent of exports.However, it is only the downstream refining
and marketing operations that take place in Peninsular Malaysia; in
1971-75 production was confined to Sabah and Sarawak which are
outside the scope of this study, although since then wells off the
east coast of Peninsular Malaysia have come on stream.
Iron, Bauxite and Copper
Iron ore, which in 1960 accounted for almost 29 per cent of
the total value of mineral production and employed 18 per cent of the
112
labour force in the mining industry, has since then declined
fairly steadily in importance. Two of the largest iron mines were
closed down in 1970 and production has fallen from its peak of 7.2
million tons in 1963, to 4.4 million tons in 1970, and 348,000 tons
113
in 1975.
Bauxite production which had grown from 451,958 tons in
1960 to a peak of 1,121,318 tons in 1970, fell to 703,600 tons in
114
1975 and 625,000 tons in 1978.
Copper mining began in Sabah in 1975 and is therefore still
in its infancy. Although there is prospecting in Peninsular
Malaysia, in 1975 copper mining was carried out only in East Malaysia
and so is outside the scope of this study.
111 TMP. pp. 20-21, Table 2-4; Mid-Term Review of Third Malaysia
Plan, p. 9, Table 14.
112 Yip Yat Hoong, "The Mining Industry", Malaysia, A Survey. Wang
Gungwu, ed., p. 305.
113 SMP. p. 170, para. 538; TMP p. 324, para. 1077.
114 SMP. p. 171, para. 539; Mid-Term Review of Third Malaysia
Plan, p. 159, para. 427.
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Manufacturing
The development of manufacturing industry in Malaysia can
be roughly divided into three stages: first, in the 1950's
manufacturing geared to the processing of the country's main export
commodities - tin and rubber, and the light engineering stimulated by
this; then in the sixties, industry aimed at import substitution; and
third, in the seventies, the development of manufacturing for export.
It was in the sixties that large scale industry began to grow rapidly
with the encouragement of Government incentives and tariff
protection. Between 1965-70 the contribution of the manufacturing
sector to GDP grew at an average annual rate of growth of 10 per
cent.^^ Manufacturing based on import substitution continued into
the period of the SMP accounting for about 30 per cent in the growth
of value added during 1971-75, but is expected to decline to about 12
per cent during the TMP."^ However, the main impetus for growth in
the manufacturing sector during 1971-75 came from the expansion of
export-oriented manufacturing which grew from $591 million in 1970 to
$2.1 billion in 1975, accounting for 61.2 per cent of the growth of
value added in the manufacturing sector.
Under the TMP it is expected that export-oriented
manufacturing will be the main source of growth accounting for about
one-half of the growth in value added during 1976-1980. At the same
time the domestic market is expanding as private disposable income
grows. By 1990 the manufacturing sector is expected to become the
largest sector in the economy, growing from 12.2 per cent of GDP in
118
1970 to a target of 26.2 per cent in 1990, and contributing about
11926 per cent of total new employment or 776,000 jobs over 1970-90.
115 SMP. p. 31, Table 2-5.
116 TMP. p. 119, para. 361.
117 ibid., p. 14, para. 52.
118 ibid. , p. 58, Table 4-4.
119 ibid. , p. 67, para. 223.
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The overall composition of manufacturing industry is
presented in Table 5.6. It can be seen that in spite of the growth
of new industry in recent years, the older industries - food
products, beverages, tobacco, rubber processing and wood
products - still made up 57 per cent of the gross value of output in
the manufacturing industry in 1973, and they also accounted for 44
per cent of all establishments, 47 per cent of value added and 41 per
cent of employment. However, the development of the electrical
industry has added an important new source of employment. For the
most part, the long-established industries are labour intensive and
are often small cottage industries. The newer areas of
manufacturing - chemicals and chemical products, petroleum and
petroleum products, non-metallic mineral products, iron and steel,
non-ferrous metals, electrical machinery and transport
equipment - are usually capital intensive.
The development of manufacturing has tended to follow the
lines of existing industry because the manpower and physical
infrastructure are concentrated there. Peninsular Malaysia accounts
120
for 95.0 per cent of manufacturing output in Malaysia.
In Peninsular Malaysia in 1970, 57 per cent of
manufacturing output, other than in primary
processing, originated from Selangor, mainly in the
urbanized Klang Valley. A further 37% originated
from the more developed States on the West
Coast - Penang, Perak, Negri Sembilan and
Johor - with the remaining Statje^ producing only 5
per cent of manufacturing output.
This high degree of concentration the Government is trying to
overcome with its Locational Incentive Schemes.
The basic pattern of a small number of large companies and
a large number of very small establishments remains. The Financial
Survey of Companies, which provided the sampling frame for this
study, found in 1968 that 78.2 per cent of the companies covered had
120 Mid-Term Review of Third Malaysia Plan, p. 146, para. 371.
121 TOP. p. 205, para. 627.
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Table 5.6
Manufacturing Industries, Peninsular Malaysia, 1973
No. of Gross Value No. of(l) Value
Establish¬ Value Added Employees Added
ments of Output Emploj
Industry $'000 $'000 $'000
Food 3,053 1 ,902,518 365,003 43,475 8.4
Beverages 73 121,631 61,206 3,170 19.3
Tobacco 168 343,602 130,418 9,058 14.4
Textiles 240 291,876 104,222 22,742 4.6
Clothing 216 104,935 29,684 10,810 2.7
Leather 222 30,210 8,864 2,848 3.1
Wood, Wood & Cork Products
(except furniture) 1,044 824,858 304,241 41,819 7.3
Furniture 863 67,933 19,282 6,586 2.9
Paper, Paper Products 152 62,794 17,971 4,007 4.5
Printing 475 237,964 114,551 14,782 7.7
Industrial Chemicals 54 183,793 61,304 2,881 21.3
Other Chemical Products 283 218,955 98,382 7,328 13.4
Petroleum Refining 4 232,566 49,628 492 100.9
Misc Petroleum & Coal Products 6 4,630 2,248 1 18 19. 1
Rubber Products 561 1 ,149,376 222,451 25,076 8.9
Plastic Products 299 132,713 44,488 9,245 4.8
Pottery, China & Earthernware 49 10,963 4,669 1,141 4.1
Glass & Glass Products 34 26,593 11,786 1,538 7.7
Non-Metallic Mineral Products 332 207,022 104,192 11,180 9.3
Iron & Steel Basic Industries 189 225,868 76,149 6,463 11.8
Non-Ferrous Metal Basic Industries 9 21,166 9,742 701 13.9
Metal Products (except machinery) 734 196,927 84,183 13,821 6.1
Electrical Machinery & Apparatus 1,574 731,041 285,097 24,524 11.6
Machines (except electrical) 147 54,091 20,908 2,721 7.7
Transport Equipment 173 234,004 62,201 8,807 7.1
Professional, Scientific Optical &
Photographic Equipment 26 23,102 9,924 1,714 5.8
Other Manufacturing Industries 121 24,048 7,691 1,914 4.0
TOTAL 11,(01 7 ,665,174 2, 312,109 297,961 7.8
(i) Industries' full-time and part-time employees as well as unpaid workers.
Source: Malaysia, Annual Bulletin of Statistics, 1976. Table 4.2.
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less than $1 million annual turnover, but that they accounted for
122
only 10 per cent of the value of sales and other revenue. Because
they were so small these companies were eliminated from the study,
indeed the Department of Statistics itself no longer includes them in
the Financial Survey. Of the companies covered, 77.9 per cent were
in the smallest size group with $1-5 million annual turnover in 1969;
123
by 1974 this proportion had fallen slightly to 69.3 per cent.
There has been a tendency for new manufacturing activities
to be capital intensive. The pattern of Government incentives
encouraged this by giving tax exemption on the basis of capital
expenditure, as has the availability of low interest capital and the
shortage of managers with the consequent desire to make the best use
of the limited number available and maximise their effectiveness.
The expansion of manufacturing took place without
coordination or supervision and as a result there had been a
124
proliferation of enterprises in certain industries. (The stated
purpose of the ICA was to overcome these very difficulties.) The
result has been that some plants are running under capacity and
competition is very fierce. David Dim found underutilization of
125
capital in a wide range of industries. Indeed 61 per cent of the
companies, in his survey reported that their utilisation of capital
126
was lower than desired. The main cause of this they attributed to
lack of demand owing to foreign competition and/or a surfeit of
122 Department of Statistics, Report of the Financial Survey
of Limited Companies, Malaysia 1968. p. 1.
123 Department of Statistics, Report of the Financial Survey
of Limited Companies, Malaysia 1974. p. 1., Table A
124 V. Kanapathy cites the example of the car assembly industry
which in 1970 had six assembly plants, producing twenty one
brands of cards, and eighty models, for an annual market of
around eighteen thousand cars. "Foreign Investment in Malaysia:
Experience and Prospects," UMBC Economic Review, VI, 2 (1970).
125 D. Lim, Capital Utilization in West Malaysian Manufacturing,
p. 17d. ~
126 ibid. , p. 49.
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127
local producers. Under-utilisation of capital was more severe
amongst Malaysian-owned establishments than foreign-owned or
controlled establishments, and more severe amongst unincorporated
128
than incorporated establishments. This suggests that the
experienced professional managers in foreign, incorporated firms
achieved a higher level of efficiency than the patrimonial form of
management that characterizes unincorporated local companies.
Despite the overall progress made during 1971-75, 1975
itself was a particularly difficult year. Manufacturing output
stagnated, indeed in the first half of 1975 manufacturing output*
129
actually declined by 4.3 per cent measured on an annual basis.
Many industries were barely able to maintain 1974 sales levels, while
for others sales turnover actually declined by between 10-30 per
130
cent. Over half of the firms in the sector were reported to be
operating at capacities 20-40 per cent below maximum, and some at or
131
even below break even level. Not only did manufacturing lose its
position as the leading growth area in 1975 but employment growth in
132the sector stagnated. However, in 1976 manufacturing recovered
and in 1976-78 was once again the fastest growing sector of the
133
economy contributing 19 per cent to GDP in 1978. The difficulties
experienced in 1975 will obviously effect the attitude of
manufacturing companies to management development in that year, the
second year of the study.
127 ibid. , pp. 50-51.
128 ibid. , pp. 19-20.
129 MIDF, 16th Annual Report and Accounts for Year Ended 31
March 1976. p. 40.
130 ibid. , p. 43.
131 loc.cit.
132 ibid. , p. 44.




The economy of Malaysia was built historically on exports
and it continues to be largely an export-oriented economy. Those
commodities in which the country has an advantage - such as rubber,
tin, timber, palm oil and more recently low sulphur petroleum are
exported; and food, manufactured goods, and capital goods, imported.
The size of the export trade is considerable: Malaysia is responsible
for 46 per cent of world exports of natural rubber and has been
described as "the most important international rubber market in the
134
world"; she is responsible for 65 per cent of world exports in
135
palm oil and 33 per cent of tin exports. Malaysia's main trading
partners lie in the Asian and Pacific region, which accounted for 56
136
per cent of her imports and 48 per cent of exports in 1972, and it
is here that her natural advantage lies.
Internal Trade
The internal trade of Peninsular Malaysia is made up of a
great number of small units and a very few large general wholesalers.
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 provide the basic dimensions of the retail and
wholesale trade as it existed in 1968. In the retail trade, although
there were nearly 60,000 establishments, the average size was very
small indeed with only 0.7 per cent having more than $500,000 annual
turnover in 1968 and employment averaging out at 2.3 employees per
establishment. Just under half of employment was made up of owners,
with family helpers the main additional source of labour. Over 90
per cent of establishments were owned by individual proprietors while
private limited companies formed fewer than 1 per cent. The great
134 A. Davenport, "Modernising Malaysia's Market," Far Eastern
Economic Review, 10 September 1976, p. 46.
135 loc.cit.
136 United Nations, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific,
1974. p. 272, Table 80.
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Table 5.7
Retail Establishments ^Peninsular Malaysia, 1968
Size of Turnover No of Establishments %
Less than $100,000 55,346 92.6
$100,000 - $250,000 3,044 5.1
$250,000 - $500,000 910 1 .5
Over $500,00 437 0.7
Total 59,737 100.0
Employment No of Employees %
Paid Employees 28,461 20.6
Owners 61,321 44.3
Family Helpers 48,659 35. 1
Total 138,441 100.0
Ownership No .of Establishments %
Individual Proprietor 55,476 92.9
Partnership 3,640 6.1
Other (principally private
limited companies) 621 1.0
Total 59,737 100.0
(i) The United Nations definition of 'establishment' is used: "ideally, an
economic unit which engages, under a single ownership or control, in
one or predominantly one kind of economic activity at a single physical
location."
(ii) Includes both part-time and full-time employees.
Source: Malaysia, Department of Statistics, Survey of Distributive Trades
West Malaysia, 1968. Tables 9, 14, 18.
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Table 5.8
Wholesale Establishments, Peninsular Malaysia, 1968
Size of Turnover No. of Establishments^ %
Less than $1 million 8, 153 87.3
$1 million - $5 million 1,046 1 1.2
Over $5 million 144 1.5
Total 9,342 100.0
Emp1oyment^^ No. of Employees %
Paid Employees 39,904 70.6
Owners 1 1,467 20.3
Family Helpers 5, 158 9.1
Total 56,528 100.0
Ownership No. of Establishments %
Individual Proprietor 5,622 60.2
Partnership 2,761 29.6
Other (principally private
limited companies) 959 10.3
Total 9,342 100.0
(i) The United Nations definition of 'establishment' is used: "ideally,
an economic unit which engages, under a single ownership or
control, in one or predominantly one kind of economic activity
at a single physical location".
(ii) Includes both part-time and full-time employees.
Source: Malaysia, Department of Statistics, Survey of Distributive
Trades, West Malaysia 1968. Tables 20, 25, 29.
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bulk of the retail trade thus lies outside the scope of this study.
The very small proportion of the retail trade that falls
within the study is still quite sizeable. Table 5.9 presents data
for the companies with more than $1 million annual turnover. The
retail trade is largely in the hands of Malaysian owned firms - 87
per cent of companies being Malaysian and only 13 per cent foreign
controlled or foreign branches, however that 13 per cent were
responsible for 24 per cent of annual turnover. In sharp contrast to
the small companies these firms have on average 43 employees, but
again the foreign controlled firms and foreign branches tend to be
larger, averaging 70 employees to the local companies 39.
The wholesale trade also consisted predominantly of small
individual proprietorships and partnerships, although there was a
number of slightly larger concerns - in 1968 12.7 per cent of the
total had over $1 million annual turnover. Roughly 10 per cent of
establishments were limited companies but this small proportion was
responsible for 44 per cent of turnover in the wholesale trade.
The Financial Survey provides a basic outline of the
section of the wholesale trade that lies within the study. This is
presented in Table 5.9, although it should be noted that this table
refers to Malaysia as a whole not just Peninsular Malaysia. While
almost three quarters of the companies are locally owned, there are
196 foreign controlled firms or branches of foreign firms in the
wholesale trade and these companies are responsible for almost half
the total annual revenue in the wholesale trade. They are also, on
average, larger than their locally owned counterparts averaging 77 to
their 42 employees, and they generate more revenue per employee than
the locally controlled companies - $275,835 compared to $200,087.
Table 5.10 gives more detail about the main sections of the
wholesale industry and data are presented for those establishments
with more than $1 million turnover. The principal category consists
of large general wholesalers with a total annual turnover in 1968 of
over $1 billion. Over half of these fall into the 'other' ownership
category - that is they are public or private limited companies - and
these accounted for 76.8 per cent of the turnover in the category,
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No. of No. of
Employees % Employees %
Employment
Locally Controlled 22,369 59.6 16,595 78.7
Foreign Controlled 10,614 28.3 3,737 17.7
Malaysian Branches of
Companies Incorporated
Abroad 4,553 12.1 749 3.6
Total 37,536 100 21,081 100
NB. These figures apply only to limited companies with more than $1 million
annual turnover in 1974.
Source: Department of Statistics, Report of the Financial Survey of
Limited Companies, Malaysia 1974. pp. 13-16, Tables 1, 1.1, 1.2,
1.3 and pp. 74-77, Tables 15, 15.1, 15.2, 15.3.
Table5.10
TheWholesaleTrade:byMajorBusin ssGroupandOwn ship,P in ularMalaysia,1968
TypeofOwnership
Businesseswithov r $1milliontotal turnoveri1968 HouseholdandPersonalGo s Rice,oth rgrains,fl u Otherfoods Tobacco,cigarettes Clothing,textiles
Individual Proprietor
No.fTurnover Estab. 303 268 149 92
$'000 195,663 122,191 51,287 50,686
Partnership
No.of Estab. 172 283 111 195
Turnover $'000 266,909 212,709 94,602 149,381
Other(Principally PrivateLtdCo's)
No.of Estab. 50 57 24 29
Turnover $'000 207,804 181,058 87,212 43,481
Total
No.ofTurnover Estab.$'000 525 609 284 316670,377 515,958 233,101 243,549
Business,Industrial,Agricul ur lGood Vehicleparts&accessories196 Business&industrialmachinery54 Buildingmaterials(othertha lumber&timber) Rubber Livestock&otheragricultu al products Misc.Businessindu trial& agriculturaloods LargeGeneralWholesal rs
395 1,581 367 225
36










82,006 92,861 204,309 360,326 12,479 45,218 827,023
470181,190 176116,572 728374,041 2,048855,678 458188,642 291112,717 2971,077,023
Source:Malaysia,DepartmentofSt tist cs,urveyfDistributiveT ades,W stM laysia,1968.Table29
Ln
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almost certainly they are the large agency houses. The pattern in
the rubber trade is noteworthy because of the many small individual
proprietors involved - they made up 77.2 per cent of all businesses
yet they were responsible for only 28.8 per cent of turnover. The
rubber trade was the second largest business category in terms of
turnover with over $855 million annual turnover in 1968. It can be
seen from this how important the rubber trade is in Malaysia both in
terms of the size of the trade and the numerous establishments
dependent upon it. Although Table 5.10 only gives a partial picture
of the wholesale trade the general pattern can be descried of the
very prominent position of large general wholesalers, on the one
hand, and on the other, the large network of establishments handling
household and personal goods, as well as business, industrial and
agricultural goods. M&iuj of 1 Kc$t data are unfortunately rather dated,
but the general patterns are likely to be substantially the same as
recorded in these surveys.
OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT OF THE CORPORATE SECTOR
The ownership and management of the corporate sector of the
economy is a product of the pattern of economic development already
discussed, with Europeans and Chinese playing the dominant role and
the Government becoming increasingly active on behalf of the Malay
community. In Peninsular Malaysia foreign interests owned 63.3 per
cent of share capital of limited companies in 1971, while Malay
interests owned a mere 2.4 per cent, and 'other Malaysian^' (largely
Chinese) owned 34.3 percent. The Government's efforts to
redistribute ownership to give Malays a larger share had reduced the
inequality slightly by 1975 bringing the foreign share down to 54.9
per cent, the Malay share up to 7.8 per cent, and increasing the
'other Malaysian' share to 37.3 per cent.
Foreign ownership has been most heavily concentrated in the
modern agricultural sector, mining, manufacturing and trade. (See
Table 5.11). In all but the manufacturing industry foreign companies
have been long established in the country and prior to independence
their management was predominantly, if not exclusively, European.
Table5.11









































(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Incorporateandnon-corpo tesectors.Establishmentrcat gorizedotheba isfm j ityow ersh p.Gover m t ownershipisadd dthM laycategorysmostfihelntru tbyp blicenterprisesangencies.Irubber andoilpalm,Governmentow ership,excludingFELDA,is0.9%andmanuf cturing,5.0 . Includesoth rMalaysianswellest blis mentswh roparticul rg upo nsm rth50%ft eas e . IncludesFELDAwhichhap antedacreageof526,900which96.2%sclassifiedaMal y-owne . Privateestablishmentsonly.Iincludesdoc or ,en i slawyer ,accountant ,ar hit ct ,ngin ssurve ors veterinarysurg ons.
Source:ThirdMalaysiaP n,1976-1980.p.83,Table9-8
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However, with independence they were required to Malaysianize their
management cadre, except for a very few 'key posts' which could be
reserved for Europeans. Since at that period there was not the
strong insistence on racial balance there has been since the NEP, the
natural choice tended to be Chinese and Indian Malaysians who had
education and business orientation. Having Malaysianized in this way
foreign companies have had little room for manoeuvre in attaining
racial balance targets other than through growth, and as has been
shown, the plantation and mining companies are not expanding.
Although none of the post 1969 companies were covered in the survey
they will have had an easier task in that they will have been
recruiting a managerial staff from scratch in the full knowledge that
it must reflect the racial composition of the population.
Chinese ownership is particularly concentrated in the
construction, retail and haulage industries, the wholesale and bus
industries, and in professional establishments. It is in these areas
that they have built up a position of prominence over a considerable
period of time and have achieved a virtual monopoly: in the
construction industry, for instance, they owned 85.6 per cent of
fixed assets in 1972, and in the retail trade they owned 75.6 per
cent in terms of value of turnover. However, it is in precisely
these industries that the Government is seeking to expand Malay
participation through official preferences.
Indians are too few in number to monopolise any one
industry but they tend to be overrepresented in the ownership of
taxis, the professions and coconut and tea plantations.
Tin Mining
In the early nineteen seventies, foreign interests still
dominated ownership in the tin mining industry, owning 70 per cent
I Q7
of share capital in 1970, and 63 per cent in 1973.
137 TMP. p. 326, para. 1087.
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The second largest shareholding group is the Chinese who owned 29 per
138
cent in 1970 and 36 per cent in 1973. Since then the Government
has bought a substantial share of the industry. The tin dredging
industry is still under the management of three large mining agencies
and a number of smaller mining agencies, which are linked together to
139
form a tightly knit and powerful group.
In the past mining engineers were frequently expatriates
and, despite the country's Malaysianisation programme, the shortage
of suitably trained Malaysians to take over, and the importance of
this industry to the country, led the Government to take a very
flexible approach to the Malaysianisation of management in tin
mining.
Gravel pump mining accounted for 54 per cent of production
in 1975 and the vast majority of these mines were small,
Chinese-owned ones. Puthucheary came to the conclusion that Chinese
mines are largely separately owned units as opposed to the centrally
managed groups in the European mining industry and there is no reason
to suppose that this is not still the case. Management appears to be
limited to the mine owner and the 'kepala' or headman who supervises
the labourers.
The Government has been keen to encourage Malay
participation in the tin mining industry. While it has taken action
to ensure Malay interests a share in the ownership of equity of the
large dredging companies, it has also been encouraging Malays to
enter the gravel-pump mining side of the industry through preferences
in the granting of mining rights. However, this has yet to make a
significant impact on the industry: in 1970, only 26 mines were owned
138 loc.cit.
139 In a study conducted in 1974, Lim and Anderson found the major
companies in the mining industry to have more interlocking
directorships than those in any other industry. Lim Mah Hui and
M. Anderson, "Concentration of Wealth and Power in the Top
Corporations in Malaysia," Paper presented at the Third
Convention, Malaysian Economic Association, 1976, p. 19, Table
8.
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by Malays, in 1975, 38 tin mines out of a total of 961 were owned by
140
Malays, and by 1978, this had risen to 42.
Agriculture
Rubber and oil palm, like tin, can be divided into large
scale and small scale activities. In 1975, 1,391,900 acres of rubber
141
were under estates and 2,796,200 acres under smallholdings; while
in oil palm 57 per cent of total acreage was under estates which
produced 74 per cent of production, the rest coming from land
142
development schemes. Table 5.12 gives a breakdown of the ownership
of rubber estates as of 1969. The great majority of estates are now
owned by Malaysians who show a marked preference for ownership
through partnerships, and a strong disinclination towards public
companies. Amongst non-Malaysian estates, which include Singaporean
ones likely to be similar in pattern to the Malaysian, 46 per cent
are public companies.
Table 5.12
Rubber Estates by Citizenship and Ownership, Peninsular Malaysia, 1969
Public Private Partner- Others Total
Co. Co. Ship (i)
Malaysian:
No. of Estates 46 370 755 330 1,501
7o 3 25 50 22 100
Non-Malaysian:
No. of Estates 276 129 108 84 597
% 46 22 18 14 100
Total:
No. of Estates 322 499 863 414 2,098
% 15 24 41 20 100
(i) Includes individual proprietorships, ownership by Government and
co-operatives
Source: Malaysia, Rubber Statistics Handbook, 1969. p. 12, Table 2-4.
140 TMP. p. 326, para. 1087; Mid-Term Review of Third Malaysia
Plan, p. 160, para. 433. The 1975 figure is taken from the
Mid-Term Review.
141 Department of Statistics, Annual Bulletin of Statistics,
Malaysia 1976. p. 7, Table 2.3.
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The non-Malaysian estates tend to be considerably larger
than the Malaysian ones, 48 per cent being 100 acres or more in size
compared to only 11 per cent of Malaysian estates. (See Table 5.13).
Of all estates over 100 acres 63 per cent are owned by
non-Malaysians. Therefore, although the size of the non-Malaysian
estate sector is relatively small in terms of numbers it is large in
terms of acreage and public incorporation places the emphasis of this
group firmly on professional management.
Table 5.13
Rubber Estates by Planted Acreage and Citizenship
Peninsular Malaysia, 1969
Size Group Number of Estates
(Acreage planted
with Rubber) Malaysian Non-Malaysian Total
0-499 1,163 225 1,388
500-999 172 85 257
1000-1999 109 133 242
2000-2999 28 59 87
3000-4999 21 53 74
5000 and over 8 42 50
TOTAL 1,501 579 2,098
Source: Malaysia, Rubber Statistics Handbook, 1969. p. 14, Table ;
Most of the European owned estates and some of the
Singaporean and Malaysian owned estates are managed by agency houses
which are responsible for the recruitment, training and supervision
of the managers on the estates under their charge. With the growing
pressure for greater efficiency the managing agencies have also
played an important role in the development of the industry.
Manufacturing
In manufacturing there is again a local element consisting
of a large number of small units many of which are individual
proprietorships or partnerships, and a small, but growing, number of
large companies that are foreign-owned. In 1971 foreign companies
accounted for 15 per cent of the total number of manufacturing
142 TMP. p. 294, para. 932.
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establishments in Peninsular Malaysia, 58 per cent of the value added
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and 35 per cent of full-time employees. The development of
manufacturing industry since independence has brought a new group of
foreign companies into Malaysia - the multinational corporations
which have brought with them a sophisticated level of technology and
a distinctively Western approach to management and management
development. A number of agency houses have also recently begun
manufacturing products previously imported. The pattern of ownership
amongst foreign companies is tending to alter as new foreign firms
are compelled to enter joint ventures with a local partner and to
Malaysianize their ownership. It has also been changed by the entry
of the Government into manufacturing largely through PERNAS which has
gone into joint ventures with an ever-growing number of firms
including manufacturing establishments. As of 1972/73, Government
ownership in the manufacturing industry had reached 5 per cent. (See
Table 5.11.)
Smaller establishments have tended to be Chinese-owned and
managed and to concentrate on a relatively simple technology.
However, there has been a gradual move towards more large scale and
more sophisticated types of manufacturing amongst Chinese companies
in recent years and consequently a growing need for more
sophisticated management.
Service Industries
In trade and commerce foreign agency houses have retained a
position of prominence. Foreign companies owned 40.9 per cent of the
wholesale trade in 1972/73. (See Table 5.11). The Chinese are
responsible for the export of much smallholder produce and have
retained a very strong position in the retail trade. As has been
shown, they usually operate as individual proprietorships or
partnerships, yet there is a network of establishments often united
143 D. Lim, "Foreign Investment and Economic Development in
Malaysia," Malaysia and the Multinational Corporations. S. Chee
and S.M. Khoo, eds., p. 82 ftn.
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by clan or dialect ensuring that it is as tightly knit as the more
formal links of the agency house. The Chinese establishments and the
agency houses operate in a symbiotic relationship, with the agency
houses providing credit to the Chinese wholesaler and enabling him to
provide credit to the retailer. Direct Government involvement has
begun to change this industry too, with PERNAS taking over the China
trade.
+ + +
Malaysia has a dynamic and rapidly growing economy, which
is going through a period of change, diversifying into new
manufacturing industries, spreading ownership and management of
industry to include Malays, and adapting to the changes brought about
by increased Government involvement in and control over the direction
of development. It has a large and prominent foreign sector
consisting of the long-established agency houses engaged in tin,
agriculture, trade and commerce, and a growing number of firms - many
of them multinationals and relatively new arrivals, engaged in the
manufacturing industry. It has also a substantial Chinese business
community engaged particularly in construction, trade and commerce,
haulage and mining, and to an increasing extent, manufacturing.
However a sizeable number of these Chinese establishments are outside
the corporate sector.
The period of the study, 1971-1975, coincides with that of
the SMP and the implementation of the NEP. The changes brought about
by the intervention of the Government in the economic arena led to a
loss of confidence by the business community and a reduction in
investment. This coincided with a period of world recession which
was responsible for substantial cutbacks in Malaysian production,
"dampening business sentiment and outlook especially in respect to
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the addition of new capacity.
Despite the problems of 1975 Malaysia seems set on a
further period of rapid growth, with highly ambitious targets set by
144 MIDF, 16th Annual Report and Accounts for the Year Ended
~31st March 1976. p. 40.
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the TMP. ECAFE noted in 1970 that there was no shortage of capital
for industrial development in Malaysia, but that the constraint on
growth was rather a shortage of managerial and technical
145
expertise, skilled labour and institutional facilities. The
TMP estimates:
...the demand for professional, technical and
related workers at both the professional and
subprofessional levels will grow by 5.5% per
annum...the requirement for engineers is anticipated
to expand by 8.0% per annum; agronomists and related
agricultural specialists, 6.3% and engineering
assistants 6.8%...rapid increases in demand will
also be experienced in administration and
management, particularly in business.
There was an increase in the number of administrative and managerial
staff of 14.6 per cent in 1971-1975, and the Government estimates
that there will be an increase of 48.8 per cent between 1976 and
147
1990. This means that there will be an enormous need for
management training and development.
145 ECAFE, Asian Industrial Development Council, Asian Industrial
Development News, 5 (1970), p. 62. See also H. Hughes,
"Australians as Investors: Australian Investment in Singapore
and Malaysian Manufacturing Industries," Australian
Economic Papers, 6, 8 (1967), p. 67 and E.L. Wheelwright,
Industrialization in Malaysia, p. 120.
146 TMP. p. 70, para. 223.




The research for this study was based on the private sector
of Peninsular Malaysia. It was restricted to Peninsular Malaysia
because this is the part of Malaysia that has experienced the
greatest commercial and industrial development and therefore, where
management development is most relevant. It contains 85 per cent of
the population and accounts for 95 per cent of manufacturing output.
It was also to this part of the country that the Malaysian Government
requested that the original survey be addressed.
In choosing the methodology for the study it was decided
that neither a complete statistical survey of the private sector nor
an in-depth study of a very few companies was suitable although both
methods had their advantages. The statistical survey while providing
important factual data about recruitment and training practices would
not touch on the most vital element of all - the attitude and
thinking of senior management in the companies towards management
development. While the case study approach would overcome this
difficulty and provide valuable insights into the thinking of
management, the way in which management development was actually
implemented, and the particular problems of the Malaysian context, it
lacked the breadth and representativeness of the survey approach. It
was therefore decided to try and combine both approaches: to draw a
representative sample of companies large enough to give an accurate
picture of the business community but not so large as to be
impossible to visit individually, and then to conduct both a
statistical survey of this sample and to interview the chief
executive of each company in the sample.
One of the first tasks in the study was to choose a
satisfactory statistical base from which to draw the sample of
companies. There were two possible alternatives: 1) the employment
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figures provided by the 1969 Survey of Manufacturing Industries , and
2) the turnover figures of the 1969 Financial Survey of Limited
2
Companies. After careful consideration and with the advice of the
Chief Statistician and his colleagues it was decided to choose the
Financial Survey of Limited Companies. The Survey of
Manufacturing Industries only covered manufacturing, plantations,
construction and mining and excluded the service industries.
3
Secondly, it related to establishments, rather than companies, and
it is at the company level that policy with regard to management
development would tend to be decided.
The Financial Survey, on the other hand, did relate to
companies and was broken down according to size, in terms of annual
turnover, ownership and industry. Given the relevance of all three
factors to the level of management development this was very useful.
However, it did not cover banks, insurance companies, nominee
companies, shipping and airline companies and non-profit-making
organisations. Although the Financial Survey is conducted annually,
the latest figures available were for 1969, therefore, the sample
that was drawn and used both in 1972 and in 1976 was based on a 1969
base and this meant that the newer companies, in particular the
parastatal companies which have recently appeared on the Malaysian
industrial scene, were not included. While the Financial Survey
excluded individual proprietorships and partnerships, the
incorporated sector which it did cover accounted for 84 per cent of
gross sales, 79 per cent of wages and 72 per cent of employment.
1 Malaysia, Department of Statistics, Survey of Manufacturing
Industries, West Malaysia, 1969.
2 Malaysia, Department of Statistics, Report on the Financial
Survey of Limited Companies, Malaysia 1969
3 The Survey of Manufacturing Industries uses the U.N. definition
of establishment: "ideally an economic unit which engages, under
a single ownership or control i.e. under a single entity, in one
or predominantly one kind of economic activity at a single
physical location."
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The 5056 companies included in the Survey in 1968 included
all incorporated businesses down to the smallest; in fact in 1968, 78
per cent of companies had a turnover of less than $1 million yet this
78 per cent accounted for only 10 per cent of the total revenue of
4
all companies in the Survey. Since in such very small companies
there is not likely to be more than one or two managers, management
development is less relevant. It was therefore decided to omit
companies with less than $1 million turnover in 1969 and limit the
study to the 1083 larger companies.
On the basis of the same assumption, that is, that the
relevance of management development is related to the size of the
company, the sample was weighted so that a larger proportion of the
big companies was included.
The universe was categorised in terms of:
a) turnover, using the following size groups:
SG 4 $50 million turnover
SG 3 $20 - $50 million turnover
SG 2 $ 5 - $20 million turnover
SG 1 $ 1 - $ 5 million turnover
b) industry, using the industrial classification of the
Department of Statistics;^ where the company is engaged in
several activities, the industrial category into which it
falls is determined by the principal activity of the
company based on its revenue for the reference year;
c) control,^ that is,
4 Malaysia, Department of Statistics, Report on the Financial
Survey of Limited Companies, 1968. p. 1.
5 Malaysia, Department of Statistics, Industrial Classification.
6 These categories are the ones used by the Department of
Statistics in its Financial Survey of Limited Companies. It
states that "In most cases 'locally controlled' companies can be
regarded as those in which 50% or more of the voting stock is
held by residents. 'Foreign controlled' companies are those in
which over 50% of voting stock is held by non-residents."
Department of Statistics, Report on the Financial Survey of
Limited Companies, Malaysia 1968. p. 1.
188
i) limited companies incorporated in Malaysia and locally
controlled,
ii) limited companies incorporated in Malaysia but foreign
controlled, and
iii) Malaysian branches of companies incorporated abroad
Sampling was done in the following proportions:
100% of the $50 million and above size group
50% of the $20 - 50 million size group
10% of the $ 5- -20 million size group
5% of the $ 1 - 5 million size group
It was at this stage that a number of problems arose. The print-out
of the largest size group which might have been expected to contain
some of the most prominent companies in Malaysia, in fact, contained
only a handful of them. The 100 per cent sample produced only 28
companies, one of which had closed down, 4 were rubber dealers with
virtually no management structure, and 4 were subsidiaries of other
companies in the group.
The use of turnover as a size criterion in a study of
management development was not ideal but in the Malaysian context
where such activities as rubber trading are characterised by a high
turnover and a very small management this was particularly true. It
was going to be very difficult to find much comparability between the
rubber trading firm with one manager and 10 employees and the
petroleum firm with 120 managers and 900 employees though their
turnovers might fall in the same size category. In an attempt to
find a more suitable measure of size, every alternative source of
statistics was re-examined. None proved to be suitable.
A second difficulty was that many firms were represented
several times over by their various subsidiary companies. Since the
subject of the study was management development policies and
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practices, and the parent company usually determines policy for the
group, considering each subsidiary separately would only result in
duplication. The presence of subsidiaries in the universe also had
the effect of placing some of the more prominent companies in the
lower size groups since the turnover of each subsidiary was taken
separately rather than as part of the group.
In order to attempt to obtain a representative picture of
the business community it was decided to get a complete print-out of
all companies with more than $5 million turnover (turnover figures
were not available for the smallest size category) and to group
a
subsidiaries under their parent companies. Turnover figures for the
group were aggregated in order to get a realistic picture of size.
In the course of this exercise it was also decided to group
plantations and mines under their respective managing agencies.
Although this could not be justified in terms of legal relationship
it was considered that, since the managing agency was effectively
responsible for the recruitment and development of managers for its
clients, for the purposes of this study it could be treated in the
same way as a parent company with subsidiaries.
Having gone through this regrouping exercise for the top




Size Group No. in Per Cent No. in
Universe Sampled Sample
SG4 ($50 million +) 31 100% 31
SG3 ($20 - 50 million) 41 50% 21
SG2 ($5-20 million) 167 10% 16
SGI ($1-5 million) 844 5% 41
TOTAL 1083 10% 109
Given the importance of the racial balance issue in
Malaysia, it was desirable to pay special attention to the
development of management skills among Malays. Account was taken of
this in the design of the interview schedule and in the conduct of
the interviews themselves. Indeed, it was partly due to this concern
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for the management needs of bumiputras that a cut-off point as low as
$1 million turnover was chosen. Despite this not one Malay company
occurred up in the sample.''
The data for the main sample was collected in two ways: the
chief executive, and where applicable the training manager, of each
company was interviewed to gain a picture of the overall practice of
management development and to get an impression of the company's
attitude towards it. Each company was asked to complete three
questionnaires giving concrete figures related to employment,
recruitment, training, and future training requirements. While
numbers trained is in no way equivalent to managers developed, it was
assumed that there was likely to be a relationship between the two
and that the interviews would provide much of the missing data. The
chief executive of each company in the sample was written to
personally requesting an interview and the completion of the main
questionnaire. This was followed up by a letter from the Special
Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister asking for the company's
co-operation in the study. (See Appendix B).
The interviews varied greatly in length, according to the
size and complexity of the company from one hour, to three or four
visits of 2-3 hours each. An interview schedule (See Appendix C) was
used to provide a clear framework for the interview while leaving it
sufficiently open-ended for respondents to move freely to those areas
which concerned them most. The interview was intended to yield
information about the overall approach of the company to management
development. Special regard was given to forward planning and how
far there was a conscious policy for development. Recruitment
7 There appear to be a number of explanations for this:
a) In 1969, there were very few Malay companies and most of
those that there were fell below the $1 million cut off
point;
b) those that generated more than $1 million turnover in 1968
were very small in number and so the chances of their being
selected in a random sample were small; and
c) quite a number of Malay companies have been formed since
the 1969 Survey and so would not be included in the
universe.
191
policies were discussed, trends in the use of various sources, and an
assessment of experience with them. Career and succession planning
were also considered. Because management development is largely
achieved on the job rather than by formal training, attention was
paid to whether firms were setting clear objectives against which
managers' performance could be assessed, weaknesses corrected, and
training needs identified. Companies were also asked how they
decided to give a man a particular kind of training and how, if at
all, it was evaluated. Time was spent discussing the firms'
experience with various training methods - on the job training,
in-company courses, external courses, etc - and the strengths and
weaknesses of the several training institutions were discussed.
At the end of each interview respondents were asked what they thought
the priorities were for improving management training facilities in
their own firms and in Malaysia, paying particular attention to
racial balance.
The main questionnaire was designed to yield information of
a quantitative nature about the size of staff, number of managers,
and their ethnic group, source of recruitment of managerial personnel
and the numbers of managers trained by different methods (See
Appendix D). These data were requested for the last complete year,
that is, for 1971. The questionnaire includes a definition of a
manager as an executive above the grade of foreman or supervisor who
contributes to the decision-making process, exercise some control
over the use of resources and in some way directs the activity of
others. It was stated that management trainees should be included in
this category.
At the time of the interview for subsequent completion, two
further questionnaires were left, one of which asked for the numbers
sent on various management courses, an assessment of future demand,
and an evaluation of the courses used, and a second in which
companies were asked to indicate their demand for courses at senior,
middle and junior levels, of varying duration and on a variety of
topics, in such areas as production, finance, personnel and marketing
(See Appendix D).
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A brief word should be said here about bias and the
subjective nature of the interview. The original survey was conducted
at the request of the Malaysian Government and the letter from the
Special Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister reinforced the
official nature of the study. While ensuring companies' response,
this also put them on their guard. An interview inevitably involves
interpersonal relations and the fact that the researcher was a young
European woman meant that different groups responded quite
differently. For the most part European executives were courteous
and friendly and as the interview progressed in some cases relaxed
enough to discuss their views and anxieties in a very frank and open
way. Some of the older established European companies were fairly
conservative and rather sceptical of such a 'young upstart' from a
business school. Most of the Chinese companies were highly
suspicious though some found the whole exercise quite hilarious and
indeed as will be seen later, discussing management development in a
small Chinese shophouse was a little ludicrous. The interviews were
all conducted in English, however, in a few cases the chief executive
in a Chinese firm did not speak English, and in these cases the chief
clerk , or a trusted friend, was brought in to provide the
translation. Nonetheless, communication was not always complete.
The study received remarkable co-operation achieving a 93
per cent response rate. Many senior executives, in all sizes of
company gave up a considerable amount of their time to be
interviewed. Several informal discussion meetings with groups of
businessmen - Malay, Chinese and European - were also held at which
useful insights were gained into the problems under consideration.
As part of the study the main pre- and post-experience
training institutions were visited and discussions were held with the
head of the institution or in the case of the universities the head
of the Department of Economics and Business Administration, and often
with his staff. The purpose of these interviews was to find out what
facilities were available, what problems they faced and how they saw
the direction of their future development.
In July and August 1976 a follow-up to this first study was
conducted. By then some of the original companies had gone out of
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business and there were others that did not respond. The sample that
resulted was as follows:
Table 6.2
The Sample, 1976
Size No. in Non-Respondents Total Non-Respondents Total
Sample 1972 1972 or Ceased 1976
Operating 1976
SG4 ($50 million+) 31 2 29 1 28
SG3 ($20-50 million) 21 0 21 2 19
SG2 ($5-20 million) 16 0 16 3 13
SGI ($1-5 million) 41 9 32 9 23
TOTAL 109 11 98 15 83
Since time was a severe constraint on this occasion it was
g
not possible to visit every company as in 1972 , and so a rather
fuller questionnaire was designed that was sent to all companies in
the original sample, (See Appendix E). This asked for quantitative
data about the employment, recruitment and training of managers in
1975, along lines identical to the 1972 questionnaire so that the
material would be comparable. It also included questions relating to
the practice of management development within the company and the use
of training facilities outside the company. A 50 per cent random
sample of the companies in the original sample was then taken and
once again the chief executive was written to personally and an
interview requested. The initial letter was followed up by an
official letter from the Special Economic Adviser to the Prime
Minister as before, requesting support and cooperation for the study.
(See Appendix B) .




MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES
The aim of this chapter is to look at the overall
approach - the policies and attitudes - companies took to the
development of their management cadres. This was examined from two
angles: first, their policies and practices as described in the
interviews; and second, the actual numbers of managers recruited and
trained in different ways. The first contains a large subjective
element but deals with the central aspects of management development;
the second provides actual numerical data but can only deal with the
more obvious characteristics of a training programme.
In interpreting the statistical data the year of the
original data base has to be born in mind. This was 1969 and by 1975
the sample represented, very roughly, only 2 per cent of the
companies of the defined universe.^ Some companies had ceased
operation, while a few had outgrown their size group. Inflation had
also affected turnover, although not the relative positions of the
companies. Because the follow-up was designed to go back to the
original companies rather than redrawing the sample, and because the
main focus of the study is policies and practices rather than a
statistical survey, no adjustments have been made for these changes.
The study covers the corporate sector which accounts for an
2
estimated 30 per cent of GNP. While it ignores companies
1 The latest available Financial Survey is for 1974. Unlike the
1969 Survey, this Survey included banks, insurance companies,
nominee companies, shipping and airline companies and non-profit
organizations. Unfortunately, the published figures do not
differentiate between Peninsular and East Malaysia. However, if
companies falling into the category "banks and financial
institutions" are omitted 3360 companies are included in the
Survey. Since the great majority of these will lie in
Peninsular Malaysia, and growth between 1974 and 1975 will have
expanded this number, 3360 has been used as a rough estimate of
the size of the universe in 1975.
2 TMP. p. 183, para. 566.
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with less than $1 million annual turnover which represent around 69
per cent of the total number of companies, those that it covers
account for about 93 per cent of the total revenue, 76 per cent of
the total value of fixed assets, 78 per cent of employment and 78 per
3
cent of total assets of the corporate sector in Malaysia.
BASIC DIMENSIONS OF THE SAMPLE
First the basic dimensions of the situation under
consideration will be examined. Table 7.1 presents the employment
figures of the sample and the directions of change between 1971-75.
Despite the undesirability of using turnover as the size criterion in
a study of management development, there was a relationship between
turnover and size of employment, with SG4 companies having an average
of 3,296 employees in 1971 compared to SG3 with 1,533, SG2 with 330,
and SGI with 127. Nonetheless, there were great variations within
each size group which will become clearer when the industrial and
ownership groupings are examined. The rate of growth in employment
over the five year period 1971-75 is interesting: the largest
companies grew at a very low rate - 4 per cent - which suggests that
they may have reached an optimum size. The Malaysian market is
relatively small and may not be able to support companies beyond a
certain size. On the other hand the companies in SGI have grown very
rapidly, though admittedly from a small base, and those in SG3 have
also expanded their employment markedly. Companies in SG2 show a
very different picture and have actually declined in terms of
employment. Many of them were particularly hard hit by the recession
of 1974-75, while others were affected by the Government's
preferences to Malay firms. While SG2 seems to be most affected by
such factors, there was in fact a high casualty rate amongst
companies in SGI. Nine of the 32 companies in SGI that responded in
1971 were untraceable in 1975 and it can be assumed that a high
proportion had gone out of business.
3 Department of Statistics, Report of the Financial Survey
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The rate of growth of the managerial cadre has tended to
exceed that of employment overall. (See Table 7.2.). Between 1971-75
the number of managers in the sample increased at a rate of 32 per
cent, compared to an increase of only 8 per cent in employment. The
1971-75 rate of growth is overall slightly higher than that during
1966-71, and in SGI, in particular, markedly so. SG3 shows a very
rapid rate of growth in management employment as it did in overall
employment, while SG2 once again has the lowest rate of growth.
Companies were asked to estimate their future growth in management
employment and in all size groups, except SG2, a sharp drop in the
rate of growth was anticipated. Unless companies manage to maintain
a rate of growth similar to that between 1971-75, a rate considerably
aided by the boom years of 1973-74, the Government's target of an
increase in administrative and managerial workers in Peninsular
4
Malaysia between 1975-90 of 121 per cent will not be achieved. This
figure includes both the public and private sectors and the
establishment of new companies as well as the growth of existing
ones. Nonetheless, it appears highly ambitious. Companies growth
figures 1975-80 are considerably underestimated (except for SG2) for
when, in 1972, companies were asked to estimate the size of their
management, their estimates showed a marked conservatism probably
reflecting the climate of uncertainty in 1972, and the same may be
5
the case with the 1975 estimates.
In addition to the effect of size, it was also possible to
study the effect of two other variables on the sample - industry and
ownership. The Financial Survey categorised all companies according
to industry and types of ownership - whether local, foreign or a
subsidiary of a foreign company. This was a useful distinction but
4 TMP. p. 83, Table 4-15.
5 Harbison and Myers have commented: "A rather simple method of
estimating future requirements is to ask existing establishments
to specify them. This will provide an informed judgement of
short-term requirements but it is quite unreliable for long-run
estimates." F. Harbison and C. A. Myers, Education, Manpower
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tended to obscure the fairly clear-cut lines between companies with
expatriates in top management, and those with an entirely Chinese
management. One thinks of 'local' as referring to firms owned and
run by Malaysians, while it included many firms in which top
management was almost entirely expatriate.^ The recent emphasis on
'localizing' equity has obscured the distinction even further.
'Foreign', which one would expect to refer to firms run by Europeans
and Americans, included a number of Singaporean and Hong Kong firms
whose style of management is much more similar to that of the
Malaysian Chinese business community.
Since it was management policies and practices that were
under investigation and it was assumed that management style bears a
close relationship to the orientation of top management, it was
decided to regroup by 'business community'. The Chinese companies
which comprise the largest part of the 'local' group form a distinct
business community with a characteristic management style. Another
distinct group within the Malaysian business scene consists of firms
with Europeans in top management, most of which were classified
either as 'foreign' or 'subsidiary'. A third identifiable community
is that of the large multinational companies. Although they, like
the European group have expatriates in top management, they tend to
have a distinct company culture and management style that sets them
apart. The European group consists largely of long-established
companies involved in the older industries of tin, rubber and
trading. There were a very few companies in the sample that did not
fit into this set of categories; they include several Indian
companies and have been classified as miscellaneous.
With the recent emphasis on the development of the
manufacturing industry in Malaysia and the tendency for established
companies to diversify into manufacturing there has been a blurring
6 "Expatriate" is used here in the rather loose way it tends to be
used in common speech in Malaysia i.e to refer to people of
European extraction, including Americans and Australians, but
not to Singaporeans or Hong Kong Chinese.
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of the industrial distinctions. The Department of Statistics
categorizes companies according to their principal industry and this
is the category used here, however, it must be borne in mind that,
for example, a company whose main activity is trading may also be
involved in some manufacturing.
Table 7.3 breaks down the employment and management figures
of the companies in each size group by industry and business
community. The largest companies are predominantly European or
multinational, while the smallest companies are characteristically
Chinese. If it is recalled that only a 10 per cent sample of SG2 and
5 per cent sample of SGI was taken, the immense size of the Chinese
business community becomes apparent. Another obvious feature is the
number of companies of all sizes involved in the service industry,
comprising over half the total companies. Although smaller than
companies in other industries in terms of employment and management,
they grew at a faster rate on both counts, employment increasing by
27 per cent between 1971-75 and management by 53 per cent, compared
to 25 and 29 per cent respectively in manufacturing and only 3 and 10
per cent in the extractive industry. It is interesting that in all
industries and all business communities the number of managers is
increasing at a considerably faster rate than the number of
employees. It is also noteworthy that the largest manufacturing
firms grew relatively slowly, increasing in employment by 17 per cent
between 1971-75 compared to the manufacturing firms in SG3 and SGI
which grew by 40 per cent and 54 per cent respectively. The
extractive companies in the sample are very large employers both in
terms of general employment and managerial employment but they are
growing very slowly indeed and the largest companies are virtually
static.
Breaking down the size group figures in this way sheds
light on the decline of companies in SG2. The companies affected seem
to be manufacturing concerns. While the Chinese companies show an
actual decline in their management suggesting that they bore the
brunt of the difficulties, European companies increased only very
slightly in terms of employment.
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Table 7.3
Employment and Management by Size Group, Industry and Business Community
(i) (i)
No. of Total No. of % Incr. in Average No. of Total No. of % Incr. in Average No.
Companies Employees Employment Empl. per Co. Managers Managers of Managers
'71 '75 1971 1975 1971-75 1971 1975 1971 1975 1971-75 per Co.
1971 1975
Industry:
Extractive 6 5 82,372 77,427 (.5%) 13,729 15,485 973 837 3% 162 167
Manufacturing 6 6 5,000 5,857 17% 833 976 434 529 22% 72 88
Service 17 17 8,200 11,034 35% 482 649 586 980 67% 34 58
usiness Community:
Chinese 5 5 766 1,036 35% 153 207 79 101 28% 16 20
European 12 11 80,366 78,005 4% 6,697 7,091 1,110 1,235 30% 93 112
Multinational 11 11 14,427 15,253 6% 1,312 1,387 801 1,007 26% 73 92
Miscellaneous 1 1 13 24 85% 13 24 3 3 0 3 3
Industry:
Extractive 5 4 22,306 23,373 10% 4,461 5,843 244 318 36% 49 80
Manufacturing 4 4 3,624 5,081 40% 906 1,270 155 218 41% 39 55
Service 12 11 6,257 7,735 24% 521 703 341 505 49% 28 46
usiness Community:
Chinese 8 6 5,083 4,312 8% 635 719 101 127 44% 13 21
European 10 10 24,734 28,956 17% 2,473 2,896 510 745 46% 51 75
Multinational 2 2 665 754 13% 333 377 67 90 34% 34 45
Miscellaneous 1 1 1,705 1,458 -14% 1,705 1,458 62 79 27% 62 79
Industry:
Extractive 0 0 - - - - - - - - - -
Manufacturing 5 4 1,657 1,415 -9% 331 354 55 56 27% 11 14
Service 11 9 3,615 842 6% 329 94 77 76 13% 6 8
usiness Community:
Chinese 10 9 1,771 1,404 20% 177 156 72 67 -4% 7 7
European 2 2 314 328 4% 157 164 12 17 42% 6 9
Multinational 1 1 197 418 112% 197 418 7 22 214% 7 22
Miscellaneous 1 1 90 107 19% 90 107 9 12 33% 9 12
Industry:
Extractive 5 3 1,469 989 4% 294 330 19 17 31% 4 6
Manufacturing 11 8 1,633 2,261 54% 148 283 49 69 57% 4 9
Service 16 12 2,103 983 3% 131 82 64 69 30% 4 6
usiness Community:
Chinese 28 19 4,660 3,673 27% 166 193 105 109 35% 4 4
European 3 3 330 425 29% 110 142 25 44 76% 8 15
Multinational 0 0 - - - - - - - - - -
Miscellaneous 1 1 215 135 -37% 215 135 2 2 0 2 2
Total Industry
Extractive 16 12 106,,147 101,,789 3% 6,634 8,482 1,236 1,172 10% 77 98
Manufacturing 26 22 11,,914 14.,614 25% 458 664 693 872 29% 27 40
Service 56 49 20,,175 20,,594 27% 360 420 1,068 1,630 53% 19 33
Total Business Community
Chinese 51 39 12.,280 10.,425 12% 241 267 357 404 27% 7 10
European 27 26 105,,744 107,,714 7% 3,916 4,143 1,657 2,041 36% 61 79
Multinational 14 14 15,,289 16,,425 7% 1,092 1,173 875 1,119 28% 63 80
Miscellaneous 4 4 2,,023 1,,724 -15% 506 431 76 96 26% 19 24
(i) Only companies who replied on both occasions are included in this calculation.
202
The summary figures for the business communities draw
attention to the very different scales on which European and Chinese
companies operate. In 1975 the average European company in the
sample had 4,143 employees and 79 managers and the average Chinese
company only 267 employees and 10 managers. However, there was a
higher proportion of managers to labour in the Chinese
companies - 1:27 compared to 1:52 in the European companies, and a
particularly high ratio of 1:15 in the multinational companies. This
last figure suggests a particularly high degree of capital
intensiveness, whilst the figure for the European companies is
influenced by the presence of the larger extractive companies in this
group. The extractive industry is by far the most labour intensive,
with a ratio of 87 employees per manager, compared to 22 in the
service industry and 17 in manufacturing - the sector in which one
would expect to find the greatest capital intensity.
In discussing management development in Malaysia it is
essential to bear in mind these enormous differences in scale, rates
of growth, and management/labour ratios between the various
industries and business communities.
PATTERNS OF MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT
In order to assess the scale on which companies are
developing their managerial cadres, the normative model discussed in
Chapter 2 was used, although very flexibly. Four criteria were
chosen which, it was hypothesized, would be minimally affected by
size, industry and ownership. These were: the company's overall
approach or attitude to management development; its method of
appraisal; its training programme; and its on the job training
methods. Companies were rated on a scale of 1 to 3 for each
criterion. This was relatively crude but it was the greatest degree
of discrimination that could be made, given the very great
differences in the level of sophistication of the companies
concerned. Table 7.4 summarizes the various ratings. By adding the
four ratings given to a company a score is arrived at that represents
the level of management development in the company.
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Table 7.4
Definition of Management Development Ratings
Aspects of a Ratings
Management
Development 3 (high) 2 1 (low)
Programme
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Figure 7.1 presents the totals in graphical form for both
1971 and 1975. It should be borne in mind that the 1975 picture is
based only upon 50 per cent of the original sample. While there is a
clear improvement in the practice of management development between
1971 and 1975, nonetheless, the degree of improvement is not very
great: the mean score has only increased from 6.5 to 7.5 although the
median has increased from 5 to 8. However, these totals are
influenced by the fact that slightly under 50 per cent of the
companies in SGI and 2 were reinterviewed since many of them had
either gone out of business or did not respond. As a result the
degree of improvement shown in Figure 7.1 is slightly overstated.
Figures 7.2 to 7.5 present this data by size group.
In the largest companies there was movement towards the
centre of the range (Figure 7.2); that is, more companies were
involved in developing their managerial staff, but fewer were doing
it well. In fact, the median score for companies in SG4 went down
from 9 in 1971 to 8 in 1975. Nonetheless these are still the
companies doing most. Generally, they can articulate a clear
management development policy and most of the chief executives
appeared to take the task very seriously. Indeed, in just under half
of the companies there was a training manager specifically
responsible for management development. There is also regular
appraisal of managers' performance often using standardized appraisal
forms stressing relatively objective critera. Training appears to
have become less well planned and integrated into career development
but some companies were taking steps to revitalize their training
programmes.
Figure 7.3 presents the distribution of totals in SG3.
Improvement amongst these companies has been negligible: the median
score has moved from 7 in 1971 to 7.5 in 1975. This is likely to be
related to the unfavourable investment climate at the time, and yet
it is surprising given the very rapid growth in the managerial cadres
of companies in this size group. Management development in this group
often consists of brief periods of training organized on an ad hoc
basis. There is usually a system of regular management appraisal but
in most cases this is confidential rather than being used to help and
guide managers in the improvement of their performance.
Figure 7.2 Percentage Distribution of Scores on
Management Development - SG4
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Scores on Management Development
Figure 7.3 Percentage Distribution of Scores on
Management Development - SG3
Scores on Management Develoument
Figure 7.4 Percentage Distribution of Scores on
Management Development - SG2
Scores on Management Development
Figure 7.5 Percentage Distribution of Scores on
Management Development - SGI
Scores on Management Development
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Companies in SG2 are the one group showing considerable
improvement (Figure 7.4) - a rather contradictory picture given the
drop in employment in this size group. The median score has gone up
from 5 in 1971 to 7.5 in 1975. This is not to say that the overall
level is high: reference to Table 7.4 will show that a total of 7.5
indicates only the beginnings of a management development programme.
Nonetheless, there was marked interest in training particularly in
the small manufacturing companies.
Among companies in SGI there were a number of casualties of
the recession. However, the bulk of companies in SGI were
substantially unchanged, being small entrepreneurial establishments,
frequently family businesses, minimally concerned with management
development in the usual sense of the word. Their emphasis is rather
on a sound education for their children who will probably become the
future managers of the company.
These graphs provide a general picture of the practice of
management development. More specific information is gained through
a close study of the components of a management development
programme. Since patterns of management development tend to be
determined as much by industry and business community as size, these
factors will be considered together.
APPROACHES TO MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT
In the course of the interviews various component parts of
a possible management development model were explored; the first of
these was the overall approach and attitude of the company to
management development.
Twenty three of the twenty five companies in SG4 were
either European or multinational. Most of them had been in Malaysia
for some time and some of the agency houses dated from the end of the
nineteenth century. The need to Malaysianize the management cadre
had forced these companies to concern themselves with management
development, and some of them readily admitted that prior to
Malaysianization virtually no thought had been given to the matter so
that many of the old agency houses and management agents, management
was almost entirely expatriate up until the mid-50's, and in some
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cases the mid-60's. However, in both the important planting and the
mining industries Malaysianization agreements were concluded with the
Government allowing for a relatively slow run down of expatriate
management.'' This was particularly the case in the tin mining
industry which could argue with good reason that there were very few
Malaysian mining engineers. An aspect of the Malaysianization
agreements was the companies' provision of scholarships to prepare
suitable Malaysian management recruits. Trading firms on the other
hand have had to Malaysianize rapidly. As one company chairman
explained, when they did this they went to the largest, best
educated, most sophisticated reservoir of potential managers -
Singapore, which between 1963 and 1965 was part of Malaysia. The
result was that they Malaysianized almost entirely with Chinese
Malaysian managers and this has now created fresh problems with the
recent insistence on racial balance in management.
The multinational companies spend by far the most time,
attention and money on management development. In many of them it is
a line management responsibility and forms part of an international
policy of management development in the company. However, many of
them took it beyond the stage of mere policy: of all the chief
executives interviewed it was those from multinational companies
7 Silcock, explaining this, wrote in 1963: "It must be appreciated
that the rubber and tin industries in Malaya were built up under
a colonial regime, and their directors and shareholders might
well react nervously to any interference. The government is
well aware that excessive dependence on one or two export crops
makes the economy very vulnerable; but it is unwilling to act
vigorously to overcome this vulnerability, and believes that
minor interference, if it led to capital flight could do more
harm than good. The agency houses, which control so much of
Malaya's rubber, tin and trade, are therefore subjected to very
little pressure to build up effective local management or
control." T.H. Silcock "Communal and Party Structure,"
The Political Economy ofIndependent Malaya. T.H. Silcock and
E.K. Fisk, eds., p. 25.
Since the NEP this has changed, however, it accounts for the
continued presence of a relatively high proportion of European
managers in the tin and rubber industries.
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that showed the most concern for and had given the most thought to,
the development of their managerial staff. They clearly considered
it a vital factor in the overall success of their company and this
was reflected in every aspect of their management development
programmes. Careful manpower planning is practised - in the case of
senior managers as much as 10-15 years ahead - and the manager
undergoes a programme of development tailored to his needs and career
potential. However, not all multinational companies plan so
carefully; the scale of the operation appears to have some bearing on
the company's approach. A number have small subsidiaries in Malaysia
and in these the international company's management development
philosophy may not be fully implemented. While all can draw on the
considerable expertise available at head office, in a few cases this
was not used. Indeed, it was interesting to see how much influence a
particularly enthusiastic chairman or training manager had: in a
number of cases the reduction in a company's management development
activities appeared to be closely related to the departure of a
particular person.
The extractive companies - tin, rubber or oil palm - had a
very similar approach to management development. They sought to
recruit a man with the most suitable qualifications for the job,
during the first few years required him to pass professional
examinations - the dredgemaster's certificate or the Incorporated
Society of Planters (ISP) Examinations for instance - and once that
initial period of training was over, the development of the manager
was left largely to experience. The rubber industry had annual
technical conferences organized by the RRIM, (attended by both
Chinese and European planters), conferences that clearly made a very
important contribution to keeping the industry up to date. However,
there appeared to be very little attention given to the development
of managerial skills in these industries, despite the large numbers
of managers involved, and the tremendous pressures to improve
efficiency. Indeed, in both industries there has been a drop in the
number of managers employed per acre, or per mine, increasing the
degree of responsibility of each manager. The reason for the
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apparent lack of management development in the planning industry was
that experience was considered to be the most important factor in
making a manager in such a highly labour intensive industry. However,
one suspects that these industries are also strongly affected by the
natural conservatism of long established successful industries and
are reluctant to change to new ways that may not seem immediately
applicable. They have tended to be paternalistic, in the most
positive, as well as in a rather negative way, and in the very
isolated conditions under which managers work in this mixture of
experience and paternalism, reinforced periodically with a conference
on the most up to date developments in the industry, has proven
reasonably successful.
The manufacturing industry divided itself into two parts,
the Chinese companies largely in the older, more labour intensive
industries, and the European and multinational companies usually in
the newer, more Capital intensive ones. The latter group tended to
be particularly concerned with the technical development of its
management. While new manufacturing concerns can bring in
expatriates to help establish a factory they are required to phase
out all foreign experts except for 'key posts' within the first few
years. There is therefore a great deal of emphasis on the rapid
development of local managers with the technical skills required.
Even in the more established manufacturing concerns there was a
natural bias towards technical training. However, some of the
multinational companies had reached the stage where they could also
turn their attention to the development of management skills. The
success of their approach is indicated by one researcher's finding
that in the Malaysian manufacturing industry size of operation as
measured by number of employees has "a favourable impact on
efficiency as measured by capital utilization...probably because
large establishments enjoy technological and management economies of
i 118scale.
8 D.Lim, "Capital Utilization in West Malaysian Manufacturing",
p.34.
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The wholesale trade was very well represented in the sample
and reflected the picture presented in Table 5.8: there were general
wholesalers - usually agency houses - car dealers, and a very large
number of small Chinese rubber traders - and here small refers only
to the size of the management and not to turnover. In this industry
there seemed to be a general consensus between European and Chinese
firms in their attitudes to management development: namely, that it
was of little importance, an ability to sell could not be taught,
experience was the most important factor and managers learnt as they
went along. There is fierce competition in the wholesale and retail
trade and profit margins are often very small, as a result training
tends to be considered a luxury that can be dispensed with. (The
only exception is product knowledge and both Chinese and European
companies send their staff to visit principals where it is necessary
to learn about new products.) The result of this sort of attitude is
the situation one firm found itself in wishing to adopt a more
progressive approach and diversify into new fields but finding the
old staff unadaptable, they were forced to bring in new staff with a
fresh outlook.
By far the greatest proportion of Chinese companies were in
the service industry, as traders and middlemen. In such companies
there is no investment appraisal or forward planning, and they work
with virtually no capital making their money by buying on credit.
They sell the goods, use the money so gained for the period of
credit, often doubling it and more, and then repay the initial debt.
They make money particularly out of the fluctuations in price of
certain commodities, and as speculators and gamblers take each
opportunity as it comes. Since a Chinese businessman can only make
money if he has a good credit rating his relationships within his
community are extremely important. It was for these reasons that
experience was considered to be the key element in the development of
a manager - to acquire a 'feel' for the market, and to establish
one's credentials within the community. Because little capital is
required to do business a Chinese company tends to be very flexible
and may become involved in all sorts of different activities.
Chinese companies were said to be able to operate where European
companies could not because they dispensed with all the frills
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especially in terms of highly paid, highly trained managers. Formal
management development not only seems to be irrelevant to such
companies, it seems to run counter to their business interests.
An aspect of the Chinese business community that affects
its attitude towa^rds management development is its conservatism and
introversion. It is subdivided into closely knit, often clan-based,
industrial groups. This has been a form of protection in a country
in which in the past they were not deemed to be entitled to a
permanent place. In the present the Government's policy of
discrimination in favour of the Malays, operates against those who
are not Malays, and the Chinese with their dominant position in the
low technology service and manufacturing sectors are a prime target.
This threat makes their closely knit industrial groupings even more
important for they are almost the sole means of protection the
Chinese have. Despite the flexibility of Chinese companies in
business these groupings tend to have a powerful conservative
influence on the management style or philosophy of Chinese companies,
since they need the trust and co-operation of their fellow companies
in order to operate in an increasingly difficult environment and a
change of management philosophy would threaten that.
Rubber traders, seemed to epitomize the conservative
Chinese approach to management, believing in no form of management
development other than long experience of the trade. Forward
planning was ruled out they said, by the unpredictability of the
market and the uncertainties of the political situation in Malaysia.
They form a closely knit, business enclave almost all of whom are
Chinese, and the great majority are Hokkien. It is an enclave bound
by tradition with a dislike for strange, new methods. As one trader
said, "No one ever talks about management things", and to do so would
be to incur the distrust of the community. He described how he had
learnt the trade as a child spending half a day at school and the
other half of the day in the shop working. During the vacations his
father introduced him to other rubber dealers and on leaving school
he entered the business.
Over half the Chinese companies in the sample were family
firms and this strongly affected their management style, authority
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tending to be centralized in the senior family member. A Chinese
businessman explained, "Business means making money and making money
means decision-making." It is thus the crux of business activity and
cannot be delegated; the fact that the welfare of the family is at
stake reinforces this. On the other hand, it was sometimes felt by
the younger generation that this degree of centralization stood in
the way of change and adaptation.
Studies of the Chinese firm carried out in Hong Kong and
Singapore have also found it is characteristically autocratically
managed with a very high degree of centralization of decision-making
9
and consequently very little consultation with junior managers.
Status differences are strongly emphasized and deference shown
accordingly. "Chinese subordinates are said to pass responsibility
up the line...to bow quickly to authority... studiously to avoid
conflict... rarely to assume initiative.This situation cannot be
conducive to the development of management skills and the Chinese
company does not give much thought to management development.
This leads to a further characteristic of Chinese
companies: they tend to lose their most promising managers. When a
company employs non-family members as managers, generally without
executive authority, the most enterprising young managers will seek
to train themselves and as soon as they have learned as much as
possible, they will set up on their own. Chinese were said to prefer
being their own bosses. As a result those who stay are likely to be
the less dynamic, less able, individuals whose example only serves to
reinforce the chief executive's resistance to delegation. It also
explains the complaint of Chinese firms that, "if you train them they
will leave". Where the Chinese company succeeds in developing
managers it does so by providing a few men from the right family, men
with the early character training and general background to suit
9 F.C.Deyo, Decision-Making and Supervisory Authority in
Cross-Cultural Perspective, pp. 5-6.
10 ibid. , pp. 6-7.
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them to business, with an opportunity to prove themselves in the
family company.
In the Chinese business community as a whole there was
constant insistence on the key role of experience in the development
of a manager, coupled with a scepticism towards "book knowledge".
This is, of course, fairly characteristic of the small firm and the
same attitudes tend to be expressed by small British firms. In the
case of Chinese firms it seemed to be a barrier to further
development. There was general recognition that where the younger
generation had acquired a polytechnic or university education they
would be unwilling to return to such a firm, for the salary offered
would be too low, and they would not fit in. Indeed it was said that
because in a Chinese company there is a great deal of hard work for
comparatively meagre rewards parents try to give their children a
Western education so that they will not need to work for such a
company, and they will be able to get a position in a European
company or become self-employed professionals. Where young family
members had returned to the family firm after receiving a higher
education through a sense of obligation or the insistence of the
family, they felt an acute sense of frustration at the resistance to
change, at the traditional, intuitive style of management, and at
their own lack of executive authority, a frustration that came across
clearly in the interviews. With the brightest and most enterprising
individuals tending to leave, the future of this type of small,
conservative, family firm is fairly bleak.
In Chinese firms the requirement for technical expertise
are usually limited. Of the 51 Chinese companies in the sample, 30
were in the service industry, 14 in manufacturing and 7 in the
extractive industry. Those in manufacturing tended to use relatively
simple forms of technology - light engineering firms, sawmills, and
biscuit factories, for example. Where greater technical expertise
was required, for instance in more modern manufacturing operations,
Chinese companies were pragmatic and trained their managers in the
appropriate skills. Although little attention was given to
managerial skills these companies appeared to be more adaptable and
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open to change, less hide-bound by tradition than those in the older
industries.
The comments of a small local manufacturer of cement
products summarize the attitude of the Chinese businessman:
In my particular line we have so many small
things and products to consider - our products are
not standardised and each client always insists on
his own specifications and design. It is impossible
to use any sophisticated production methods. I
stick to the methods I have devised through trial
and error.
Further I have been making money all along and
am in a position to compete effectively with a big
public company manufacturing similar products and
utilising so-called modern management techniques.
There is no necessity for me to change and run the
risk of a loss through introducing ideas which are
theoretically sound but costly to implement.
My clients are usually contractors - you cannot
deal with them like the way you deal with big modern
business. Our relationship is based on trust and we
cannot expect to demand collateral or to examine
their credit standing or the viability of the
proj ect.
Moreover, I am so busy that if I were to spend
my time working on costly information systems,
profit planning, idealistic optimal solutions, and
attend all the management courses and seminars
conducted by management theorists with strings of
qualifications but hardly any practical experience,
I would have no time left for making a profit.
These big ideas, which may be applicable to the
large Western corporations, are not necessarily
applicable ^o local firms, particularly small
businesses.
As these remarks make clear, the lack of emphasis this
Chinese company has placed on management development has not deterred
it from making a handsome profit. Indeed the neglect of management
training has tended to make economic sense. The same can be said for
technical training: with cheap labour the Chinese company can afford
11 Quoted in Lam Hee Thong, "High Productivity and Poor Working
Conditions," Malaysian Business, August 1976, p. 41.
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to pay little attention to technical efficiency. One researcher
found,
...small industry... suffers from a variety
of...problems such as out-moded techniques of
production; ineffective marketing organisationj^poor
quality of product; and inefficient management.
Yet it has continued to make a profit and to claim a substantial
share of the local market. However, if this has been the case in the
past it is not likely to be so in the future as companies become
increasingly export oriented and have to compete in terms of quality
of product and efficiency in the international market.
The Indian business community is relatively small and has
not been singled out for close study. Only three Indian companies
appeared in the sample and those three were very similar in their
approach to management development to the Chinese companies. Two of
the three were family companies and had the same firm, autocratic
form of management to be found in Chinese companies and all of them
put a great deal of emphasis on experience and hard work in making a
manager. All three were in the service industry and had little need
for technical training, while management training was considered
unnecessary.
Recruitment Patterns
The sources from which companies in the sample drew their
managers and the criteria they used for selecting them reflected
their overall attitude to management development, and the constraints
under which they operate. Table 7.5 presents the recruitment figures
for 1971 and 1975 broken down by size group. In both years the
larger companies were responsible for the bulk of recruitment: in
1971 recruitment into SG3 and SG4 accounted for 95 per cent of total
management recruitment in the sample and in 1975, 85 per cent.
12 Papanek found the same situation amongst the entrepreneurs in
Pakistan. G.F. Papanek, Pakistan's Development, Social Goals
and Private Incentives, p. 62.
13 Cheng Peng Lim, "Small Industry - its role in the industrial
development of the Malaysian economy," Paper given at Third






































































































































































The smallest companies have very small stable managements and
recruitment of a manager into any one company tends to be an
infrequent occurrence, witness the fact that in 1971 the 32
respondent companies in SGI recruited only 5 managers, equivalent to
4 per cent of their managers. By 1975 this picture had changed with
the 23 respondent companies in SGI recruiting 24 managers, or 15 per
cent of their managerial cadre. It is in sharp contrast to the
companies in SG4 which recruited an average of 8 managers per company
in 1971 and 12 in 1975, equivalent to 12 per cent of the cadre in
1971 and 14 per cent in 1975. Because they recruit more managers on
a regular basis the larger companies have a planned approach to
recruitment. They normally advertise, in some cases test the ability
of candidates, and interview them either with a panel of the key
people involved in the post or by a succession of these. They often
maintain special contacts with universities both in Malaysia, and
occasionally abroad, in order to recruit the best new graduates, and
in many cases offer scholarships in the technical areas the industry
requires to ensure a supply of suitably qualified recruits.
Smaller companies on the other hand almost never advertise.
Because the management cadre is so stable they feel they are
recruiting someone for life and because these are usually family
companies they only want to recruit people with whom the family can
get along, or who will fit in with the very small management groups.
As a result recruitment is almost entirely by personal recommendation
and selection by a very brief interview. Table 7.6 summarises this
picture in terms of the scores companies received on their
recruitment and selection practices.
The method of recruitment affects the sources from which
managers can be drawn. The larger companies draw roughly a quarter
of their management recruits from university or college. Indeed in
SG4 the proportion from these two sources increased from 25 per cent
in 1971 to 31 per cent in 1975. The other main sources of
recruitment were non-managerial grades and the private sector. In
the largest companies promotion from non-managerial grades tends to
be part of a company policy of management development that includes
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a) Approach and Policy
3- systematic recruitment to meet predetermined needs of company; clearly
articulated recruitment policy; source of recruitment decided
in relation to skill requirements;
2- ad hoc recruitment as posts fall vacant related through not always
identical to skill requirements for the job (i.e. no job analysis);
only a hazy recruitment policy;
1- recruitment with no special reference to skill requirements limited to
friend and relatives.
b) Selection Procedures
3- objective, standardized (possibly by tests, interviews etc.) geared to
pre-established skill requirements for the job; aptitude tests
considered for selection of Malays below generally accepted level;
2- strong subjective component, personality criteria; little standardization;
roughly related to needs of job;
1- almost entirely basest, on personality and/or relationship, unrelated to
requirements of the job.
c) Validation
3- careful systematic validation of recruitments and selection criteria;
2- awareness of importance of validation and some attempt made to do this
impressionistically;
1- no thought given to validation of recruitment and selection criteria.
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companies like to develop managers in the company culture and,
therefore, either to promote from within or to recruit direct from
university and develop a man throughout his career. Nonetheless, the
private sector was the single largest source of recruitment both in
1971 and in 1975, for almost every size group. A number of companies
mentioned the problem of other companies poaching management staff
and this trend seems to have increased slightly from 33 per cent of
total recruits in 1971 to 39 per cent in 1975. Along with this has
gone a slight decrease in the proportion of managers being promoted
from the ranks, from 30 per cent of total recruits in 1971 to 24 per
cent in 1975. Although these figures are far from startling they do
hint at a possible slackening of interest in management development.
The public sector on the other hand is a relatively minor source of
recruitment, indeed many companies complained that they kept losing
staff to the public sector.
Smaller companies had no time for university graduates, who
they considered too theoretical and insufficiently practical. They
also admitted that few university graduates would be attracted by the
pay and working conditions in a small company. Hunter records:
...as I was forcibly told in Singapore, small
employers in countries that make their way in an
intensively competitive world by cheap labour drawn
from a poor population simply cannot afford to
employ the Rolls Royce technicians, they pick up a
handyman who has some experience and expect him to
"make do -^nd mend" on second-hand obsolescent
machinery.
This reflects very well the position of many of the small employers
in Malaysia as well.
Because of the importance such companies attached to
practical experience and the inability of the company to train
management they preferred to recruit management staff from the
private sector or non-management grades, who had proven their ability
and could go straight to work.
14 G.Hunter, "Issues in Manpower Policy: Some Contrasts from East
Africa and South East Asia," Manpower and Education. F. Harbison
and C. A. Myers, eds., p. 342.
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Table 7.7 breaks down the recruitment figures by industry
so highlighting the differences between the three industrial groups.
The attitude of the service industry that no amount of education or
training can teach a man to sell is reflected in their choice of
management recruits with experience either from non-managerial grades
or the private sector. In 1975 while recruitment from the ranks had
gone down, recruitment from the private sector had shot up to 51 per
cent of the total.
Manufacturing industry with its greater technical
requirements recruited roughly a quarter of its staff from
university. However, its largest single source was the
non-managerial grades and, in contrast to the service industry, the
proportion from this source grew between 1971 and 1975, so that by
1975 44 per cent of all management recruits in the manufacturing
companies in the sample came from the ranks. The numbers drawn from
the private sector, on the other hand, declined to 20 per cent, the
smallest proportion of any of the industries. The implication is
that manufacturing companies are training and developing their own
staff who are drawn from the ranks or recruited from university and
either do not have the need or find it unsatisfactory to attract
managers from other companies in the private sector.
The recruitment pattern of the extractive industry reflects
the emphasis these companies put on recruiting the best qualified
people. It drew a higher proportion of its recruits from technical
college and university, than either of the other two industrial
groups. Indeed, both the tin mining industry and the plantation
industry offered scholarships for students to attract them to the
industry. The apparent shift towards greater recruitment from
university, though, is a result of the upgrading of Serdang
Agricultural College to University status. The public sector was a
small but not insignificant source of recruitment and in this case
particularly ex-police and army officers. Over 4000 servicemen were
demobilised in 1972 and the Government provided a scheme of
compulsory retraining to prepare them for employment. The plantation
industry found the experience in handling people and the discipline
of military life fitted such recruits well for the management
Table7.7

























































































requirements of estates. It is noteworthy that in this case a
particularly small proportion of recruits came from non-managerial
grades. This was apparently because such staff lacked the
educational and professional background necessary for management.
Turning to the recruitment patterns of the different
business communities (See Table 7.8), Chinese companies follow the
pattern of SGI, drawing almost all their management recruits either
from non-managerial grades or the private sector. This is in keeping
with their frequently stated policy of only recruiting people with
business experience and in most of these firms recruitment was
restricted to relatives and close friends. Since a high proportion
of the Chinese companies are trading firms dealing with, at times,
substantial sums of money, they feel it is imperative to employ
someone who is trustworthy. The criteria mentioned by Chinese
companies choosing a manager were trustworthiness, personality and
16
willingness to work hard. They prefer to recruit staff who are
Chinese-educated, because, having no English, such recruits can only
find employment in the Chinese business sector, where jobs are scarce
and depend on knowing someone in industry; consequently the
Chinese-educated tend to work harder, for lower pay and are less
likely to leave. Indeed Chinese companies tend to capitalize on the
educational and linguistic handicaps of their employees. Another
factor may well be a cultural one - that those who have been through
Chinese schools are likely to have the sorts of attitudes and values
best fitted for Chinese business. On the rare occasions when
15 This pattern of recruiting extends in a modified form to the
employment of labour. Siew Nim Chee noted in relation to
Chinese tin mines:
"It is a well-established fact that the mine-owner always tends
to employ men of his own race or district on his mine. This
characteristic feature of the tribal relationship between the
miner and his employees has been maintained to this day, and an
inspection of the schedules showed definite proof of such a
custom." Siew Nim Chee, "Labour and Tin Mining in Malaya,"
Readings in Malayan Economics. T.H. Silcock, ed.,p.420 fn.
16 This emphasis Chinese companies put on trustworthiness and
loyalty both in the recruitment and, as will be seen, the
promotion of managers, is a characteristic that has been noted
by a number of researchers. See F.C. Deyo, op.cit., p. 93.
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when university graduates were recruited they were generally from the
University of Taiwan or from Nanyang University in Singapore, both of
which teach in the Chinese language. However, professional or
academic qualifications were not considered particularly important
and ability was seen to be related to diligence and experience.
The preference of these companies for promoting from within combined
with the fact that most non-management recruits enter with a very
limited education has meant that Chinese companies find themselves
with poorly educated managers who often only speak Chinese and who
feel themselves at a disadvantage compared to managers from foreign
firms in taking advantage of publicly available training facilities.
European firms recruited a particularly large proportion of
their management staff from the private sector and this became more
marked in 1975. The trend is probably linked to the anxiety many of
them felt in 1975 which made them reluctant to invest in training
staff and more inclined to recruit experienced managers who did not
require training.
The multinational companies show a strong tendency to draw
18
managers from non-managerial grades. While in the Chinese
companies this was done for the purpose of recruiting an experienced
17 This set of criteria for the selection of managers is again
reflected in the Chinese tin industry:
"...most of the responsible occupations... are held by men
between the ages of forty and sixty. ...The very backbone of the
labour force of any mine is formed by their experience, long
service with and loyalty to their employers, their industry and
clearheadedness as workers, as well as the respect in which they
are held by their labourers.... The Kepalas, who can make a mine
a success or a failure are mostly between fifty and seventy
years of age." Siew Nim Chee, "Labour and Tin Mining in
Malaya", op.cit., p. 421.
18 Referring to both European and foreign firms, the Executive
Director of the Malaysian International Chamber of Commerce has
noted "... there is a continued preference for recruitment to
executive grade through the ranks, especially for those
appointments which do not necessarily require professional or
tertiary technical qualifications. There is much emphasis on
promotion of those with sub-professional qualifications and
experience". D.C.L. Wilson, "A Business View of Higher
Education in Malaysia." pp.3-4.
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and trusted manager, in the multinationals it was to develop men with
proven ability and potential, and they were in a favourable position
to do this. Compared to other business communities, the
multinational companies also draw the highest proportion of recruits
from university, and this proportion increased noticeably between
1971 and 1975.
The preference that both the European and multinational
companies show for university graduates is interesting. Obviously
they wish to choose only people with the strongest professional
qualifications. However, they are also selecting those who will have
been exposed through higher education to Western attitudes and
values, methods of problem solving, and culture generally; that is,
people for whom the cultural gap between company and manager will be
at a minimum. It is noteworthy that the multinationals are stronger
in their preference for university graduates than the European
companies: they will have had more experience of recruiting managers
in a range of developing countries and so will have a clearer man
specification. On the other hand, many of the European companies
have been in Malaysia for so long that one might assume that the
company culture has been modified by the local culture, the gap,
therefore may not be so great and the need for acculturation through
higher education, correspondingly smaller.
Companies were asked about their satisfaction with recruits
from the various universities and technical colleges. A marked
phenomenon was the preference of European and multinational firms for
graduates of overseas universities, particularly from Britain,
19
Australia, New Zealand and United States. Although in some cases
such recruits were on industry scholarships to obtain a training not
available in Malaysia, for example students at the Cambourne School
of Mining in Britain, for the most part comments on this preference
related not to the specilization or quality of the education but to
personality factors. Graduates from such universities were
19 The planting companies were the exception to this in that they
took quite a number of recruits from Indian agricultural
universities.
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considered to be more mature, more self-confident, and to be better
at man management. However, underlying this preference for overseas
graduates appeared to be the feeling that prolonged exposure to
Western culture meant that they shared a common core culture with the
company, and its executives, head office, and principals, and that
having one foot still in Malaysian culture they may be able to
mediate between the company and its employees more effectively than
the graduate of a local university.
Amongst graduates of local universities the greatest number
came from the University of Malaya, other universities being so new.
The University of Malaya is the oldest and most respected university
in the country, and its faculties include a Faculty of Business
Administration which comprises seven divisions - Analytical
Economics, Applied Economics, Rural Development, Public
Administration, Business Administration, Accounting and Statistics.
In 1976 the Faculty had 60-70 staff, roughly two-thirds its full
complement of 90, and morale appeared low. The rapid build up of the
new universities, particularly the Universiti Kebangsaan, had given
the impression that the University of Malaya was being neglected in
terms of financial resources; for example, the Universiti Kebansaan
was receiving special aid in order to build up its staff by sending
them abroad for higher degrees. Government policy towards the use of
the Malay language - all courses were meant to the taught in
Malay - and towards discipline was said to have taken much of the
enjoyment out of teaching.
The principal criticism made of the education graduates of
the University of Malaya received was that it was too theoretical.
Graduates were said to have a narrow outlook, to be ambitious, rather
filled with their own importance, but not able to manage men and to
be reluctant to get their hands dirty. It was said that they were
attitudinally not prepared for the commercial world. A few companies
appreciated that it was the quality of the recruits rather than the
immediate relevance of their education that was most important and in
1972 the quality of engineering and accountancy graduates was
particularly commended.
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Other sources of recruitment included the Universiti
Pertanian, Universiti Teknoloji, Military College, and ITM. (ITM and
the Universiti Kebangsaan being primarily Malay institutions will be
dealt with separately in Chapter 9.) Very few of the companies in
the sample had experience of students from the Universiti Sains
Penang since it was started only in 1969, however, those that
had - usually for vacation training - voiced reactions similar to
those to the University of Malay students: that while the education
was sound students were unwontedly sure of themselves.
An important source of recruitment for the plantation
industry is the Universiti Pertanian, formally Serdang Agricultural
College. Courses there are specifically geared to the needs of the
industry and comment was generally favourable, with graduates said to
have a sound, practical training. Graduates from the Technical
College, now the Univesiti Teknoloji, were also well regarded as
having a good, practical technical training, but the bulk of them
went into Government employment. The Military College was another
source of recruitment mentioned as producing well disciplined and
highly adaptable graduates.
There were areas where there was clearly a shortage of
suitably trained candidates to recruit. This seemed to be
20
particularly the case at the supervisory level, and in the
scientific and technical fields especially amongst Malays. The
Government has recognised its role in solving this mis-match between
supply and demand:
The challenge will be to equip them /i.e. Malaysian
youth/ through education and training to participate
productively in the agricultural and industrial
development of the country. To this end, education
and training in the sciences, technology agcjl business
management will require much more emphasis.
20 David Dim, in a report on the manufacturing industry in
Peninsular Malaysia, found the shortage of supervisory staff was
such that it was an important factor contributing to the
underutilization of capital in the industry. D. Dim "Capital
Utilization in West Malaysian Manufacturing." p. 51.
21 TMP. p. 41, para. 149.
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Succession Planning and Promotion
Relatively few companies had the sort of succession plan
that enabled them to plan the development of managers to fill future
posts. Table 7.9 summarizes the scores companies received on
succession planning. Those that were most active in this area were
once again the largest companies, and their scores actually improved
between 1971-75. One of the main reasons for the careful planning
that goes on in these companies is the fact that they have to plan
for Malaysianization, and now, racial balance in management. Some of
the companies in SG2 and SG3 were relatively new and succession
planning was, reasonably enough, not seen as a priority with a young
management group. Amongst the Chinese family companies succession
planning was an internal family affair and in a few cases it was
considered bad luck to plan for succession until after the death of
the head of the firm. In the planting industry it seemed superfluous
in a situation where there was virtually no growth and many
experienced, competent managers. In the large tin companies the
uncertainties of the political situation as well as the depletion of
tin reserves made it difficult to plan in the long term and so to
plan for succession.
Systematic training for succession was uncommon because
most training was ad hoc and related to specific technical skills
rather than to the long term development of managers. In a few small
companies where individual managers could be given a lot of attention
ad hoc training for succession appeared to be successful.
Promotion was an aspect of succession that was explored.
With the exception of Malay managers, who will be dealt with
separately, the European and multinational firms promoted almost
entirely on the basis of performance. However, a number of these
companies mentioned that local managers preferred to have age and
22
seniority taken into account and the older European companies did
22 Deyo's work suggests that seniority is an important factor in
promotion in Chinese firms, although it was not mentioned by the
companies in the sample. This may account for the preference on





Group 3 (high) 2 1 (low)
SG4 1971 n=29 9 10 10
1975 n= 16 7 7 2
SG3 1971 n=21 4 8 9
1975 n= 12 0 6 6
SG2 1971 n=l 6 2 6 8
1975 n= 8 1 4 3
SGI 1971 n=32 0 7 25








Existence of a succession plan that takes
into account expansion plans of company,
future requirements, and resources of
skilled manpower so that no top post could
fall vacant without a person prepared to
fill it.
Informal, rough and ready succession
planning that guarantees no top job will
fall vacant but does not necessarily take
full account of detailed skill requirements
of the job.
Ad hoc succession with no forethought or
planning.
Clearly articulated, based on proven
performance, impartial.
Understood, though at times arbitrary,
related to performance but not entirely
objective or impartial.
Largely arbitrary, based primarily on
relationship/frienaship.
c) Systematic Training for Succession
Scores 3 - Job requirements for upper level position
identified, training and development needs
of those in line for succession determined
and appropriate training and development
experiences provided.
2 - Those in line for succession give some
preparatory training through not always
carefully related to the job: and no
conscious and systematic development of
managers to take over senior positions.
1 - No special training for succession and no
real awareness of the need for it.
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appear to consider such factors. The lack of mobility of Malaysian
managers was brought up in this context. Many companies found their
managers reluctant to accept transfer to a different part of the
country. In the extractive industry promotion is, of course, very
limited indeed. In Chinese companies promotion is carried out using
the same set of criteria as for recruitment into management, criteria
which rate loyalty and honesty above ability. Indeed, one Chinese
company stated this very explicitly; it was a company dealing in
precious stones and needed a manager who was absolutely trustworthy.
It was, therefore, promoting a clerk who had been with the company
for many years and proven his loyalty although it recognized he was
not sufficiently able to make a good manager.
Appraisal
Appraisal and feedback as to how well one is performing and
where one could improve one's performance is an important aspect of
self development for the manager, and should provide the company with
objective information about him so that it can assist him in
developing his abilities and make the best use of his potential. In
Malaysia appraisal is common but feedback and counselling rare.
Appraisal is frequently a part of the annual salary review and has an
immediate impact on rewards.
Table 7.10
Appraisal
No. of Companies with Each Sco're
Size
Group 3 2 1
SG4 1971 n=29 14 5 10
1975 n=l6 6 7 3
SG3 1971 n=21 2 11 8
1975 n=12 2 8 2
SG2 1971 n=l6 2 3 11
1975 n=8 1 5 2
SGI 1971 n=32 - 2 30
1975 n=l 1 1 1 9
Rating System: See Table 7.4
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In Chinese companies there is a year end bonus related to
company rather than individual performance, but since, this bonus can
be as much as a year's salary it is a considerable incentive.
In the planting industry managers submit an annual
operating budget and are judged against this largely self-set target.
In an industry that specializes in managing estates for other
companies, not suprisingly, a careful check is kept on managers
through biannual tours of inspection by a Visiting Agent (VA). In
the multinational companies standardized appraisal forms developed in
the international context of the company are often used, indeed many
of the European companies also use this type of standardized form for
annual appraisal.
Feedback and discussion of performance is almost never
carried out. The few exceptions include a handful of multinationals
which have brought in 'Management by Objectives' (MBO) with the
manager taking an active part in the setting of his objectives, and
his performance in relation to those objectives discussed with him.
Other than this it is generally agreed that discussion of a man's
performance is a highly sensitive area likely to lead to loss of
'face' and misunderstanding and therefore unsuitable in Malaysia.
Since human relations are one of the problem areas of management in
Malaysia it is not surprising that such sensitive exercises are
eschewed. Nonetheless the plantation industry seems to succeed in
that VAs discuss each manager's performance with him. A vital point
in both cases is that appraisal is entirely performance - rather than
personality - oriented. Many of the standardized appraisal forms
used by companies in fact have a large subjective, personality
element and discussion and possible criticism of a manager's
personality is bound to be sensitive, especially when carried out by
a foreign company.
Because Chinese companies are generally so small - an
average of only 7 managers per company in 1971, 10 in 1975 -
appraisal is not formalized but consists of daily observation of a
man's performance. These companies therefore tend to do poorly when
compared with the normative model of appraisal used in Table 7.10,
indeed it is very difficult to determine exactly what is going on in
a company where such fluid informal systems are used.
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This chapter has examined the characteristics, policies and
practices of the companies in the sample towards some of the elements
of a management development programme, in particular, their overall
level of performance, basic philosophy or approach, their recruitment
practices, attitude towards succession planning and promotion and use
of management appraisal. The next chapter will complete this picture
by examining the training practices of the sample companies.
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CHAPTER 8
MANAGEMENT TRAINING PRACTICES AND PREFERENCES
While formal management training is only one aspect of
management development it is a particularly important and obvious
one. The general attitude of a company, or the senior executive in a
company, towards management development, though perhaps the most
important factor is difficult to assess, and in the case of local
companies, difficult to identify. Training, on the other hand, is
relatively concrete involving countable individuals undergoing a
specific learning experience. It is, therefore, the easiest
manifestation of management development on which to obtain reliable
data and will be dealt with here at some length. There is, of
course, still a great deal of variation in what any particular
company may identify as on the job training, or the use it makes of
external training courses, so an assessment has been made of the
various aspects of the companies' training programmes. This
assessment is based on the interviews rather than direct observation
of specific forms of training, nevertheless it provides a useful
guide.
In examining the degree to which companies train their
managerial cadre a number of factors should be borne in mind. There
is the relative youthfulness of the population generally which will
be reflected in management. Although higher education has expanded
very rapidly the impact of increasing numbers was just beginning to
be felt in 1976 and even then it was primarily the large
multinational and European companies who were recruiting managers
direct from university. That is to say, the vast majority of
managers in Malaysia would not have enjoyed a university type
education. In secondary schooling the expansion of places came
immediately after independence and a high proportion of younger
managers are likely to have received secondary education. However, a
very small proportion of the older generation will have had the
benefit even of that level of schooling. As has been shown, it was
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the English schools which provided the best quality of instruction.^
However, students from these schools were ill-suited to the demands
of the Chinese business sector and attracted to the more lucrative
positions open to them in foreign companies. European and
multinational firms have managers with a higher level of general
education than Chinese companies, employ a larger management cadre,
and have more reason to concern themselves with the training of their
managers. Senior management is usually European and as a result
feels a need to train its Malaysian staff in company skills and
methods. Added to this there is the compulsion European and
multinational companies face to Malaysianize their management, and if
they are pioneer companies very clear stipulations may have been made
in regard to the provision of training.
The direction of the development of manufacturing has meant
that there has been a heavy demand for technically trained management
that had, at the time of the study, and in particular the first half
of the study, outstripped the supply. As a result one would expect
manufacturing companies to be particularly involved in training to
meet the immediate technical needs of the company. The extractive
industries, on the other hand, are hardly expanding their management,
with very low rates of new recruitment and an emphasis instead,
especially in the planting industry, on increasing the efficiency of
existing management. One might therefore expect a shift in emphasis
from junior to middle management training. The service industry
expanded its management more rapidly than those in either of the
other two sectors between 1971-75, often through diversification into
manufacturing, and this will have created a need for training at the
junior level.
MANAGEMENT TRAINING PRACTICES ANALYSED BY SIZE GROUP
Turning now to what was, in fact being done, Table 8.1
presents the number of managers trained and the main training methods
used. The two most salient facts that emerge are, first the
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contribution of the two largest size groups to training - in 1971 SG3
and 4 accounted for 96 per cent of all managers trained by companies
in the sample, and in 1975, 94 per cent; and second, the substantial
decrease in training activity between 1971 and 1975. The total
number of managers trained dropped both in absolute and in relative
terms and the number of companies that carried out no management
training rose, particularly among the smallest companies. The
overall fall in managers trained is the result of a decline in
training in SG4 which does by far the most training of any of the
size groups. Indeed, even if grossed up for the universe to get a
picture of the comparative training contribution of the different
sizes of company in the business community at large, SG4 is seen to
be responsible for more training than any of the other size groups.
On the average companies in SG4 trained 24.8 managers in 1971,
compared to 6.9 in SG3, 1.5 in SG2, and 0.5 in SGI. These figures
emphasize the very different orders of magnitude in training
activities and possibilities in different sizes of company.
These differences are reflected in the scores companies
received on their training programmes. (See Table 8.2). The
companies in SG4 were far more aware of and involved in training
while the majority of companies in SGI did little and were highly
sceptical of the value of formal training. Differences between the
size groups both in the numbers trained and in the attitude towards
training reflect as much, if not more, the different approaches to
management development in the business communities and the different
training requirements of the three industrial groups.
MANAGEMENT TRAINING PRACTICES ANALYSED BY BUSINESS COMMUNITY
AND INDUSTRY
The Chinese Business Community
Chinese companies are characteristically found in the low
technology sections of each industry. In Chinese tin companies the
technology used for extraction is simple and the main requirements
for management seem to be the trust and respect of the Chinese
Table8.2
























































business community, an ability to organize manual labour, and a
2
capacity for hard work. These companies therefore see no need for
management training as such. Experience of the industry is
considered the most important and relevant means to develop a
manager. The same applies to the Chinese planting sector. The
Chinese owned sector of this industry is considerably smaller than
the European and therefore the need to think through the training
needs of the managers is not as urgent. Companies again prefer to
stress practical experience.
The same strong emphasis is to be found in the Chinese
segment of the service industry which is made up of a very large
number of extremely small enterprises. (Refer Tables 5.7 and 5.8).
In manufacturing the Chinese dominate the older low technology
industries such as foodstuffs, footwear, the processing of wood
products. It has therefore been possible for them to manage without
formal training, or with a minimum of such training. (See Table 8.3)
The stability of the management cadre in Chinese companies
has made training appear superfluous. "Everyone knows his job and
therefore there is no need for training," one general manager
explained. The conservatism of large parts of the Chinese business
community prevents them from trying out the training available. As
one manager put it, "If managers go on courses, the workers won't
like it".
Educational and cultural barriers to training were also
frequently mentioned. The majority of managers in Chinese companies
3
had little education ' and that was at a Chinese school, consequently
either they did not speak English or spoke it poorly and felt
handicapped by their limited education. As one company explained,
"There are no men suitable for training". From the point of view of
a manager in this position a training course would almost certainly
result in embarrassment, a loss of 'face', and would therefore be
2 Refer Chapter 7, p. 226, footnote 17.
3 Dr Cheng Peng Lim found 74.8 per cent of the entrepreneurs in
small industry in Malaysia did not have any upper secondary
education. Cheng Peng Lim, op.cit. , p. 20.
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avoided. The perceived cultural gap between the Chinese companies
and the training institutions was probably an even greater barrier.
Training institutions in Malaysia teach what has come to be thought
of as generally applicable management theory and practice, but its
origin in the West, and its basic applicability to Western companies,
not to mention the employment of Western advisers by the
institutions, makes conservative Chinese companies feel that there is
nothing the institutions can offer that is relevant to the Chinese
practice of management. The extremely practical orientation of these
companies makes the theoretically based training courses seem all the
less relevant.
Management is kept to a minimum and all major decisions are
taken by the chief executive, the principal entrepreneur. To such an
individual formal management training often seems totally irrelevant.
The amount of work Chinese entrepreneurs put into their
business - 12-14 hours a day was said to be not uncommon when trying
to build up a business - means that they have no time to approach
management scientifically even if they knew how to do so, and they
have no time for training.
That is not to say the Chinese business community carries
out no training at all. It must develop its entrepreneurs and this
process starts at birth. The revered combination of experience and
hard work forms the basis of the apprenticeship through which many of
the Chinese entrepreneurs interviewed had served and indeed were
4
putting their sons. Practical training on the job under the
guidance of a senior manager was also mentioned as being used on the
rare occasions when there was noone with the requisite experience
4 The Indian family firms were very similar to the Chinese in
this, they began developing the new generation of managers as
young children by instilling the values of hard work and
obedience into their sons. They were then given the best
possible education, followed by a long period of apprenticeship
in the family firm, or possibly partly in a trusted friend's
firm prior to assuming a managerial position, although not
managerial authority, which still resided with the senior family
members.
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available. When new skills were required the first reaction of the
Chinese company is generally to try and find a manager with the
requisite skills rather than sending an existing manager for
training. This is a natural reaction in a small company. A need for
new skills suggests expansion or diversification and existing
management may well be fully occupied. The small company will
usually not have the training capacity within its resources and will
prefer to bring someone in who can get to work immediately rather
than spend time training.
The only segment of the Chinese business community that did
not entirely fit this pattern was that of the new manufacturing
companies. There was not the influence of a well-established
industrial group; management tended to be younger, consequently
better educated, and more open to outside influences; and finally,
and probably most important, there was the need to acquire the
technical skills involved. Nonetheless, there was a tendancy for
such companies to acquire the minimum amount of training to function.
One Chinese family firm venturing into a field in which it
had no experience bought the necessary machinery and sent the younger
brother on the manufacturer's course to learn how to operate it.
This he came back and proceeded to do, however, his knowledge was
very limited and there were many mistakes, some costly, and when the
equipment broke down he had to go on another course to learn how to
mend it. In 1972, the factor seemed to be in chaos. Nevertheless
the manager acquired the necessary skills, the company expanded and
as the needs of the cutomers changed and developed, new equipment was
brought in and the production manager sent off on further courses.
By 1976, this was a flourishing concern. In marked contrast, there
was another Chinese family business in the same industry, a model of
progressive management, whose senior managers had a thorough
theoretical and practical understanding of their production process
and had received the best possible training in both technical and
management skills. In 1972, it was pointed out as a constant example
of what an enlightened Chinese company could achieve; in 1976, it was
on its knees. The conservative Chinese approach of minimizing the
amount of money tied up in equipment and management and of keeping
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overheads down had enabled the former company to weather the
recession of 1975; the latter company, with money heavily invested in
equipment and management found itself overextended when the banks
were clamping down. In the uncertain business environment of
Malaysia the reluctance of the Chinese business community to expose
themselves to the risk involved in adjusting their approach to
management and to management development is scarcely surprising.
However, the great majority of conservative Chinese family firms will
probably not last another generation unless they do change.
The attitude of the Chinese companies to training is
clearly reflected in the numbers they actually did train and the
scores they received on the various aspects of their training
programmes (See Tables 8.3 and 8.4). In 1971, only 7 companies in
the Chinese group trained any of their managerial staff, by 1975 this
had increased to 15 although the number of managers actually trained
had dropped slightly. It is very difficult to assess an approach to
training that starts almost at the cradle, especially if one is using
the model set out in Chapter 2. For this reason, the Chinese have
fared very poorly in the assessment of their training activities.
This is not to say that effective training does not go on, but it is
a training in the attitudes and values, as well as the capacity for
sheer hard work that go into developing an entrepreneur rather than a
manager.
Only four companies had mounted any in-company courses and
external courses had been used by only seven of the 51 respondent
companies in 1971. Many of the 44 companies which did not use
external courses did not even know of their existence. There were,
however, a few interesting exceptions which suggest a possible change
in attitude. Many of the companies involved in the rubber industry
mentioned that they attend the RRIM conferences and those that do not
attend them keep themselves up to date with the latest technical
developments through their contacts in Kuala Lumpur and through the
Chinese newspaper which carries a regular half-page on the rubber
industry. The Selangor Chinese Engineering Merchant's Association
has ventured considerably further collaborating with the National
Productivity Centre to mount courses in Chinese specifically tailored
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to the needs of the industry. The Plastics Association similarly has
enlisted the assistance of a University of Malaya lecturer to run a
specialized training programme. This type of external training,
closely related to the needs of the industry, is an important
development that could pave the way for the inclusion of management
as well as technical training.
Overseas training, although carried out only by a handful
of Chinese companies, was one of the most effectively used types of
training. Generally it was related to practical, technical skills
either for the manufacturing industry, or for servicing equipment
sold by the wholesale and retail trade, and a few companies mentioned
they regularly attended sales fairs around the world to get new
ideas. All the Chinese companies that used overseas training were
convinced of its value: it gave managers "a more receptive approach",
made them "more open to criticism and suggestion", "more receptive to
new ideas", "ready to try harder", managers who had not been abroad
and had little education were said to be inflexible and resistant to
change.
The European Business Community
The great majority of the European companies in the sample
were long established companies in either the service or extractive
industries. Of the 27 respondent European companies in 1971, 16 were
in the service industry, eight in the extractive industry and only
three in manufacturing. This reflects the historical preoccupation
of the European companies, although it does not take into account the
fact that many of the old agency houses and managing agencies are
diversifying out of their principal industry, and in some cases have
extended their interests beyond the South East Asian region.
Nonetheless they do not tend to have the characteristics of the big
multinational companies with their strong central core of control and
advisory services.
With the exception of mining, the old European companies
have been involved in labour intensive, low technology industries.
In the managing agencies, their business was related to the quality
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for the training of new recruits were established very early on. At
first management trainees were all European, drawn from such places
as Aberdeen Agricultural College. Training for the specific
requirements of the job was done through on the job training (the
quality of which varied according to the ability and disposition of
the estate manager) and through the requirement that trainees sit
language and planting knowledge examinations. A few companies
organized these internally but more commonly trainees sat for the
Incorporated Society of Planters (ISP) exams. The ISP is the
professional association of the planting industry and has played an
important role in improving the quality of the training received
through its Technical Education Scheme, the publication of planting
manuals and the sponsorship of rubber and oil palm conferences and
symposia.^ With independence and particularly from the mid-sixties
on, plantation companies began to recruit Malaysians as management
trainees and to step up the training of new recruits. One company
started a Cadet Training Scheme as early as 1954, another opened a
school for trainees. On the job training was carefully planned to
cover all aspects of plantation management. However, with the
expansion of Serdang Agricultural College and the establishment of
the ITM plantation management course the quality of pre-experience
training recruits have received has improved and this has enabled the
period of training on the job to be reduced.
Once this initial technical apprenticeship has been
completed, the training of plantation managers continues to be
primarily on the job training consisting of job rotation, through
different types and sizes of estate, and regular assessment by VA's.
It also includes attendance at the professional conferences run by
the RRIM and the ISP and to a very limited extent external training
courses. The importance of man management in this industry has led
it to emphasize practical experience in a variety of situations
5 The ISP was founded in 1919, promoted the first rubber
conference in Malaya in 1924, and launched its Technical
Education Scheme in 1928. In 1937 it published A.T. Edgar's
Manual of Rubber Planting (Malaya) which became known as the
planters 'Bible'.
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rather than specific training courses. The remoteness of many of the
plantations has made attendance on courses difficult and reinforced
the bias towards on the job training. One form of external training
that has been found particularly useful by the plantation companies
is Outward Bound Courses which build up the fitness and self
confidence of new recruits. Nonetheless, the area over which a
plantation manager has responsibility and the amount of
administrative work has grown steadily. Recognizing the growing need
for a training course to prepare managers to cope with this new
situation in 1977 the planting industry collaborated with the
Malaysian Insitute of Management to begin running a plantation
managers' course bringing together the theoretical expertise of MIM
lecturers and the practical experience of the best Visiting Agents.
Overseas training is used to a limited extent by planting companies.
These patterns of training are brought out in Tables 8.5 and 8.6.
There are only three large tin managing agencies compared
to about nine in planting, and these face the problem of declining
tin reserves, as well as Government action to acquire a controlling
interest in the industry. In the past all managers were Europeans
who came out to Malaya with a suitable training in mining technology.
Because of the shortage of Malaysians with appropriate qualifications
the industry has been allowed to Malaysianize very slowly. Training
within the industry consists of pre-experience professional
qualifications, such as a university degree in mining engineering,
and a system of on the job training and examinations for the new
recruit. Once this is completed there is generally no regular use of
any other form of training although people are occasionally sent on
external courses. In only one company were in-company courses
mounted and was training undertaken on anything but the most modest
of scales.
There were only three European companies in the sample
categorized as being in the manufacturing industry, that is whose
main activity was manufacturing, and of those two were long
established companies. Despite the very different technical
requirements of the former two, both tended to have little time for
any form of management training. Unlike the planting industry where
Table8.5
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natural conservatism with regard to management training has been
modified by the pressure to improve efficiency and by the sheer
numbers of managers over which they have control, these companies
continued to believe in a suitable technical background followed by
on the job experience as the best means of management training.
The European segment of the service industry is dominated
by agency houses. Historically they have played an important role in
the economic development of the country, however, with the changes in
the direction of economic development that followed
independence - the emphasis on industrialization and import
substitution - the future of the agency houses looked uncertain and
as a result they have been going through a period of adjustment and
reorientation. In some cases the agency houses established a market
and this drew the original manufacturer to Malaysia, in others the
agency house itself began manufacturing under licence. They have
seen Government policy cut their business from beneath their feet and
have been the target of official criticism, this has made them
extremely sensitive and aware of their vulnerability, at the same
time it has forced invigorating changes on them.
In the past these companies recruited their managerial
staff from Europe and little training was given. Although they are
now fully Malaysianized, they still do less training than the other
industrial sectors. The wholesale and retail trade is not seen as
demanding a high level of training except in cases where the products
being handled are technically sophisticated. This accounts for the
fact that only 27 per cent of their managers received any form of
management training in 1971 compared to 53 per cent in manufacturing,
and 27 of the 56 companies carried out no training at all. In 1975,
the situation was substantially unchanged, however the amount of
training done by the manufacturing industry had fallen off markedly
and so in comparison the performance of the service industry appeared
better. On the job training for most of the companies in the service
industry tended to involve a fairly unstructured programme of
learning by doing. Where in-company courses were mounted these were
short and practical, aimed usually at junior to middle management.
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External training courses were used but they did not seen
to form part of a comprehensive training programme, being ad hoc with
little, if any, follow-up. The sizeable increase in the numbers of
people sent on external training between 1971-75 was not matched
amongst the subsample interviewed in 1975, by an improvement in the
way in which it was used (see Table 8.6). The increase in the number
going on external courses has been at the expense of on-the-job
training (see Table 8.5). This may suggest a move towards more
systematic, formal training and reflects the expansion in the
provision of training facilities in Malaysia, however it is also
likely that it reflects an increasing tendency for companies to opt
out of responsibility for planning and implementing in-house
training.
This rather gloomy picture of training in the European
sector of the service industry is modified in the case of the very
large agency houses which have a considerably more progressive
attitude to management training, run in-house courses for their
management, and make extensive use of external courses and of
overseas training.
Overseas training was most commonly used in the service
industry and was generally the most carefully and constructively
planned. It frequently involved visits to the principals whose
merchandise the company handled and in some cases this included
attendance at technical and management training courses particularly
in Britain. Despite the high cost of this form of training the
service industry firmly believed in its usefulness. The most
important practical advantage was the acquisition of specialised
skills and familiarisation with the latest models and developments in
different product lines. However, there was general consensus that
overseas training was a broadening, maturing, revitalising experience
that gave managers a new self-confidence and status. The training of




The multinational companies had given more thought and
planning to the total development of their management than any of the
other groups within the Malaysian business community. Over half the
multinational companies that appeared in the sample were in
manufacturing industry and had clearly established international
standards of quality, efficiency and overall performance. While
Chinese companies, if they were interested in training at all, were
purely concerned with the acquisition of practical technical skills,
and European companies having largely made the necessary arrangements
for technical training were beginning to consider management
training, the main concern of the multinationals was management
training. Their technical training was on the whole superbly planned
and organized and the company could draw on local, regional or
international company training centres, and managers could be
seconded to sister companies within the international framework for
specialized experience. But it was the need for management training
that the multinational companies emphasized.
There were two main aspects of management development that
seemed to concern the multinationals: first was the need to develop
the managerial skills of their staff; and second, was the need to
adapt their staff to the methods, attitudes and values of the
company, to acculturate them.
The view was expressed by many of the multinationals, as
well as by some of the European companies that while the technical
skills of their Malaysian staff were excellent, they lacked skill in
human relations. They did not know how to delegate or supervise, and
tended to be insensitive to the problems of their staff. They were
weak at operating as a member of a team and there was a marked lack
of exchange and discussion between people about their jobs. One
explanation for this was that Malaysia has been going through a
period of very rapid educational expansion which has enabled the
children of fairly humble backgrounds to gain the academic
qualifications required by multinational companies, and at the same
time the expansion of the industrial sector has meant greater
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opportunities for local graduates in what are seen to be prestigious,
remunerative positions in large European and multinational firms.
The result has been the rapid movement of people from traditional
backgrounds into the modern sector. While this situation is
particularly true of Malays, and this will be discussed in the next
chapter, it is also true of Chinese although the terms 'modern' and
'traditional' are not quite so appropriate. In the case of Chinese
managers it has been more a movement from one culture and style of
business to another. The reluctance to delegate, the deference to
authority and the preference for individual enterprize rather than
teamwork, are characteristics of Chinese business, at odds with the
management style of many multinational firms.^ The chronic
insecurity the Chinese have felt historically and that has been
aggravated by the Government's discriminatory racial balance policies
is likely to have reinforced the Chinese managers' natural
individualism and his defensive introversion.
Another problem mentioned was the limited creative input
local managers made. This tended to be put down to the educational
system which, particularly, in the Chinese schools, encouraged rote
learning, to the Asian family system which stressed obedience to
authority, and indeed to the colonial heritage which also tended to
emphasize these things.
In order to cope with these difficulties companies have
emphasized the development of managerial skills through a combination
of on the job development including job enrichment by giving
increased responsibility through in-company courses in a whole range
of management subjects but especially in human relation skills and
creative thinking, through the extensive use of external training
facilities, particularly to broaden the outlook of managers, and
through the use of overseas training (refer Tables 8.3 and 8.4).
The support multinational companies give to local training
institutions was very noticeably despite the fact that almost all
6 See Chapter 7, p. 214.
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their training could in fact have been done internally. They lent
managers to teach these courses, in the case of MIM sat on the
governing council, sent their staff to attend the courses and
generally gave a great deal of moral and practical assistance.
Another interesting point that was mentioned was the
motivation of local managers who were said to be primarily interested
in financial rewards. This is easily understood in the light of the
insecurity felt by both Chinese and Indians. Maslow's theory of
motivation asserts that the higher level needs become motivating
forces only when the lower level needs, including the need for safety
and security, are met. This attitude will, therefore, be difficult
to change during the present period of social upheaval in Malaysia.
Multinational companies take conscious steps to minimize
the cultural gap between themselves and their managers - by the
recruitment of university graduates, particularly from overseas
universities, and by the use of overseas training. Considerable
store was set by such training for many of the same reasons as the
European companies. The development of management skills and
attitudes was particularly mentioned, as was the importance of
exposure to international management thinking, and familiarization
with head office functions. It was felt it enabled the manager to
identify more closely with the aims, methods and attitudes of the
parent company and broadened his personal horizons.
The multinational companies were by far the most involved
in management development at all levels, both on the technical and
management side. (See Table 8.3). They had the expertise, resources
and commitment to provide the best possible training. (See Table
8.4). However in 1975 their training activity declined sharply which
was almost certainly related to political factors, for as large
overseas companies they are the obvious target of economic
nationalism. On the other hand they also tend to take a long term
view and appear to try far harder to take Government priorities into
consideration in their planning than do the smaller companies.
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THE USE OF TRAINING INSTITUTIONS IN MALAYSIA
This section looks at companies requirements for external
training facilities and satisfaction with the training institutions
that provide them. Companies in the survey were asked:
(1) To list all the external training courses on which they had
sent managers.
(2) To complete a Management Training Preferences Form
indicating the subject areas in which they would like to
see courses offered and the length of course most suited to
them.
(3) To make recommendations as to how the training institutions
could be improved
The two main management training institutions for the
private sector are the Malaysian Institute of Management (MIM) and
the National Productivity Centre (NPC). The NPC was established by
the ILO in 1962 and in 1966 it became an autonomous body subsidized
by the Government. Its aim is to provide training at both management
and supervisory levels and it has expanded rapidly to provide a wide
range of training courses. It is located in Petaling Jaya, at the
industrial and commercial heart of the country, but has become
increasingly active in providing courses in other industrial centres
as well as in East Malaysia. The NPC has also been ready to
collaborate with companies to arrange tailormade training programmes
and has entered the field of consultancy. It has had the advantage
of a permanent home, a Government allocated budget, and the
assistance of overseas consultants in building up its training
programme. On the other hand it has been obliged to offer civil
service salaries that have made it difficult to attract and keep the
calibre of staff it would like.
The MIM was founded in 1966 by a group of senior managers
from both the public and private sectors to provide a national
organisation for the training and development of managers in
Malaysia. It receives no Government funding and must rely for its
revenue on membership subscriptions and the income from courses. In
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1972 it was still very small with a tiny office; by 1976 it had
acquired a permanent home, a full time general manager, a training
adviser, a programmes executive, and was recruiting a small core of
training staff. It was running a wide range of training courses for
practising managers including a two year part-time Diploma in
Management and a twelve-day Basic Management Programme for management
trainees.
Besides these two, companies particularly in Johore made
occasional use of the Singapore Institute of Management (SIM). A
very few companies also made use of consultancy firms to run training
courses for them.
By 1976, interest in training had grown and there were a
number of organizations that had sprung up to meet the new demand.
These included consultancy firms such as Price Waterhouse, SGV-Kassim
Chan, and PA Management Consultants, for whom training was simply one
of their services; professional interest groups such as MAP, an
organization of past NPC participants and the Malaysian Insitute of
Personnel Management (MIPM) set up in 1975 to upgrade the profession
of personnel management; and TACK, a training firm. This list does
not cover institutions providing or organizing specialised technical
training such as the Selangor Chinese Engineering Merchant's
Association, the Plastics Association, the RRIM, or the ISP, already
mentioned. These institutions perform an extremely valuable role in
upgrading the professional and technical skills of management in
specific industries.
The use companies made of the management training bodies is
set out in Table 8.7. The larger companies, SG3 and 4, are clearly
the main customers, and in the case of MIM and the smaller training
bodies, the only users in the sample. The resistance of small
Chinese companies to external training is both reflected in these
figures and influenced by this pattern of use. Since the main
customers are the larger companies the courses tend to be geared to
their needs and will not be particularly relevant to companies in SGI
and SG2. Chinese companies queried how great an understanding a body
like MIM could have of the problems of small business when the
principal office bearers were drawn from large Westernized firms. In
Table8.7
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fact it drew both its council members and its membership from a range
of institutions in both the public and private sectors and from both
Malaysian and Western companies, however, the driving force behind
MIM has tended to be committed individuals particularly from the
multinational companies. Indeed MIM has not sought to cater for
small enterpreneurial establishments but to provide management
training for medium to large firms, and possibly even more important,
to interest senior executives in management development.
NPC is the only training organization in Malaysia offering
training to the smaller companies within the sample.^ Yet these are
the companies which need training most, in that they are not able to
provide it for themselves and they serve "as a breeding ground" for
g
developing the skills of industrial workers and entrepreneurs.
Table 8.8 presents the types of courses on which companies
sent managers. There was a very marked increase in the number of
courses attended as well as a shift in the subject areas used from
1971 to 1975. In 1971 more personnel courses were still the most
heavily used but courses in finance and control came second
particularly finance for non-financial managers.
MANAGEMENT TRAINING PREFERENCES
Companies were asked what types of management training they
would like to see provided - in what subject areas and what length of
training courses at each level of management. Table 8.9 gives their
responses in 1972. It indicates the strong demand for courses in
Personnel and Finance/Control that manifested itself in the courses
actually attended in 1975. However, Table 8.9 suggests a far greater
7 MARA also runs training for small bumiputra firms and a number
of other Government bodies offer consultancy to small industry.
But as one observer has commented, "the rather imposing and
inaccessible buildings in which these institutions are located
have discouraged all but the most audacious small industrialists
from seeking their assistance." Cheng Peng Lim, op.cit., p. 36.








































































interest in training on the part of the small companies than actually
materialized. Despite the small companies assertion that external
training was of no relevance to their businesses, quite a few were
sufficiently interested to complete the training preferences form.
Nonetheless, the factors militating against training in these
companies were still clearly very strong.
The subject areas in which companies wanted courses
provided in 1976 are given in Table 8.10. Despite the limited number
of courses in the production field attended in 1975, between 18 and
23 companies said they would like to see courses provided in a range
of production subjects for middle managers. In the field of finance
and control the response reflects the patterns of use: a large
number of companies are interested in courses in this subject for
middle to senior managers. Certain subjects such as financial
planning and investment appraisal, as well as organization and
methods are seen as being of particular use to senior managers, while
others, such as costing and cost relationships and budgetary control,
are seen to be of special interest to middle managers. Of particular
interest to the respondent companies were courses in personnel
management at the middle and senior level, in industrial relations at
the middle level, and in human relations and supervisory training at
the junior level. In the marketing sphere there is a demand for
training in profitability analysis for senior and middle managers,
and in sales training and control and forecasting for middle
managers.
For the training institutions to identify the types of
courses of interest to companies of different sizes, the data was
broken down by size group. First, it should be noticed that fewer
than half the companies in SGI and 2 completed this section of the
questionnaire. The others put 'none', 'not applicable' or simply
left a blank. Thus, the number of companies in these size groups
interested in the subjects suggested is very small indeed and it is
difficult to draw any conclusions. That said, a few slight trends
are noticeable, namely an interest in the general areas of finance
and 'control, marketing, and production. In contrast to the companies
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of the questionnaire and they are largely responsible for the
patterns already discussed.
Finally, companies were asked to list any other areas in
which they would like to see courses offered. The number of further
suggestions made indicates a remarkable interest in training and
varies from training in group dynamics to supply/distribution
systems.
Companies were asked for their preferences regarding length
of training. This data is given in Table 8.11. The most desirable
length of course both in 1972 and 1976 was felt to be 1-2 weeks,
followed on both occasions by short 2-3 day courses and evening
courses. The number of companies interested in one month courses is
striking given the cost in terms of managers' time involved. There
is a clear relationship between seniority and the preferred length of
course: short 2-3 day courses being more suited to senior managers as
against 1-2 week courses for middle and junior managers, and evening
courses, particularly at the middle and junior levels.
Table 8.11
Length of Training Preferred
Level of 2 - 3 1-2 One Three Longer Evening
Course Days Weeks Month Months
72 76 72 76 72 76 72 76 72 76 72 76
Senior 21 30 17 15 4 6 - 3 - 2 11 7
Middle 18 14 28 30 10 9 2 4 - 3 17 10
Junior 16 9 26 27 8 11 3 3 2 1 18 15
TOTAL 55 53 71 72 22 26 5 10 2 6 46 32
COMPANIES' RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING LOCAL TRAINING INSTITUTIONS
Finally, companies were asked how they thought the existing
training institutions could be improved. The considerable time and
effort companies put into responding to this question is a good
indication of the interest and concern they have in the training
currently available. Table 8.12 presents the responses given. It
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must be remembered in interpreting thes* data that the question was
completely open-ended and so each company has probably made only the
most salient suggestions. In other words, this list is not
necessarily comprehensive.
There were certain clear themes running through the
suggestions. First was a concern for relevance and practicality.
This was brought out very strongly both in 1972 and 1976. Companies
expressed a willingness to work with the training institutions to
ensure that courses were tailored to meet real needs: an offer that
should clearly be taken up by the training institutions. Implicit in
these suggestions is an acknowledgement that the training
institutions are providing a valuable service, but are out of touch
with the practical requirements of the business world. Not only is
it desirable that courses be planned in collaboration with industry
but also that there be close liaison after the course is over to see
whether there is in fact an improvement in the performance of the
participants and to use such information in the planning and design
of future courses. Another suggestion is the development and use of
local case studies to which close collaboration between training
institutions and companies could well lead. Sequential or sandwich
courses were suggested as one way of improving the practicality of
training. Chinese companies questioned the degree of understanding
bodies like MIM and NPC had of the problems of small Chinese firms.
They too urged greater collaboration between the training bodies and
local firms and urged that courses be made available in Chinese.
Second, there was criticism of the course leaders who, it was felt,
had little, if any, practical experience of industry. This was a
point raised in 1972, and is obviously difficult to correct if there
is to be a staff of permanent trainers. Few practising managers can
switch over to full time training without jeopardising their long
term career prospects and so training in Malaysia seems to be the
preserve of the university graduate or lecturer who is making his way
into industry. The solution would appear to be to make far more use
of practising managers as part-time course leaders and, given the
interest in external training expressed by companies both in the
questionnaire and during interviews, there would seem to be
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considerable potential in this area. Particularly singled out for
criticism in 1972 were visiting lecturers from abroad, who had no
understanding of local conditions. Companies repeatedly came back to
the need for immediate practical relevance and the choice of
instructors who could provide it.
Finally, companies made many suggestions dealing with
practical details. The first suggestion noted here deals with the
need for specialization among the various training institutions to
avoid wasteful competition. Already there is a tendency to
specialize. The Malayan Institute of Management is patronized by the
larger companies, the National Productivity Centre by the medium and
small companies, and Price Waterhouse is known to offer good courses
in finance. But other organizations are seeking a share of the
training market and could well undermine the existing institutions.
Other suggestions cover length, timing and level of
courses. What appears to be wanted is greater variety in the range
of courses offered with a particular demand for more short and
weekend courses. The problem of providing training for companies
outside the Kuala Lumpur - Petaling Jaya area has now begun to be
tackled. In 1976, a few day-long courses had been run in Penang and
Johore Bahru by MIPM and NPC but the response has not always been
encouraging. Companies in Penang and Port Butterworth particularly
mentioned the need for locally run courses; companies in Johore can
and do use the facilities in Singapore.
Companies were asked whether they would like to see an MBA
programme provided in Malaysia. There was general agreement that
this was neither necessary nor desirable. The Malaysian business
scene, it was felt, did not need managers with that level of academic
qualification.
Companies were also asked for their views on the Asian
Institute of Management (AIM) in the Philippines. Very few companies
had used its facilities and none expressed any enthusiasm for them.
They felt that if they were going to send their management abroad for
training they would rather send them to Europe which would introduce
them to the culture and way of thinking of their head office and/or
principals than to the Philippines which would do neither. Indeed,
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Table 8.12
Companies' Recommendations for Improving
Training Organizations (1976)
Companies' Recommendations No. of Companies
Making Recommendations
PRACTICALITY AND RELEVANCE OF COURSES
Training organizations should run courses in
consultation with companies to meet the particular
needs of their industries 7
Courses should be relevant to the particular
industries/companies of participants 6
Courses should take into consideration the particular
needs of individual participants 2
Courses should be more practical 5
More local case studies should be developed and used 6
Research work should be undertaken and form a part of
the curriculum 1
There should be more syndicate discussions rather than
a one-way flow of information 1
There should be more general courses stressing
attitudes 1
There should be more post course follow up 1
There should be a post course evaluation of
participants' performance 2
QUALITY OF COURSE LEADERS
Course leaders should have practical experience
of industry 12
Lecturers should be of higher calibre 4
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Companies' Recommendations No. of Companies
Making Recommendations
PRACTICAL DETAILS OF LEVEL, LENGTH, LOCATION, ETC
Each institution should have a specialized
curricukm to avoid overlap 1
More advanced courses should be provided for
senior managers 3
More courses should be run for junior managers 1
Participants should be of the same level of
seniority 1
There should be more short courses 4
Courses should be longer 2
There should be more evening courses 1
There should be more weekend courses 4
Courses should be run at different times
in the year (not just once a year) 1
More courses should be run outside the
main centre (E.g. in Penang, Ipoh) 1
Some courses should be run in Chinese 1
Courses should be cheaper 1
There should be more accurate description of
courses 1
even company regional training centres had not been as successful as
expected largely owing to the strong sense of nationalism in the
countries of the region.
While the amount of training carried out overall had
dropped slightly between 1971 and 1975, the activities of the
training institutions had increased many times and the quality of
their courses had improved. However they are still little known and
even less used by the small local companies, for whom the need for
training is great. As Chinese companies enter the export market they
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are becoming increasingly aware of the organizational and
professional gap between them and their competitors. They need
specific, problem oriented training and NPC is in a particularly good
position to meet this need. Among larger companies there is still a
need for top management to be convinced of the importance of
training, for only then will it be given the degree of priority it




RACIAL BALANCE IN MANAGEMENT
RACIAL BALANCE - THE CHALLENGE AND THE PROBLEMS
Attainment of the targets set by the NEP in management
present the most serious challenge to management development in the
private sector. From the relatively small base of 11 per cent of
management positions in 1971, Malays are expected to expand and hold
at least 30 per cent of management posts, in all sectors and at all
levels, by 1990. Indeed, there is considerable uncertainty about the
figure of 30 per cent, at one period companies were being persuaded
to aim for 40 per cent Malay managers and if the Government insists
that the target should be attainment of the same racial composition
in management as in the population at large, it would be 55 per cent.
Problems related to the restructuring of the management
cadre are legion and most of the companies interviewed talked at
length about them. The first and most pressing problem, particularly
in 1972, and to a slightly lesser extent in 1976, was the small
number of Malays available for management, especially Malays with the
appropriate educational and professional background. The NEP was
brought in with the SMP in 1971 at a time when the University of
Malaya was the only local university producing graduates, and the
demand for Malays, therefore, very rapidly exceeded the supply.
Malays who received a higher education were almost all on
scholarships that bonded them to serve the Government, and the few
that were free to choose still tended to prefer Government
employment - the traditionally prestigious, secure employment of
educated Malays - eschewing the riskier dirtier jobs within the
private sector. Malays at this time had a strong preference for Arts
subjects and the numbers training in such fields as engineering,
chemistry and pharmacology were very small. By 1976, graduates were
coming from the new universities and the number of Malays going
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through university had increased dramatically. Nonetheless, there
were still areas of acute shortage of trained Malays, aggravated by
the very rapid expansion of the public sector."^
A second problem was that of availability of positions
within companies. Many European and multinational companies had been
in Malaysia since the early sixties, and some of them a great deal
longer. They had, therefore, Malaysianized their staff filling posts
formerly held by expatriates with Chinese, and to a lesser extent,
Indian Malaysians who were usually young and able. This left very
little opportunity to recruit Malays into management other than
through expansion or wastage.
In 1972 rapid expansion did not appear likely, although in
fact 1973 and early 74 were boom years, and the status and salary
levels offered especially by multinational companies meant there was
little staff turnover. In 1972 companies were very unsure how they
could meet the Government's target, in 1976 they were less worried,
although they had just been through the 1975 recession and were
doubtful if growth would return to its 1973 levels. The recession
itself had forced companies to tighten their belts and distracted
them somewhat from what was perceived as the less essential and
rather costly task of restructuring their management.
The pressure placed on companies by the NEP and by the
Government particularly in 1975-76, created a considerable demand for
Malays suitable for management at a time when the supply of able
candidates was very limited. This naturally forced the price up and
Malays were asking for a higher salary, more senior position and more
prestige than their non-Malay counterparts. This created problems
for companies reluctant to discriminate in favour of one group at the
expense of existing staff. Nonetheless many companies were forced to
succumb to the demands of the labour market and began offering Malays
1 The TMP states, "Given the shortage of skilled and experienced
personnel, the rapid expansion of manpower in the public sector
has perforce led to some fall in productivity due to the
recruitment of relatively inexperienced staff and lack of proper
supervision." TMP. p. 42, para. 156.
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a premium. While such salaries were kept strictly confidential,
non-Malay staff inevitably knew, especially when it came to favouring
Malays in promotion (the target being 30 per cent "at all levels".)
This was bad for staff morale and in one case that was reported in a
bank, the staff tried to sabotage the accounts. Malays who took
advantage of the market position were labelled opportunists,
exploiting their position and having no company loyalty. The fact
that as businessmen any of the senior executives would probably have
acted similarly in that situation was ignored by all but the very
few.
Besides raising the price, the increase in demand for
Malays, and especially for Malays who had already proven their
ability in the private sector, resulted in a high turnover of Malay
staff and a good deal of inter-company poaching. The worst offenders
were Government and quasi-Government bodies, especially when the
Government was entering the private sector and wanted a Malay with
private sector experience to run the company. This was bitterly
resented by companies which had invested a good deal of time, money
and effort to develop a Malay manager for promotion, only to have him
lured away. Indeed, some companies felt that Malays only used
private sector posts to work their way into Government employment at
a senior level. They came to see Malays as a bad risk because they
required extra training yet as soon as they were trained they were
snapped up by another company or a Government body. In one company,
of 12 Malays recruited over a three year period 8 had left, most
going to Government. This problem, mentioned in 1972, had become
considerably worse by 1976 as Government pressure on companies to
recruit Malays was stepped up, and as the number of parastatal bodies
and Government sponsored companies requiring able and experienced
Malaysalso increased.
Given the demand for Malays, the small proportion who had
in the past had access to a university education or professional
training, and the very recent expansion of university places for
Malays, it is not surprising that most of the Malays coming forward
as management recruits were very young and inexperienced.
Remembering that the quality of education provided in Malay
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secondary schools was poor and that universities were encouraged to
take in Malays with minimum qualifications rather than select
2
students purely on merit, it is clear that the educational standard
of the Malay recruit was also weak. Yet companies were obliged not
only to recruit such staff but to develop them rapidly for promotion.
For many companies the time and effort involved in such an
exercise, combined with the likelihood of their being poached if they
proved able, was an unacceptable expense. Parts of Malaysian
3
industry have an overabundance of competing companies and this has
meant profit margins are at a minimum with a consequent reluctance to
take on staff who cannot pull their weight immediately. Even within
those companies that have taken on Malays there has been a tendency
to put them into non-priority areas such as personnel or public
relations.
Smaller companies simply cannot afford the salaries Malays
now command (see Table 9.1). Indeed in restructuring the racial
balance of their management only the large multinationals can offer
the level of salary and status Malays are in a position to demand and
those who have done worst are the small Chinese and Indian companies
who can offer neither.
Besides these problems related to the supply and demand for
Malay managers, there is the very major problem of the suitability of
Malays for management in the private sector. Prior to the NEP, when
companies were able to choose their management on the strict
criterion of the best man for the job there were very few Malays in
management. Companies tended to choose Chinese and Indians who had
an orientation towards business, attitudes towards hard work and
efficiency that suited business, and the necessary professional or
technical training required. While it can be argued that for
historical reasons such candidates had an unfair advantage in
education and that the current measures to close the educational gap
between Malays and non-Malays should rectify this, it will not
necessarily make Malays better suited attitudinally to business.
2 See Chapter 4, p. 122.
3 See Chapter 5, p. 168.
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Malays have no tradition of commerce and the values and attitudes of
Malays, as has been shown, are supportive of a rural peasant society
rather than an urban industrial one. The very rapid expansion of
education has enabled increasing numbers of village Malays to acquire
a higher education and to aspire to a prominent position in
Government or industry but it has not substantially changed their
attitudes. Indeed, in some ways Government policy, while solving one
half of the problem the lack of higher education among Malays has
prevented any change in village values by making the attainment of
that education relatively easy.
By adjusting entrance standards, providing scholarships to
virtually all Malays with the qualifications to enter higher
education, and by creating a seller's job market, it has virtually
eliminated the need for Malays to compete. Companies repeatedly
complained that Malays were not technically or commercially oriented.
They lacked a commercial or industrial consciousness, a business
sense and they also seemed to lack the motivation to succeed in
business (which sounds similar to McClelland's need for achievement.)
According to a Chinese businessman there are four virtues - 1)
integrity or trustworthiness, 2) thrift, 3) loyalty, and 4) diligence
if Malays could be taught these four virtues they could succeed,
without them no amount of training will help.
The Government has also continued to make employment in the
Civil Service a desirable, usually the most desirable, option for
qualified Malays by the proliferation of Government and
quasi-Government bodies. As one businessman put it, "Malays prefer
to go into politics and run the country rather than go into business
and be run by others". As another pointed out, the shortage of
qualified Malays is an artificial one created by the plethora of
Government bodies which absorb a large proportion of Malay graduates.
However, if it is true and at present there is no proof of this, that
Malays are low in need for achievement, it may be that they are best
suited to administrative work such as the Civil Service, for
McClelland found no correlation between need for achievement and
success in administration. This may also be an explanation of why
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Malays have done well in multinational companies in which a manager's
role is likely to include a considerably larger administrative
element than in smaller entrepreneurial establishments, and one of
the reasons why they are least suited to sales and marketing which,
according to McClelland's work correlates with a high need for
achievement. Between 1971 and 1975 the attitude of companies towards
Malays in management seems to have changed and there appeared to be a
greater awareness of the role Malays could play within the management
team. Characteristically the Chinese manager is an individualist
which makes him ideally suited to the role of entrepreneur in which
he has excelled to a high degree. It was suggested that Malay
society is more group oriented and that, given suitable training and
development, Malays may excel in the team approach to management
which characterizes the larger corporate structures.
While part of the problem underlying the shortage of Malay
managers lay with Malays themselves, with their historical position,
and their job preferences, the attitudes of companies has not always
been very helpful and Malays have had some very negative stereotypes
to live down. Of the companies in the sample only one - a
multinational - actively sought to develop a racially balanced
management long before the NEP. As a result they had a strikingly
favourable racial balance with some very able Malay managers. In
1972 there was considerable reluctance on the part of many companies
to succumb to Government pressures to employ Malays, especially in
those industries where it was most difficult because of the nature of
the business, the technical requirements of the job, or the extreme
competitiveness of the industry. And indeed at that time the main
targets of the Government were the larger companies, which anyway
tend to be more co-operative towards Government. By 1976, the
Government had succeeded, in particular through the ICA, in putting
pressure on virtually the entire private sector.
It has, therefore, become imperative to tackle and to
overcome the problems of rapidly developing a cadre of Malay
managers. It is a challenge that will test the resources and skills
of the business community to the full, a challenge that the larger
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companies are in the best position and have the most reason to meet
and overcome.
RACIAL BALANCE IN MANAGEMENT EMPLOYMENT
Turning now to the degree of racial balance achieved,
Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 present the figures by size group, industry
and business community.
Table 9.1 shows the racial balance in the different size
groups. Right across the board there has been a dramatic increase in
the number of Malay managers employed - an increase of 103 per cent
in SG4 and 121 per cent in SG3. (The base for growth in SG2 and 1 is
so small that percentages are meaningless.) These increases brought
about a striking change in the racial composition of the management
cadre, particularly in SG4 where the numbers of Malays have increased
from 13 per cent of the management cadre to 20 per cent. In SG3, the
increase has been from 9 per cent to 13 per cent; in SG2 from 2 per
cent to 9 per cent; and in SGI, from 1 per cent to 7 per cent. It is
noteworthy that the smaller companies have begun to improve their
racial balance. Their management cadres are small, and the salaries
and work environments they offer are rarely so attractive as those in
larger companies, yet there has been an increase both in the number
of Malays employed, and the number of companies employing Malays.
Although the figures are small it must be remembered that only a 5
per cent sample of SGI was taken and so across the entire business
community these figures would be much larger. Nonetheless, even
grossed up for the universe, the small companies employ fewer than 50
per cent of Malays employed by the 28 companies in SG4.
Amongst the other racial groups, the employment of Chinese
has increased both in real and relative terms (except in SG2 and 1
where the proportion of managers who were Chinese dropped slightly);
the proportion of Indians employed remained fairly static and the
employment of 'Others' - largely Europeans or other
expatriates - dropped sharply both in absolute and relative terms.
That is, the gains made by Malays have for the most part been at the
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Table 9.1
Racial Balance in Management - By Size Group
SG4 SG3 SG2 SGI TOTAL
n=28 n=19 n=13 n=23 N=83
No. of Malay Managers
1971 232 63 2 1 298
1975 472 139 12 11 634
% Increase 103% 121% 7\ 113%
>f Chinese Managers
1971 979 442 88 99 1608
1975 1285 716 95 140 2236
% Increase 31% 62% 8% 41% 39%
No. of Indian Managers
1971 223 51 11 3 288
1975 275 76 16 2 369
% Increase 23% 49% 45% -33% 28%
No. of Other Managers
1971 400 171 10 5 586
1975 314 110 9 2 43S"
% Increase -22% -36% -10% -60% -26%
% of Managers in 1971
who were
Malay 13% 9% 2% 1% 11%
Chinese 53% 61% 79% 92% 58%
Indian 12% 7% 10% 3% 10%
Other 22% 23% 9% 4% 21%
% of Managers in 1975
who were
Malay 20% 13% 9% 7% 17%
Chinese 55% 69% 72% 91% 61%
Indian 12% 7% 12% 1% 10%
Other 13% 11% 7% 1% 12%
No. of Companies with
no Malay Managers
(% in brackets) 1971 9 (32%) 6 (32%) 11 (85%) 22 (96%) 48 (57%)
1975 7 (25%) 3 (16%) 8 (62%) 18 (78%) 32 (39%)
* The base for growth in SG2 and SGI is so small that percentages are
meaningless.
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expense of expatriates, posts the country has long been committed to
Malaysianize.
Table 9.2 gives a racial breakdown of the managerial cadre
in the industrial sectors. The service industry has particular
difficulty in correcting racial balance because its wholesale and
retail trade is dominated by the Chinese and consequently Chinese is
the business language. One agency insisted that its Malay staff
learn a Chinese dialect in order to be able to function in the
industry. Agency houses tended to feel that they were out of favour
with the Government and so not only would Malays find it difficult to
cope with the sales and marketing side of their activities, but they
would prefer not to be associated with them in general. Despite
these protestations it is the service industry that has shown the
most dramatic increase in employment of Malay managers - an increase
of 196 per cent, putting it on a par with the other two industrial
groups.
In the extractive industries 33 per cent of managers in
1971 and 22 per cent in 1975 were categorized as "Other", the great
majority of these being Europeans; there is a relatively small
proportion of Chinese in management - 37 per cent in 1971 and 43 per
cent in 1975; and a rather high proportion of Indians - 18 per cent
in both years. Given the accepted policy of gradually phasing out
non-Malaysian staff, in the extractive industries there is
considerable scope to recruit and develop Malay managerial staff.
Mining companies, like manufacturing companies, face the problem of
the shortage of Malays with the requisite qualifications. However
some planting companies enjoyed considerable success with Malay
managers who seemed at home on estates and were particularly good at
handling labour. It was also suggested that Malays preferred the
strong, paternalistic structure such companies often provide.
However, the industry is handicapped in correcting its racial balance
by its very low rate of growth.
Turning to Table 9.3 the racial balance in the
multinational companies is markedly better than that in any of the
other communities, this being for the reasons already mentioned. The
European business community is not far behind with 17 per cent Malays
in 1975 and had increased its proportion of Malays by 132 per cent
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Table 9.2
Racial Balance - By Industry
Extractive Manufacturing Service
n = 12 n = 22 n = 49
No. of Malay Managers
1971 123 79 96
1975 199 151 284
% Increase 62% 91% 196%
% of Managers in 1971
Malay 12% 12% 9%
Chinese 37% 68% 72%
Indian 18% 5% 6%
Other 33% 15% 13%
% of Managers in 1975
Malay 17% 17% 18%
Chinese 43% 68% 70%
Indian 18% 6% 6%
Other 22% 9% 6%
No. of Companies with
no Malay Managers
(% in brackets) 1971 4 (33%) 13 (59%) 31 (63%)
1975 4 (33%) 9 (41%) 22 (45%)
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Table 9.3
Racial Balance - By Business Community
Chinese European Multinational
n = 39 n = 26 n = 14
No. of Malay Managers
1971 12 148 132
1975 30 344 250
% Increase 150% 132% 89%
% of Managers in 1971
Malay 4% 10% 15%
Chinese 95% co 61%
Indian 0% 13% 8%
Other 1% 29% 15%
% of Managers in 1975
Malay 7% 17% 22%
Chinese 90% 56% 59%
Indian 1% 12% 8%
Other 2% 14% 10%
No. of Companies with
no Malay Managers
(% in brackets) 1971 34
1975 30
(87%) 8 (31%) 3 (21%)
(77%) 2 ( 8%) 1 ( 11)
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between 1971-75. These two groups of companies have been subject to
a good deal of Government pressure and as a result by 1975 all but 2
European companies and 1 multinational - a very small buying
office - had Malay managers on their staff.
Chinese companies were in a very different position. In
1971, 95 per cent of their management was Chinese and only 4 per cent
Malay. Despite a high proportional growth in the number of Malay
managers between 1971-75, growth was from such a small base that it
only brought the proportion of Malay managers up to 7 per cent. The
vast majority of Chinese companies in the sample - 87 per cent in
1971 and 77 per cent in 1975 - employed no Malay managers at all.
The small number of Indian companies in the sample reflected a very
similar situation. Most of the Chinese and Indian companies are
family firms operating in industries dominated by a specific clan.
They conduct business and keep their books in Chinese or Tamil, and
in Chinese firms managers often only speak Chinese and a little
bazaar Malay. It is, therefore, extremely difficult to integrate any
outsider, let alone a person from a different race into such a
company. In a family firm the financial well-being of the family is
at stake and it was unthinkable for anyone outside the family to be
given managerial responsibility. A large number of the Chinese
companies in the service industry were rubber traders and they felt
such large sums of money were involved they could not risk putting
them in the hands of a Malay. A further explanation given was that
Chinese business depends upon the relationship and friendship of the
businessmen involved and this makes it impossible for a Malay to come
in. On the other hand it is this closed cliquish attitude that is so
frustrating to Malays and which has led the Government to reserve
large slices of small scale commerce and industry for them. Chinese
companies felt Malays would not want to join them and since most
Malays with ability went on to university they were too expensive and
over-educated for a Chinese company. Basically they did not want
Malays in their companies, they did not trust them and did not
believe they had the business ability or the capacity for hard work
required, but most of all they did not want an outsider, someone from
another race in their companies. The cultural gap between Chinese
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and Malay is very large and is reinforced by religious and related
dietary differences. However, an aspect of the Chinese companies'
unwillingness to employ Malay managers was their resentment of a
Malay dominated Government interfering in the running of their small
family businesses. There was also the feeling that should they
employ a Malay and he did not turn out well it would be very
difficult to get rid of him.
There were a few Chinese companies with a more flexible
attitude - 5 in 1971 and 9 in 1975 in the sample - and these were
generally companies that were relatively large and had already opened
their management to professional, non-family managers. Even so they
found it difficult to compete with the European and Multinational
firms for the services of Malays.
RECRUITMENT OF MALAYS
In the past Malays who met the minimum requirements for a
job were passed over for better-qualified non-Malays. One company
reported that 70 per cent of job applications were from Chinese and
30 per cent from Malays, another that of 200 applicants for a post
less than 10 per cent were among Malays, and a third that on
advertising for management trainees among 200 applications, only one
was from a Malay. It is not surprising given these sorts of figures
that Malays found it difficult to compete with non-Malays. However,
the NEP has changed that and Malay applicants now tend to be
considered very carefully. Indeed companies find it so difficult to
attract able Malays that the more successful companies use personal
contacts a great deal and have developed close contacts with ITM and
the University of Malaya. Many of these companies offer scholarships
to Malays in disciplines appropriate to their industry with an
informal agreement the holder will join the company on graduation.
In the planting and mining industries scholarships are offered on an
industry wide basis and some companies also offer their own
scholarships. The personnel manager of one company visits Malay
schools to try and persuade pupils to accept company scholarships;
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and one of the Chinese companies writes personally to all Malay
pupils graduating from vocational schools to try and interest them in
employment in the company.
A number of companies have reexamined their job
specifications to determine the essential requirements in order to
consider all Malay candidates with the basic minimum. Most
companies had needed to lower their entrance requirements to bring
Malays in, on the understanding that they would then train them up to
a point where they could compete successfully with non-Malays. Some
of the larger companies took in Malay trainees surplus to their
immediate requirements knowing that they would lose a number during
the training period. However, this is obviously a costly approach
and other companies preferred to take Malays with some training and
experience and also pursued a company policy of poaching Malays.
This sort of situation suggests a need for a Government subsidy to
encourage training, especially since the training of Malay managers
is clearly part of Government policy. Not only do companies bend
over backwards to recruit Malay managers, but also a number of
companies mentioned that they made concessions in interviewing Malay
candidates, appreciating that Malays may not interview well and may
need time to develop. Generally speaking the large European and
multinational companies were most successful in recruiting Malays and
had achieved this by taking a very flexible, tolerant approach.
Table 9.4 presents the sources of Malay recruitment
analyzed by size group. This has increased in the case of SG4 by 167
per cent and the proportion of Malay recruits has risen from 19 per
cent in 1971 to 37 per cent in 1975. Though not quite so dramatic
similar increases have taken place in SG3. In SG3 the total number
of Malay managers has grown to the extent that the 41 Malay managers
recruited in 1975 represent 29 per cent of Malay managers employed
whereas the 26 recruited in 1971 represented 41 per cent. Here again
the figures for SG2 and 1 are so small that it is impossible to draw
4 This approach reflects the attitude articulated in the Campus


































































































































any conclusions except to note a marginal increase in Malay
recruitment.
In 1971, the principal source of Malay recruitment in SG4
was promotion from non-managerial grades, and in SG3, technical
college, usually Serdang or ITM. In 1975 the companies in SG4 drew
45 per cent of their Malay recruits either from university or
technical college; another 45 per cent were recruited as experienced
managers either from the public or private sector. In SG3
recruitment from the public and private sectors accounted for 61 per
cent of Malay recruitment in 1975. This practice of poaching Malay
managers from other companies or from the government was the subject
of frequent comment by the companies interviewed. In 1971 many
companies complained that virtually all Malay university graduates
were bonded to the Government and that this made it particularly
difficult for the private sector to improve its racial balance. This
is reflected in the relatively small proportion of Malays recruited
from university in 1971. However, by 1975 not only had bonding
ceased to be a serious problem, but companies were attracting Malays
from the public sector. Despite the continued complaint that there
is a shortage of Malays in certain specialist fields there does not
appear to be an acute shortage of qualified Malays overall and the
increased future output from the universities should ease the
situation still further.
The industry recruitment figures in Table 9.5 indicate that
the extractive industries have been recruiting relatively high
proportions of Malays - 23 per cent of all recruits were Malay in
1971 and 34 per cent in 1975. These principally came from technical
college or university which accounted for 41 per cent of recruits in
1975. In both the tin and rubber industries, professional
qualifications are considered important and in the agricultural
sphere the industry is well catered for. The same cannot be said of
the tin industry which still has to rely heavily on overseas training
institutions. The other two main sources of recruitment are the
public and private sectors. A number of companies mentioned they
were recruiting Malays with military or police backgrounds and these
recruits had proved very successful.
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Table 9.5
Malay Recruitment - By Industry
Extractive Manufacturing Service
1971 1975 1971 1975 1971 1975
Total Recruitment 119 136 95 126 181 277
Malay Recruitment
Non-Managerial Grades 1 2 5 10 10 5
Private Sector 4 12 3 5 2 31
Public Sector 7 13 1 10 8 14
School 0 0 0 0 0 0
Technical College 13 9 0 1 5 15
University 2 10 7 15 3 18
TOTAL 27 46 16 41 28 83
Racial Breakdown of
Recruitment
Malay 23% 34% 17% 32% 16% 30%
Chinese 61% 43% 72% 66% 79% 62%
Indian 13% 21% 6% 2% 2% 7%
Other 3% 2% 5% 0 3% 1%
Malay Recruits as % of
Malay Managers 22% 23% 20% ^7% 29% 29%
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In the service and manufacturing industries the proportion
of Malay recruits is in roughly the same proportions: 16 per cent and
17 per cent in 1971 and 30 per cent and 32 per cent in 1975. In the
service industries there is a very marked trend towards recruiting
Malays from other companies in the private sector: this accounted for
only 2 out of 28 recruits in 1971, but 31 out of 83 in 1975.
Recruitment from university also increased substantially and the
largest single source of Malay recruitment in the manufacturing
industry was university which accounted for a third of recruitment in
1975. This probably is less a reflection of companies' insistence on
a university training and more an indication of the fact that almost
all Malays with any ability now have the opportunity to go to
university.
Looking at recruitment by business community the reason for
the very favourable racial balance in the multinational companies
becomes clear - by 1975 49 per cent of their recruits were Malay, a
far higher proportion than in either of the other business
communities and a sharp increase on their 1971 proportion of 23 per
cent. In numerical terms foreign companies have recruited most
Malays; however, their total recruitment is so large that the
proportion this forms is markedly smaller than that in the
multinationals. Nonetheless the trend in both groups is towards a
considerably increased recruitment of Malay managers. The Chinese
companies have not increased the flow of Malays into management
proportionately and numbers are still very small.
Another marked difference between the multinational and
foreign companies is that the former recruited a large proportion of
their Malays directly from university while the latter preferred to
poach from the private sector. This is indicative of the different
attitudes of companies in these two groups - the multinational
companies preferring to develop staff in their own particular modes
of operation and preferring to take the long view of staff
development, while the foreign companies want experienced men who can
make an immediate contribution to the running of the firm.
Companies were asked their opinion of sources of Malay
recruitment. Most of these have already been covered in the
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Table 9.6
Malay Recruitment - By Business Community
Chinese European Multinational
1971 1975 1971 1975 1971 1975
Total Recruitment 25 55 233 314 127 132
Malay Recruitment
Non-Managerial Grades 1 2 4 4 10 8
Private Sector 2 2 4 35 3 1 1
Public Sector 0 1 9 22 7 12
School 0 0 0 0 0 0
Technical College 0 1 18 18 0 6
University 0 0 2 12 9 28
TOTAL 3 6 37 91 29 65
Racial Breakdown of
Recruitment
Malay 12% 1 1% 16% 29% 23% 49%
Chinese 88% 89% 71% 57% 69% 42%
Indian 0% 0% 9% 12% 4% 7%
Other 0% 0% 4% 2% 4% 2%
Malay Recruits as % of
Malay Managers 25% 20% 25% 26% 22% 26%
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discussion of overall recruitment in Chapter 7, however the Institiut
Teknoloji Mara (ITM) and the Universiti Kebangsaan are exceptions.
ITM was established to offer commercial and industrial training
exclusively to bumiputras, particularly from rural areas. It
provides training in English at subprofessional and professional
level and clearly identifies itself as a polytechnic rather than a
university. The overall reaction of the business community to ITM
was a fairly negative one. Criticism was related to the concept of
ITM itself, to the quality and relevance of the training students
received and to their job aspirations. It was felt that to bring
rural Malays into a protected all-Malay environment such as ITM
offers, was a poor preparation for business life. As one businessman
put it "ITM takes very immature, inexperienced and ill-educated
kampong children and keeps them closeted together, as a result they
remain so". ITM did not begin to tackle the attitudinal problems of
rural Malays vis a vis industry but provided an environment in which
village values could be sustained. The quality of the training
students received was generally considered weak and academic
standards were considered to be falling owing to official pressure to
qualify as many students as possible. There were, however, some
notable exceptions: students who sat for overseas examinations rather
than the ITM diploma were found to have a higher standard of
attainment and a better command of English. The Diploma in Business
Studies was mentioned as offering a relevant training. The
three-year Diploma Course in Planting Industry Management run in
Perlis was said to provide an excellent programme of theory and
practice closely related to the needs of the planting industry. This
was particularly the case in 1972, when ITM, led by an exceptionally
able director, had developed close links with the industry. By 1976
the departure of the previous director had led to a relaxing of these
relations and the industry was less enthusiastic about the course.
However it was the aspirations of students in relation to
their training that was the main target of criticism. It was said,
students at ITM were led to expect employment as management staff on
high salaries but since they were not of the calibre of university
students, and had no practical experience to compensate for this,
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companies found such aspirations unrealistic. If ITM graduates were
appointed as management trainees they required considerable further
training from the company, but were not considered to have top
management potential and had established a reputation for not staying
long with any company. They were therefore considered a bad risk.
The most able graduates of ITM were often sent overseas to study for
a university degree or were snapped up by the Government, which
tended to leave the weaker students for the private sector. Yet the
shortage of staff at supervisory level was frequently mentioned and
ITM, as a polytechnic, would have appeared to be well suited to cater
to this need. The problem seems to have been that the shortage of
Malay candidates for management at a time when the Government was
putting considerable pressure on companies to improve their racial
balance obliged companies to recruit ITM graduates into management
and not being of university calibre companies were later dissatisfied
with them. This situation is likely to change with the very large
numbers of Malay university graduates coming onto the labour market
when ITM graduates can be employed at the level for which they have
been trained.
A recent addition to the range of courses offered at ITM
is its Programme for Executive Development (PED), a three-month
programme designed to orient new Malay university graduates to the
needs of industry. The cost of the programme was fully underwritten
by the private sector and practicing managers were brought in to
address the students. However, its main value was probably more the
opportunity it gave companies that supported the programme to recruit
Malay graduates rather than any major improvement in students'
preparation for business. One of ITM's major problems was a very
young inexperienced teaching staff, and a high staff turnover.
During a period of strong demand for Malay graduates it was difficult
to keep Malay staff at establishments, such as NPC and ITM, geared
towards the needs of industry. Yet ITM had a substantial staff
training fund and could draw on funds from the Public Services
Department and MARA which enabled it to send roughly 20 members of
staff a year abroad to receive further training who were then bonded
to ITM for 5 years after completing their studies.
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The Universiti Kebangsaan, although not restricted to
Malays, through its exclusive use of the Malay language as the medium
of instructions attracted an almost exclusively Malay student
body - in 1975 93 per cent of its 2,502 students were Malay. Its
faculties included a Faculty of Economics and Management established
in 1974, consequently there had been no graduates of the programme at
the time of the study. The Faculty was divided into six departments:
Analytical Economics, Economic Development and Planning, Agriculture
and Resource Economics, Business Management, Accounting, and
Statistical and Quantitative Analysis. In 1975 the Faculty already
had 385 students and a staff of 30 academics and 24 tutors, and this
number was expected to have almost trebled by 1980. It was thus
geared to make an important contribution towards improving the supply
of qualified Malays into management. As in any new university the
Faculty of Economics and Management faced a number of problems, and
one of the main problems mentioned was that of language. The vast
majority of books on management and economics are in English, indeed
of the 273 texts that were suggested reading for faculty courses in
1975/76, only 14 or 5 per cent, were in Malay. Yet the language of
instruction is Malay, and a pass in English is not an entrance
requirement for the university, although a number of departments were
giving extra instruction in English to try and improve the standards
of their students. The low standard of English made the arrangement
of industrial placements for students in their third and fourth years
difficult. A graduate of the Universiti Kebangsaan with virtually no
exposure to a non-Malay environment and with limited English was not
likely to meet the needs of the private sector.
TRAINING OF MALAYS
Most large companies took the training of Malays very
seriously, indeed if they were to attain the racial balance target it
was essential to the well-being of the company that its Malay
managers were as effective as possible. A common hypothesis
5 TMP. p. 401, Table 22-7.
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amongst such companies was that for cultural reasons Malays were late
developers and required a longer period of training before they could
compete on equal terms with non-Malays. Most Malays came from
underprivileged backgrounds and encountered considerable culture
shock when they entered business, a problem accentuated by the fact
that business was predominantly Chinese. Consequently, those
companies had developed special extended bumiputra training
procedures. These varied in their approach; one aimed to give
trainees an overall picture of the functioning of the company by
rotating them through different divisions, another assigned
bumiputras to subsidiaries for a six month training and probation
period, and yet another extended its usual two year training for new
recruits to three to four years for Malays, giving them a lighter
work load.
Having completed this training period Malay recruits were
then expected to compete on a par with others. However by 1975, this
assumption was being questioned: extended training was found to lead
to frustration since the trainee was removed from the responsibility
of actually doing a job. On the job development was found to be far
preferable.
Although in SG4 the total number of managers trained
declined between 1971 and 1975, the number of Malays trained
increased from 126 to 153 and the proportion of managers trained who
were Malay increased from 18 per cent to 27 per cent. In SG3 the
number trained rose from 18 to 35 and this represented 14 per cent
and 22 per cent of managers trained in 1971 and 1975, respectively.
However this was during a period in which the number of Malay
managers had risen sharply and where the proportion of Malays trained
in relation to the total number of Malay managers declined from 54
per cent to 32 per cent in SG4 and from 29 per cent to 25 per cent in
SG3. Nontheless, it should be borne in mind that there was a higher
proportion of Malays trained than there were Malays in the management
cadre.
When training Malays companies in SG4 preferred on the job
training and in-company courses in 1971; in 1975, extensive use was
also made of external courses. SG3 shows a similar swing to using
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Table 9.7
Training of Malays - By Size Group
SG4 SG3 SG2 SGI
1971 1975 1971 1975 1971 1975 1971 1975
Total No. of
Managers Trained 694 567 132 160 19 32 12 17
Malays Trained*
On-the-Job 54 50 14 13 0 4 0 0
In-Company Courses 58 51 0 8 0 1 0 0
External Courses 22 60 2 14 0 2 0 0
Overseas Training 17 20 2 5 0 0 0 0
Total 126 153 18 35 0 5 0 1
% of Managers Trained
who were Malay 18% 27% 14% 22% 0 16% 0 6%
% of all Malay
Managers Trained 54% 32% 29% 25% 0 42% 0 9%
* ncte 3.|, p.jll-.
external courses in 1975. Overseas training was mentioned as being
particularly beneficial for Malays because it got them away from
village attitudes, however the figures suggest that companies may be
reluctant to use this in developing Malay managers: 15 per cent of
the managers trained by SG4 in 1971 were sent on overseas training
while the figure for Malays was 13 per cent; in 1975, 16 per cent of
managers trained went on overseas training but only 13 per cent of
Malays. In SG3, the comparable figures were 17 per cent of managers
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in 1971 and 11 per cent of Malays, and 24 per cent of managers in
1975 and 14 per cent of Malays. The differences are small,
particularly in SG4, but they may suggest a possible reluctance on
the part of some companies to invest a great deal in training Malays
during a period of high mobility amongst Malay managers.
Looking at the figures by industry the service sector shows
an increase in the numbers of Malay managers trained from 52 in 1971
to 99 in 1975. This represents an increase from 18 per cent to 28
per cent in the proportion of Malay managers trained. Nonetheless
the proportion of Malays on management staffs who underwent training
declined. In manufacturing industry the overall decline in training
was not matched by a decline in the number of Malays trained.
Roughly the same number of Malays were trained in 1975 as in 1971 but
in 1971 this represented 15 per cent of those trained and in 1975, 28
per cent. However, because the number of Malay managers had
increased considerably by 1975, the proportion of Malay managers
trained declined substantially from 68 per cent in 1971 to 39 per
cent in 1975. A roughly similar picture is to be found in the
extractive industries.
As far as training methods go, the recent tendency already
noted, of making extensive use of external courses is evident in the
service and manufacturing industries, although not in the extractive
industries. Nevertheless, the service and manufacturing industries
do still make use of in-company courses and,to a lesser extent, on
the job training. The extractive industries continue to rely very
heavily on on the job training.
The superior performance of the multinational companies in
the racial balance sphere is also maintained in training. (Table
9.9). Although the proportion of managers trained who were Malay is
not exceptionally high amongst these multinational companies it is
higher than in either of the other two groups and accounts for a very
high proportion of the Malay managers employed: a remarkable 70 per
cent in 1971 and 43 per cent in 1975. Among the foreign companies
the proportion of Malays undergoing training in 1971 was 34 per cent
and that has dropped to 23 per cent. The emphasis these companies
place on recruiting experienced managers to avoid some of the
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Table 9.8
Training of Malays - By Industry
Extractive Manufacturing Service
1971 1975 1971 1975 1971 1975
Total No. of
Managers Trained 211 191 361 210 284 378
Malays Trained*
On-the-Job 23 23 13 15 32 28
In-Company Courses 6 8 37 17 15 35
External Courses 5 8 8 19 11 40
Overseas Training 4 1 8 8 7 16
Total 38 36 54 59 52 99
% of Managers Trained
who were Malay 18% 19% 15% 28% 18% 26%
% of all Malay
Managers Trained 31% 18% 68% 39% 54% 35%
ftf Mte "Table. fl.t
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Table 9.9
Training of Malays - By Business Community
Chinese Foreign Multinational
1971 1975 1971 1975 1971 1975
Total No. of
Managers Trained 46 43 339 363 427 344
Malays Trained *
On-the 'Job 2 2 34 40 31 20
In-Company Courses 0 0 1 1 12 47 48
External Courses 1 4 7 31 16 30
Overseas Training 1 0 5 12 13 13
>tal 4 6 52 83 87 98
% of Managers Trained
who were Malay 7^ \W%> 15% 23% 20% 28%
% of all Malay
Managers Trained 33% 20% 34% 23% 70% 43%
Kot^ Uu t-i, p.za
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training costs is partially illustrated if one notes that, in 1975,
95 Malays were recruited but a total of only 83, trained.
When considering the position in regard to
Chinese companies one is again dealing with very small numbers. Few
managers were trained and since Malays make up such a small
proportion of the management cadre they formed a very small
proportion indeed of those trained.
Turning to the methods of training used, the multinational
companies show a preference for in-house training either on the job
or through in-company courses, although the use of external courses
increased between 1971 and 1975. The foreign companies prefer a
combination of on the job training and external courses. Relatively
few of these companies run in-company courses and the number trained
in this way is small.
The training institutions have begun to provide certain
types of training specifically geared to the needs of Malays. The
Programme for Executive Development (PED) run by ITM for new Malay
university graduates has already been mentioned. NPC has established
a Bumiputra Services Division which in 1975 ran 50 courses attended
by a total of 1209 participants, mainly Malay entrepreneurs and
supervisory staff; however, none of the companies in the sample
specifically mentioned using this type of NPC course, for they
preferred their Malay managers to attend courses designed for all
managers.
PROFILE OF MALAY MANAGERS
This discussion has concentrated exclusively on the private
sector's analysis and perception of the problems of racial balance in
management. To complement the picture a small sample of Malay
managers and entrepreneurs was interviewed. This consisted of 11
managers at various levels in large scale enterprizes in Kuala Lumpur
and 13 Malay companies - 3 in Kuala Lumpur, 2 in Kuantan, 4 in
Trengganu and 4 in Kota Bharu.
Many of the managers came from educationally or socially
privileged backgrounds. The fathers, or in one case uncle, of 4 of
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them were hereditary chiefs and 3 of these 4 were amongst the oldest
managers interviewed; others were teachers, government officials, a
doctor, and in 2 cases successful Malay businessmen. Only one of the
11 came from a poor rural background. The youngest manager
interviewed was born in 1948 and so completed university before the
very rapid period of expansion in the early 1970's. All the managers
had received a good secondary education - 3 of them at the Malay
College, Kuala Kangsar, and all spoke of the profound impact this had
on them and their future educational and career development; 10 of
the 11 had received a higher education, 8 of those 10 having studied
abroad, 4 of them in Britain, 3 studying law. As a group they were
thus highly educated, with considerable exposure to Western attitudes
and values. When asked about their career aspirations they were
self-confident and ambitious, as one of them put it "the sky is the
limit". The background of this group reflects the type of Malay who
succeeded in management before the Government put pressure on the
private sector, for the group were interviewed in 1972 and most of
them had already established themselves in their careers. They were
an elite group, sufficiently intelligent and able to be employed
without Government pressure but aware of the career advantages the
new emphasis on racial balance gave to them.
All were asked why they went into business. Their reasons
were varied but a common theme in their replies was a sense of
dissatisfaction with the lack of challenge in Government
employment - and a preference for the higher rewards and more rapid
advancement of the private sector. Most of them had associated with
non-Malays when they were young, usually being one of the minority of
Malays attending English secondary school. The exceptions were the
two eldest managers both of whom had previous careers in the
Government, one as a magistrate and one in the police force. Both
only entered business on retirement, the former, a prominent and
titled gentleman, by being invited by some 25 companies to sit on
their board of directors and by going into a partnership with a
Chinese, and the latter by being invited by a golfing partner to
become personnel manager of his company. Both were examples of the
Malay participation in business that was simply window dressing
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providing the company with the benefit of association with a
prominent and respected Malay who had no executive authority. Malay
directorships might be a means of transferring wealth from a wealthy
non-Malay company to a wealthy Malay but they made no real impact on
the key area of racial balance in management. However these
arrangements were clearly in the minority.
Although not typical of the village Malay, as Malays who
had been successful in entering business, this group provided a
special insight into the problems Malays faced and made a number of
suggestions as to how they might be overcome. They felt there were
many factors militating against Malays entering business. There was
Malay disinclination towards business: it was looked down upon, and
therefore the only Malays who went into business were those who could
not earn a living any other way. They also added the impact of the
Muslim religion which stresses contentment, the attitude of "be
thankful with what you have", and there was the preferred option of
Government employment which provided security, status and a good
salary and the tendency for this to be forced on Malays by the
bonding system. If they did not attain an adequate educational
standard Malays tended to be satisfied with relatively low level
jobs.
If a Malay did try to enter business there were many
difficulties to overcome: on the one hand there were the sterotypes
of the lazy Malay to live down, on the other, the Malay's own
deepseated anxiety that he might not be able to succeed, that the
stereotype, in fact, might be accurate. A number of those
interviewed had found junior managers and supervisors quick to
prejudge Malays and the problem of overcoming such prejudice was at
times so great that Malays could become demoralized, and retreat into
the security of a Government position, so tending to confirm the
stereotype. One of the most able and successful Malay managers said
that as a result of the pressure the Government was placing on
companies to employ Malays, they did not need to bother trying to
understand business. However, the main barriers Malays seem to face
are attitudinal ones - both within themselves and from the private
sector.
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They were asked how they thought the policy of racial
balance could best be implemented. Like the companies, they
emphasized the fact that because major attitudinal and educational
changes were involved it would take time, and they stressed the need
for improving the primary and secondary education of Malays
particularly in the sciences and in mathematics, exposing young
Malays to business, possible through educational television, and
bringing them into closer association with non-Malays with whom they
would have to work. Another suggestion was a pupilage scheme in
which every Malay undergraduate would be attached to a firm for a
period under the tutorage of an executive. They also stressed the
need to reform the bonding system. At least two of the managers
interviewed had bought their release from Government bonds. They
felt that while the Government was urging companies to employ Malays
it was cutting off the supply by bonding all scholarship holders to
serve the Government. Despite criticism of the pace at which the
Government was trying to correct racial balance in management they
were in favour of the policy, and felt Malays needed to be given a
chance. Greater sensitivity on the part of the business community
towards their problems would clearly help, and it was suggested for
instance that companies endeavour wherever possible to have a Malay
supervised by another Malay because of the problem of prejudice at
that level.
The managers were asked what they saw as the priorities for
improving the training of Malays, and again the reform of the
educational system was mentioned. This group seemed very conscious
of the importance of the privileged education it had received. They
urged that more residential schools be provided in the rural areas
because of the unconstructive influence of Malay upbringing which
taught children not to be interested in business. Vocational
training was recommended for kampong children who had no opportunity
of gaining any practical experience of business, unlike Chinese
children who worked in their relatives' shops after school. There was
a strong feeling that Malays should be treated identically with other
managers and should not be given special training, however, they
should be given access to a broad range of management training
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particularly at the junior and middle levels. Training mentioned as
particularly beneficial was that for the Masters Degree in Business
Administration and for Chartered Accountancy. It was suggested that
the Government should provide financial incentives to encourage the
training of Malays.
Finally they were asked their opinion of ITM and while they
all felt it was undesirable for Malays to study in an all Malay
institution, most of them were willing to concede that it was
necessary at the moment on account of the special needs of Malays and
the danger of their being demoralized by the better educational
standards of non-Malays. However, generally they thought it was a
disadvantage to be isolated from the stimulation of competition with
non-Malays, as well as gaining an understanding of their thinking,
their hopes and anxieties. The sort of closed environment ITM
provided gave Malays an unrealistic estimate of their abilities and
they expected to be immediately successful forgetting the
importance of experience.
The Malay entrepreneurs interviewed were for the most part
very different from this group of managers. The managers were
knowledgeable and articulate; the entrepreneurs were generally poorly
educated and inarticulate and this was not helped by the fact that an
interpreter had to be used for almost all of the interviews on the
East Coast. The local SEDC and MIDF officials who arranged these
interviews also did the interpretation. Most of the entrepreneurs
provide evidence of what the managers had stated: that Malays do not
go into business unless they are forced to do so by lack of
education, poverty, and the foreclosure of other alternatives. As
one of the entrepreneurs explained, he was very poor and had no
property, so he started with $10 selling tobacco, in 1972 he was the
managing director of a firm with a turnover of $2^ million. A number
had a parent or relative in business who had started a small
enterprize and they continued this, expanding with the help of a
Government loan.
The level of education and business knowledge amongst these
small Malay businessmen was so low that while they needed training it
had to be especially geared to their situation. One of the
businessmen expressed the position of this group when he said that he
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was apprehensive about training because he knew so little he felt it
would be strange and he would not understand it and that his English
would not be good enough. Training would therefore have to be very
rudimentary and practical, it had to be in Malay and organized on the
East Coast. The two main areas of need were in finance and
accounting, including basic book-keeping, and in marketing where the
need was particularly strong.
The Malay companies interviewed in Kuala Lumpur were very
different. Since it was a tiny sample few conclusions can be drawn,
but two of the three operated in a highly competitive commercial
manner employing Chinese staff "because it is the cheapest and most
efficient labour on the market", and eschewing Malay graduates
because "the pay is too low, they don't last". The third was a MARA
owned company and its most striking feature was the youth and almost
total lack of business experience of any of the managers on the
staff. MARA was paying the company's training bill which meant the
amount of training for a small company was lavish yet it did not
appear to include practical business training, and concentrated on
courses for a management team in which there was certainly no
shortage of theoretical knowledge. Not surprisingly the company was
running in the red.
This small set of interviews highlighted some of the
problems of Malay companies, most of which are so small that they
fall outside the scope of this study and require special training
programmes which MARA and NPC are trying to provide. More important
were the interviews with managers that reflected many of the same
preoccupations as the companies, though from a different angle, and
drew attention to the very real attitudinal problems of Malays,
indeed any group in a similar position, trying to break out of a
stereotyped position. There is a strong tendency for the individual
to live up to the expectations made of him and the Malay has to
overcome this tendency and his own fears that he may not be up to it.
6 See R. Rosenthal and L. Jacobson, Pygmalion in the Classroom
for a report of research carried out on school children
revealing the extent to which teachers' expectations of
pupils' intelligence affects their performance, regardless of
what their real intelligence is.
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The Malay community has suffered from an inferiority complex as a
result of its long impoverishment and it is this which often makes
young managerial recruits appear overconfident. The Malay managers
interviewed had excellent educational credentials and were well into
successful careers, but they were not insensitive to this situation.
The problem of developing managers drawn from a community
with peasant characteristics that has no previous orientation towards
business is one many countries face. In Malaysia a solution to this
problem is made all the more urgent by the short timescale imposed by
the Government in the NEP. Inevitably some companies try to evade
the problem through 'window-dressing', but larger companies are
obliged to take the problem seriously on account of the large numbers
of managers involved and the crucial impact they can have on the
overall wellbeing of the company. European and multinational
companies are in an excellent position to find possible solutions and
have both the motivation and the training expertise. However, the
atmosphere of Malay privilege and political expediency that form the
context in which this takes place while perhaps necessary to enforce
such major changes, makes the task more difficult. In the opinion of
the companies involved the main problem is not one of intellectual or
educational deficiency, although as university standards appear to be
falling this may well be the case in the future, nor is it a problem
of management skills, in that there are some indications that Malays
may be better suited to certain management skills than non-Malays,
and in any case these companies have a good deal of experience in
providing training in such skills. The main problem appears to be
one of cultural attitudes. In restructuring Malaysian society the
Government is trying to bring about a major social revolution, to
transform a largely poor, ill-educated, rural, traditional society
into a predominantly affluent, urban, industrial modern one - all in
the course of 20 years. In 1972, shortly after the announcement of
the NEP, the most common reaction of companies was of near disbelief:
such a major change could not be effected in so short a period, and
required greater time; by 1976 it had become quite clear that the
Government was in earnest and the time allowed to achieve its end was
up to 1990.
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So what are the elements conducive to changing attitudes
from peasant to modern ? Reference to the characteristics of
'modern' man proposed by sociologists suggest that he is
characterized as taking a scientific rational approach to his life
and environment and to the acquisition of knowledge. The Government,
aware of the need for this particular attitude change has included in
the Rukunegara a committment "to building a progressive society which
shall be oriented to modern science and technology", and is giving
special attention to the teaching of science in schools. 'Modern
man' has a broader view of the world and his position in relation to
it, with an openness and adaptability to change - a condition not
fostered in Malaysia by the highly controlled press the Government
finds necessary given the tensions produced by the NEP. Urbanization
and the subsequent tendency towards nuclear families are further
features at one point taken so seriously that the mass urbanization
of Malays was suggested, but this would have aggravated the already
serious problem of urban unemployment and was later abandoned in
favour of a campaign to modernize the countryside. In contrast to a
peasant society in which status is ascribed, in a modern society
status must be achieved. In the case of Malays, the Government has
accorded them a wide range of privileges including access to higher
education and prestigious jobs in management or Government. This
appears to be the exact opposite of a modern society. Yet it is
probably the only way that Malaysian society can be 'restructured'
within the prescribed timescale. This does indicate that while the
Government is aware of the need for a mental revolution in order to
accomplish its social revolution, the very means it uses, (possibly
has to use - it is hard to see genuine alternatives,) are working
against its ends.
Companies in the private sector confront immediately the
problem, and are obliged to find a solution, despite many
complicating factors. While there may be no proven relationship
between academic and managerial success, Toyne's finding that higher
education makes the manager more receptive to some Western management
concepts'' is a powerful argument in favour of the practice of
7 Refer Chapter 2, p 19.
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recruiting Malays with higher education. Participating in rational
problem-solving both on the job and through external courses would
also appear to be a beneficial form of training, as is the use of
overseas training with the broader view it brings, the exposure to
different perspectives, and the fostering of that capacity for
empathy with the positions of others to which both Lerner and
g
McClelland refer. Larger companies in Malaysia are already engaged
in these forms of training, although the high turnover of Malay
managers is proving to be a strong discouraging factor.
Given the importance of training) if the country's
restructuring objectives are to be achieved without a slowdown in
economic growth,aGovernment subsidy for the training of Malays would
make a good deal of sense. It would relieve the larger companies of
the burden of providing a training ground for Malays for both medium
to small companies and the public sector. While they are
well-equipped to train Malay managers inevitably the cost involved of
training over and above the needs as they do will be a deterrent. An
alternative approach would be a levy-grant system, modelled on the
British levy-grant scheme, such as was recommended to the Malaysian
9
Government in 1972 in the report by Hunt and Conway. This would
provide a means whereby all companies contributed to the training of
Malays with those companies that actually did the training able to
claim the cost of this from the central pool.
Whatever means are found of accelerating the development of
Malay managers will be of great use and importance in solving similar
problems in other parts of the world. This is an area that is so
important both in the Malaysian and the international context that
considerable research effort should be directed towards it.
8 Refer Chapter 2, pp. 31-32.




This study of management development in Malaysia
illustrates the impact not only of local social and economic
conditions but also of historical and political factors on the
problems of developing a managerial cadre in a developing country.
The period of British rule in Malaya has been shown to have
had a profound impact on the present context of management
development. When the British intervened in Malaya in the 1870's
they found a feudal Malay society and an economy based on subsistence
agriculture and fishing. The British Government recognized the Malay
Sultans as the rightful rulers of the peninsula and governed through
them in order to minimize disruption to Malay society. However,
British intervention was motivated primarily by economic
considerations and their coming heralded a period of rapid economic
development. The peninsular was rich in tin and was found to be well
suited to the cultivation of rubber, and later, oil palm.
The Malays showed no desire to work in the mines or on
plantations, so were encouraged to continue their traditional
pursuits; as a result it was necessary to import labour and
management, and Malaya witnessed the influx of three entrepreneurial
groups - the British, Chinese, and Indians. All three came with
varying degrees of commercial and technological sophistication. The
Chinese, brought financial and mutual aid associations, trade guilds,
mining and smelting expertise, attitudes and values highly supportive
of commercial activity and an astonishing capacity for thrift and
hard work. While many of the Indians came as low caste labourers and
remained so, others came from the middle classes: merchants, money
lenders, civil servants and professionals who brought commercial
expertise, a familiarity with British rule, proficiency in English
and an appreciation of the benefits of English education. The
British contributed advanced technology in the form of the tin dredge
and smelting techniques, financial institutions, in particular the
joint stock company that enabled them to mobilize the financial
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resources of Britain, and the managerial ability to operate on a
large scale, notably through managing agencies. These three groups
came to dominate specific segments of the economy: the British, large
scale activities - estate agriculture, tin-dredging and smelting, and
import-export; the Chinese, small scale activities - tin mining, the
wholesale and retail trade, and light industry; and the Indians,
money-lending, parts of the wholesale and retail trade, certain
branches of the civil service, and the professions. Through their
efforts and with the active encouragement of the Government, Malaya
grew to become the largest producer of tin and rubber in the world.
In the meantime, the traditional sector languished. The
introduction of a monetary economy resulted in the growth of
indebtedness among Malays and rural Malay schools were designed to
encourage traditional pursuits. In Malay society the aristocracy
alone was provided with an education, and a role to play in the new
economy, and that was specifically oriented towards Government.
On independence when Britain returned the rule of Malaya to
the Malays, the ownership and management of the economy lay firmly in
the hands of Europeans, Chinese and Indians. The new Government
sought to accelerate the pace of economic development and diversify
the economy through industrialization, and the attraction of foreign
capital, and it was highly successful. However, it was the non-Malay
groups that had the financial resources, education, and technical and
managerial expertise to take advantage of this and the gap between
Malays and non-Malays grew even wider. In 1969 this situation
erupted in racial violence which brought a complete reassessment and
reorientation of Government policy. This was articulated in the New
Economic Policy (NEP).
The introduction of the NEP with the Second Malaysia Plan
in 1971 forms the principal backdrop to this study. The Government
is determined to change the social and economic structure so that by
1980 Malays own 30 per cent of the economy and Malay employment in
all sectors, at all levels, reflects their proportion in the
population. The Government's intention is that these targets be met
through rapid economic growth. At the same time it has ensured
preferences for Malay businessmen and obliged companies to correct
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the racial imbalance in their ownership and management. The period
of this study is thus one of rapid change in which political factors
are of great importance in establishing the priorities for management
development.
The need for management development in Malaysia is both
real and urgent given the level of economic growth the Government
hopes to achieve. The development of dynamic managers in a rapidly
growing economy needs to be deliberately undertaken if supply is to
keep up with demand.
Management in Malaysia has been dominated by the Europeans,
Chinese and Indians. Since independence most European-held posts
have been Malaysianized and this put pressure on foreign companies to
develop local managers. While the technical skills of Chinese and
Indians were said to be excellent, their entrepreneurial skills did
not always suit them to the needs of large European and multinational
concerns, and this has had to be taken into account in designing
management development.
Since 1971 there has been the added necessity of developing
a cadre of Malay managers. This has been hampered by the shortage of
Malays with the necessary skills and education, the lack of business
orientation of Malays, their preference for Government employment,
and the early reluctance of companies to employ Malay managers, a
reluctance that has now begun to break down.
The diversification of the economy into manufacturing
brought an influx of foreign firms drawn by the political and social
stability of the country, favourable investment incentives, and
bright economic prospects. Local industry also responded to the new
opportunities in manufacturing. This brought a growing demand for
managers with technical and professional skills. In contrast, the
older industries of tin and rubber were growing very slowly, if at
all, with tin reserves being worked out and rubber facing severe
competition from synthetics, and often being replanted with the more
remunerative oil palm. While management was becoming increasingly
professional there was little room in these industries for expansion.
309
In Malaysia the large multinational companies stand out as
making by far the greatest contribution to management development.
Because they take a long term view of their business involvement in
the country they plan well ahead for the managerial requirements of
the company. They were also the companies most sensitive to the
priorities of the Government in developing Malay managers. There is
no reason to think Malaysia is a special case here and developing
countries should take into account the positive contribution
multinational companies make to management development in assessing
this group.
One criticism that can be directed against multinational
companies is that in developing local managers they seemed to be more
interested in adapting managers' values and attitudes to those of the
company than the fusion of interests about which Bakke and Argyris
wrote. This adaptation on the part of the manager does not appear to
be reciprocated by the company. The determining factors in this are
likely to be the need multinationals feel for a standard,
company-wide approach to management, and a belief that the Western
approach provides the best possible model, and for a head office
located in the West probably the only possible system. How this
influences the effectiveness of managers is not known.
Theoretically, it should mean that the aims of the individual manager
and the company are likely to be at variance and the individual will
therefore not find the personal fulfilment in his work that is
considered important for a high level of motivation. Further
research is needed to establish whether this does in fact take place.
European trading houses and managing agencies were
conservative in their management style and this was reflected in
their approach to management development. Nonetheless, the managing
agencies had developed systematic management training for new
recruits and provided limited trading at middle management level.
The trading houses seemed to direct the preponderance of their
training to their technical requirements and to carry out little
planned management development, a situation reinforced by their
anxiety about their future in the country. However, both groups were
going through a period of change and reorientation, and the agency
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houses in particular were moving into new industries which required
new skills and consequently new types of training. The main
criticism to be levelled at these companies is that they tend to
limit themselves to training, carrying out as yet little management
development in the broadest sense of the term; that is, providing a
range of learning experiences, with feedback on performance
progressively to develop a manager to his full potential. The slow
rate of growth of the managing agencies has hindered this but the
trading houses will need to consider implementing such a programme to
meet the technical and managerial requirements of their new ventures.
Small local Chinese and Indian firms were in a difficult
position. Their traditional activities were slowly being undermined
by Government preferences to Malays and by the younger generation's
reluctance to enter such establishments. They were faced with the
need to change in order to take advantage of new opportunities but
did not have the technical and managerial skills required and found
the training available inaccessible and ill-suited to their needs.
While such traditional entrepreneurial groups have been good at
developing entrepreneurial skills, and the pressures on them at
present are likely to produce even greater drive and imaginative
business flair, they have not previously needed, and consequently
have not known how best, to develop management skills. This is a
segment of the business community with a great deal of natural
potential, a segment which is both labour intensive and regionally
distributed and should be given more assistance to acquire managerial
and technical skills.
Greater cooperation between small and large firms, such as
found in the 'TOP' movement in France, could help to show these
companies the technical and practical benefits for them of management
development; at present they remain largely unconvinced. ('TOP',
Technique, Organisation, Productivity, is a co-operative movement
between small to medium-sized firms and large firms involving:
1) Joint management training,
2) Individual help in applying modern management methods,
3) Collective assistance in using methods and machinery, and
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4) The exchange of experiences and visits to the specialised
services of large firms.)^
Through close association with a large well-managed firm
with a well-planned system of management development these small
local companies may be helped to see its applicability in their
situation.
The educational system is going through a period of rapid
expansion which is solving the problem of the scarcity of
professionals required by the private sector. However, it appears to
have led to lower standards and exaggerated aspirations for
graduates. Both problems are likely to solve themselves as the rate
of growth of the educational system levels off and supply of
graduates begin to meet the demand. A problem likely to remain is
the shortage of technical and other sub-professional trainees. There
has been no growth of technical colleges and polytechnics to parallel
the expansion of universities, yet this is an area where there is a
clear demand. The fact that ITM has resisted pressure on it to be
upgraded to university status is commendable, for it is one of the
few institutions aimed at meeting this need.
In Malaysian industry there is a tendency for certain
fields to become surfeited with too many companies chasing too small
a market; in the training sphere this also appears to have happened.
While the entrepreneurship and enthusiasm of the various training
organizations is encouraging, the market is still relatively small.
The two main training organisations - MIM and NPC - have developed
largely complementary areas of specialisation and it would be
preferable to bring smaller organisations under their wings rather
than have tfotucompete against each other.
However, some reorientation is required to provide for the
needs of the small local firms. The bulk of the training currently
provided is geared to the medium to large companies which can well
1 B.P. Bodin, "An Experiment in Co-operation between Large, Small
and Medium-sized Enterprises in France: The TOP Movement,"
Promotion of Small and Medium-Sized Firms in Developing
Countries through Collective Actions. OECD. pp.245-249.
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look after themselves. Having already begun to cater for small-scale
industry NPC is ideally placed to develop this service further, and
the pattern of co-operation between NPC and local trade organisations
to ensure that the courses are relevant to their needs is one that is
worth extending. However, more work is required to adapt largely
western oriented course material to local needs.
MIM is well placed to cater for large scale business, and
in particular to persuade senior managers of the importance and
utility of developing their managerial cadres. It has already
entered the field of research with the support it gave to this study
and this could fruitfully be extended. There is a need for
particular attention to be paid by both training institutions to the
relevance and practicality of their courses.
Both MIM and NPC are involved in some consultancy work.
Through the extension of this facility they can work with companies
to devise management training tailored to the individual requirements
of firms. In order to carry out their roles both organizations
require the highest calibre of staff for they must be able to retain
the confidence of practising managers who may have a great deal more
practical experience than the teachers do themselves. The use of
visiting specialists received a good deal of criticism because of
their ignorance of the local situation and consequent inability to
relate theory to the immediate needs of businessmen to Malaysia.
Finally, there is the problem of racial balance. The
social changes the Government seeks to bring about are so enormous
they amount to a social revolution, and this has inevitably placed
stresses and strains on the whole of Malaysian society, but most of
the problems the business community faces will solve themselves in
time.
However, there are a number of problems that are likely to
remain. The Government's emphasis on developing Malay entrepreneurs
is unlikely to prove successful since none of the home conditions a
Malay faces assist him in acquiring the values of industry, diligence
and frugality, and the business acumen characteristic of the
entrepreneur. The many preferences offered Malays undermine these
values and reinforce 'peasant' attitudes. It would be more sensible
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to develop the strengths of Malays rather than insist on correcting
their weaknesses; to develop their already proven administrative
abilities rather than to dwell on fostering entrepreneurship; to
insist on racial balance in management, but not in all areas of
management; to seek the global target, and not the individual for
Malay managers themselves have preferences and inclinations born out
of culture and education which are not insignificant. The
Government's racial balance policies have been highly successful in
forcing companies to provide Malays with an opportunity to prove
themselves and in persuading firms to experiment with the best ways
of developing managerial skills amongst Malay recruits. However,
little is known about the complex process of creating
entrepreneurship and this is not within the scope of a management
development programme.
The development of Malay managers has tended to fall mainly
on the large multinational companies who have the knowledge and
expertise to undertake this. However, they have unwittingly taken on
the task on behalf of the entire private sector which cheerfully
poaches the products. The contribution of these companies is so
important to the host country it needs to be recognized, and this
could be done by arranging financial support through outright
Government grants or through a levy/grant system.
The aim of this thesis was to examine the practice of
management in Peninsular Malaysia and this has been carried out by a
careful examination of the complex factors influencing the present
situation, and the policies and practices of a representative sample
of the companies involved.
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Appendix A
TERMS OF REFERENCE OF ORIGINAL STUDY
The terms of reference established by the Economic Planning Unit
within the Prime Minister's Department of the Government of Malaysia
were as follows:
1. Ascertain the needs for development of management skills,
in the medium and long terms, in the private sector in Malaysia.
For this purpose, "management" is defined to extend from senior
executive to middle management (supervisory) level.
2. Review the existing facilities and programmes for
management training available to Malaysians and assess the
adequacy of these facilities and programme to meet the needs
identified in para. 1 above.
3. Recommend effective measures to meet the management needs
of the private sector, including programmes to continuously
upgrade management performance.
4. In carrying out the study (to be completed within 6
months),
(i) regard shall be had to studies and programmes underway or
contemplated for management development in the public
sector.
(ii) special attention shall be paid to the development of
management skills and managerial personnel among Malays and
other indigneous people.
(iii) periodic consultations must be undertaken with a steering
committee that has been established for this purpose, under
the Chairmanship of Y.M. Raja Tan Sri Mohar bin Raja
Badiozaman, Secretary-General to the Treasury.
APPENDIX B
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LETTERS SENT TO COMPANIES IN THE SAMPLE. 1972 and 1976
YAYASAN PENGURUSAN MALAYSIA
(Malaysian iNnmrr* or management)
TMOKAT no*. DCuraCM . AJ1AT19CH1 BAML
II. LUOH AMEANO. KUALA UIHIUL MALAYSIA.
TAUOKAMl MANAGEMENT KUALA LUMSUK.' TAUMN MMI
yANODl-rmUA: WtOUtVU: SETIA USAHA KEHORMAT
'.M. RAJA TAN Ml MOHAK UN ENCHB I. P. WILLEY TUAN SYED ASATALJA FEJ
Study of Management Development Needs
in West Maloysia
We are writing to seek your co-operation in a study which
we are making of management development needs in West Malaysia. This
is a matter of common concern to both government and business, and this
study is being made on the invitation of the Government of Malaysia and
the Malaysian Institute of Management.
Our aims are two-foldi
1. to identify the management development needs
of the business community, taking particular account
of the national concern for racial balance; and
2. to determine the degree to which these needs are
already being met.
As a result, we hope to be able to establish priorities for
the future growth of management education and training which will be of
assistance to the Government, the training institutions and to business
itself. To this end, all the companies participating will receive a copy of
the report.
The method we are following is to take a sample of
companies, and yours is among those selected. We hope, therefore,
that you will agree (i) to complete the enclosed brief questionnaire,
and (ii) to give us an interview. The information given in both cases
will be treated in strict confidence.
The questionnaire is designed to give us a picture
of the size and characteristics of your company's management. For
this purpose, we have defined a manager as an executive above the
grade of foreman or supervisor, who contributes to the decision-making
process, exercises some control over the use of resources and, in some
way, directs the activity of others.
In the interview we should like to discuss management
development practices and policies in your company, taking the term
"management development" to refer not only to attendance on courses
but to all that goes into developing a man's ability as a manager. We
shall be particularly Interested in any recommendations you may have
for the Improvement of management training facilities In Malaysia.
We hove written to you perionqll)r because we believe
management development to be a matter of great concern to top
management, We shall appreciate your co-operation and Miss Conway
will telephone shortly to arrange an appointment; the-questionnaire can be
returned at this time.











Study of Management Development Needs
In West Malaysia
I address you with a request for the cooperation of you and your organisation
in an important study of management development needs in West Malaysia which is being
conducted at the request of the Malaysian Government in conjunction with the Malaysian
Institute of Management. I am therefore writing to you in a three-fold capacity, not only
on beholf of the Government but also as President of MIM and the Chairman of the official
Steering Committee for the study which involves both public and private sector representatives.
The study is being conducted by Professor Norman C. Hunt, who as you know
is the Professor of Business Studies at the University of Edinburgh. He is being assisted by
Miss Bryony M. Conway, a Research Associate at the same university. Their aims are
straightforward: Firstly, to identify the management development needs of the business
community in Malaysia, and secondly, to determine the degree to which facilities are at
present meeting those needs. The aim of the study is to establish the priorities for developing
management education, which would be of benefit both to Government and private sector
institutions which are involved in forward planning in this respect. This is a modern technique
which characterises, progressive management and the benefits to be gained are of value not
only to the individuals and their organisations but also to the business community and the
country as a whole. It is for these reasons that the Government has given full support to
this study.
Such matters are naturally of considerable concern to topmost management in
every organisation. It has not been possible to approach all organisations, but a selected
sampling of organisations in West Malaysia has been taken. Your organisation is included in
this group and I would be grateful for your personal cooperation, as well as that of your senior
executives who may be concerned, in permitting some simple questions to be asked about
general matters, such as the size and characteristics of management in your organisation.
This will not take much time from the busy day of senior executives, and I can assure you
that what you can make available by way of time and information can be viewed as a sound
investment in providing and building for a better future in terms of your organisation, your
particular sector and the upgrading and improvement of facilities and services for educating
and training managers who have a key role to play in the development of the country.
Having regard to the objectives and benefits of the study I am sure the private
sector leaders and fop managers will respond positively to this concern, which is shared by the
public as well as private sectors, for identifying needs and determining priorities in developing
our human resources. May I therefore request that you kindly permit Miss Conway on interview
with you yourself, which will not take long, and which will be based on a short factual question¬
naire. Thereafter, she may find it useful to talk with some of your senior managers who are in¬
volved in personnel, training and management development responsibilities in your organisation.
You may be assured that we would not wish to touch on anything which you would
consider confidential, and that in the final study to be published, your wishes in this regard
would be fully respected.







(Raja Tan Sri Mohar bin Raja Badiozamo v






WILLIAM ROBERTSON BUILDING, 5 O GEORGESQU A RE, EDINBURGH EH 8 9 J Y
from Professor Norman C.IIunt 031-667 1011 0x16577
Dear
Study of Management Development Needs
in West Malaysia
You will recall that on April 20, 1972 Raja Tan Sri Ilohar bin Raja
Badiozaman, Special Adviser to the Prime Minister, wrote to you asking
for your co-operation in a study of management development needs which
my colleague, Miss Bryony Conway, and I were conducting at the request
of the Malaysian Government. We are most grateful for the assistance
you gave us both in completing the questionnaire and in taking time out
of busy days to discuss your management development programmes with us.
On the basis of this research we submitted a report to the Government
in which we made recommendations about the provision of training
facilities in Malaysia. This we .intended to forward to you. However,
it has unfortunately not yet been released by those bodies considering
it. We understand that some of the recommendations have been
implemented while others are still under discussion.
Four yearn have passed since then, and both the manpower and
training situations have changed a good deal. We, therefore, now
propose to do a follow-up to the original study. Once again this is
undertaken with the approval of the Prime Minister's Department.
We shall not be able personally to interview 100% of the companies in
the original sample, so we should be most grateful if you could complete
the attached questionnaire and return it, as indicated, to Miss Bryony
Conway by 23rd. July. She will be interviewing half the companies in
the original sample and should she contact you I would be most grateful
if you could once again spare the time to discuss your management
development programme with her.
May I assure you that strictest confidentiality will be observed
and data will only be presented in aggregated form.
Yours sincerely,
Professor Norman C. Hunt










Study of Management Development Needs
in West Malaysia
On April 20, 1972 I wrote to you regarding a study of
Management Development Needs being conducted by Professor Hunt and
Miss Conway of Edinburgh University on behalf of the Government with
the support of the Malaysian Institute of Management. I was
extremely gratified by the response and the results of the study
greatly assisted Government in assessing management development needs
and in formulating governmental action. They are now in the process
of conducting a follow-up to that initial study and I understand
Professor Hunt has already written to you on June 30 or July 1 in
connection with this. Given the importance of developing a strong
managerial cadre, particularly in the light of The Third Malaysia
Plan, I would once again seek your whole hearted support to this
study, and specifically to complete the questionnaire sent to you and
to grant Miss Conway an interview should she request it.
2. Should you have any queries regarding the study could you
please contact Miss Conway at the Malaysian Institute of Management,
15th Floor, Fitzpatrick1s Building, Jalan Raja Chulan, Kuala Lumpur.
05-10, telephone: 206619/206620.
Yours sincerely
(RAJA TAN SRI MOHAR)






PART II. MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT POLICIES
7. General approach to management development
(a) definition of goals (articulation)
(b) forward planning
(c) quantification of goals (Ref. forecasts)
(d) racial balance
1971 1977 1982
No. of managers (Ref. 3)
No. of Malay managers








8. Recruitment & Selection




Ref. 5 Trends Rating
Recruitment incr. deer, static 4321 TOTAL


















c) systematic training for succession
d) planning for racial balance
10. Objectives & Appraisal
a) quantification of performance
objectives
b) systematic performance appraisal





11. Training & Evaluation
(a) Regular assessment of training
needs
(b) appropriateness and integration
of training experience
(c) evaluation of training and
follow-up
(d) racial balance
Assessment of training and development needs
job analysis
manpower and succession planning
performance appraisal




special training geared to needs
support for further education
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PART III TRAINING METHODS (Ref. #6)








































Role:- in conjunction with systematic in-company training
in lieu of any in-company training
supplementary to in-company training where such
courses difficult to lay on
Use





PART IV: Training Institutions















19. University of Malaya








Ungku Omar Polytechnic, Ipoh.




PART V: FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS
21. Priorities for improvement of management training facilities
in your firm
22. Priorities for improvement of management training facilities
in Malaysia
Advanced management course at the University of Malaya (perhaps
8-9 months)
Evening courses at the University of Malaya, MalaysiahInstitute




23. Special problems, if any, arising from the government's policies
regarding increasing the proportion of Malays in management
24. Special training facilities needed in order to effect this policy.




INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR MALAY MANAGERS
1. Name:
2. Year of birth:
3. Home Background:
i) Place where you grew up:
ii) Parents' (or surrogate parents') education:
Father
Mo the r
iii) Parents' (or surrogate parents') education
Fa the r
Mo the r
4. Primary school(s) attended and medium of instruction:




7. Any government or state bonded scholarships
Yes/No
If so, did you fulfil your bond
buy your way out
were you released
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8. Age at which you took up full-time paid employment:
9. Companies or organisations for which you have worked and positions
held:
Company/Organisation Position Years
10. Description of your current position:
Title:
Number of subordinates answerable to you:
Person to whom you report regularly on your work:
Brief description of responsibilities:
Any emoluments received over and above salary:-
car/car allowance
house/housing allowance
Salary range (if willing) in M$/month:
1,000 - 1,500 2,500 - 3,000
1,500 - 2,000 3,000 - 4,000
2,000 - 2,500 4,000 & above
11. What do you understand by the term "management development" ?
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12. Post experience training (including diploma/degree courses):
Course Relevance/Usefulness
(at least 1 weeks in length) Year 432 1
4 = excellent 2 = poor
3 = satisfactory 1 = no relevance/usefulness
whatsoever









14. Career expectations for the future:
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16. What prompted you to go into business ?
17. How do you think the Government's policy of increasing Malay
participation in business can best be implemented ?
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18. What is your view of exclusively Malay training such as that
offered by MARA as a preparation for business ?
19. What do you consider the priorities for the provision of training
facilities or courses for Malay managers ?
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QUESTIONNAIRES, 1972 APPENDIX D
SURVEY OF MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT NEEDS IN MALAYSIA
1. Name and address of company or establishment:
2. Total number of employees on 31.12.71:




iii) estimate for 31.12.76





Note: A manager is defined as an executive above the grade of foreman
or supervisor who contributes to the decision-making process,
exercises some control over the use of resources and in some
way directs the activities of others
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5. Number of managers and executives (including executive trainees
but excluding expatriates) recruited from the following sources in
the years 1969, 1970.
NB: Care should be taken not to count the same people twice






















Total number of managers (including management trainees) who have
undergone management training during 1971 by the following
methods:-
Number of Managers Trained
Types of Training Malay Chinese Indian Other
Systematic on-the-job training
In-company courses each of at
least one week's duration (or
equivalent)
External courses each of at




Number of managers who






SURVEY OF MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT NEEDS IN MALAYSIA
PART VI: TRAINING QUESTIONNAIRE
Please complete the table below filling in:
(a) Total number of managers (including executive trainees)
who have been sent on the following courses in 1971
(b) Number of managers you expect to send on the following
courses in five years' time.
(c) Your assessment of those courses on which you have
sent people:
4 = outstanding
3 = entirely satisfactory
2 = weak
1 = very poor
(c)
Course Rating
















Courses No. of Estimated




Courses No. of Estimated Course £cd"incj
Managers No. of Mgrs 4321
in 1976
6. Introduction to Production
Management
7. Industrial Relations








11. Statistical Methods for
Business Management
Residential Courses
12 Harvard Advanced Management
Course
13. Harvard Middle Management
Course




Industrial Engineering and Light
Industry Service Section:
1. (i) Work Study Part I
(ii) Work Study Part II
2. Preventive Maintenance
3. Maintenance Management
4. Production Planning and
Control




Courses No. of Estimated Course fljcrfmg
Managers No. of Mgrs 4321
in 1976
6. Job Simplification






10. Modern Management Development
and Training







16. Sales Management & Marketing
17. Export Promotion
Management Development:
18. Pimpinan dan Perhubongan
Sama2 Manusia
19. Penyelia Sabagia Pelateh
dan Pengajar
20. Leadership & Human Relations
21. Supervisor as a Trainer
& Instructor





4 3 2 1
Courses No. of Estimated
Managers No. of Mgrs
in 1976
23. Elements of Management
Control
24. Executive Decision Making
25. Executive Training
26. Managerial Function
27. Modern Management Development
Industrial Relations:
28. Management of Labour
Relations for Junior
Managers
29. Management of Labour
Relations for Senior
Managers
30. Management of Labour
Relations for Managers
& Trade Union Executives
31. Management of Labour
Relations - An Advanced
Course
32. Labour Relations for Top
& Senior Executives
33. Industrial Relations for
Trade Union Executives
34. Industrial Relations for
Supervisors
35. Industrial Conflicts &
Remedies
Tailor-Made Courses
36. Plantation Management for
Managers




Courses No. of Estimated Course
Managers No. of Mgrs 4321
in 1976





PART VII: MANAGEMENT TRAINING PREFERENCES
1. Length
Level 2-3 1-2 One Three Longer Evening Other































QUESTIONNAIRE, 1976 APPENDIX E
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL
SURVEY OF MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT NEEDS IN WEST MALAYSIA
Please complete and return this questionnaire by July 23, 1976
to Miss Bryony Conway at
Malaysian Institute of Management




A manager is defined as an executive above the grade of foreman or
supervisor who contributes to the decision-making process,
exercises some control over the use of resources, and in some way
directs the activities of others. Throughout this questionnaire
the term manager is understood to include management trainees.
Name and address of company or establishment:
2. Total number of employees on 31.12.75:
(For your reference the figure you quoted
in your 1971 return was
3. Total number of managers (including
Executives and executive trainees)
(i) on 31.12.75
(ii) estimate for 31.12.80









Number of managers (excluding expatriates)
recruited from each source in 1975











* If you have recruited managers from university or technical college
please list the institutions where they were trained
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6. What is the position/title of the person responsible for the
training and development of managers in your company ?
7. How do you select managers for training and the types of training
they require ?
8. Total number of managers who have undergone any form of







9. Types of training Number of managers undergoing each
type of training in 1975*
Malay Chinese Indian Other
Systematic on-the-job training
Local in-company courses each




It is understood that any one man might have gone on various
different types of training and therefore these figures will
not add up to those given in 8.
10. If you run any local in-company courses for your managers in
1975, please list these below:






11. If you have sent any managers on external courses in Malaysia






12. Please describe any overseas training on which you sent managers
in 1975, its duration, its nature, the managerial level of those





Rate your satisfaction with the training











excellent satisfactory disappointing had
excellent satisfactory disappointing bad
excellent satisfactory disappointing bad
excellent satisfactory disappointing bad
excellent satisfactory disappointing bad
excellent satisfactory disappointing bad
excellent satisfactory disappointing bad
(If necessary continue
overleaf)
14. How do you think the training provided by the post-experience
training institutions above could be improved to meet your needs ?
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15. Do you have any formal system for assessing the performance of
your managers?
a) If yes, please describe what formal system(s) you use
b) If no, please describe the way in which you assess their
performance
16. What do you consider the priorities for the improvement of
management training in your company
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17. Management Training Preferences
i) Length
(Please tick the most suitable length of course for your
company at each level of management)
Level 2-3 1-2 One Three Longer Evening Other





(Please tick the subject areas in which you would like courses
to be organised and the levels at which you would like to see
them provided)
Level





















Sales Training & Control
Forecasting
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